Gacaca courts versus the international criminal tribunal for Rwanda and national courts: lessons to learn from the Rwandan justice approaches to genocide by Wibabara, Charity
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN CAPE 
 
 
TOPIC: GACACA COURTS VERSUS THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA AND NATIONAL 
COURTS: LESSONS TO LEARN FROM THE RWANDAN 
JUSTICE APPROACHES TO GENOCIDE 
 
 
BY: CHARITY WIBABARA 
LL.B (National University of Rwanda); LL.M (University of Western 
Cape, South Africa) 
 
 
SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR DR GERHARD WERLE 
 
 
A Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Law (LLD) in the Faculty of Law, University of the 
Western Cape, South Africa 
 
                                       2013
  
 
 
i 
 
 
PLAGIARISM DECLARATION 
I, Charity Wibabara, hereby declare that the work presented in this thesis entitled ‘Gacaca Courts 
versus the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and National Courts: Lessons to Learn 
from the Rwandan Justice Approaches to Genocide’ is original. It has never been presented 
before in the University of Western Cape or any other University. Where other people’s works 
have been used, references have been provided. 
 
Signature:                  ……………………….. 
                                   Charity WIBABARA 
Date:   …................................ 
 
  
 
 
ii 
 
DEDICATION 
 
To the Almighty God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob for his effective grace on me, 1 Corinthians 
15:10-11 
 
I lovingly dedicate this thesis to my husband Arakaza Fleury Davy (Trèsor) for supporting me 
each step of the way. It is also dedicated to my precious son Arakaza Gisa Yan-Fael. 
Thank you Trèsor for the endless love, patience and understanding during the period of study 
 
Dad and Mum, Thank you very much for the investment in my education: Tubisangire Twese 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Writing a Ph.D thesis can be a long and difficult process, and many people helped me along the 
way.  I wish to extend my deepest appreciation to each of the following people for their support. 
 
First and foremost, I wish to thank my supervisor, Professor Dr. Gerhard Werle, Head of the 
Transnational Criminal Justice and Crime Prevention Program and Professor of German and 
International Criminal Law, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. His wide knowledge, insightful 
comments and sage advice from the formative stages of this thesis, to the final draft aided me in 
innumerable ways. Just like in my LLM thesis, Prof Werle has been the ideal LLD supervisor for 
this study. Throughout the process he provided me with intellectual inspiration and exposed me 
to his wealth of theoretical and practical knowledge in the field of International Criminal Law.  It 
is also with immense gratitude that I appreciate Prof Dr. Lovell Fernandez for his sound advice 
and constructive comments while in South Africa, particularly in regard to Transitional Justice.  
 
I would also like to express my sincere appreciation to Dr. Paul Bornkamm for his persistent 
guidance, research materials, suggestions and extensive comments on my work. His views and 
detailed discussions around my work have provided much needed criticism and suggestions for 
improvements. Special thanks as well to Dr. Moritz Vormbaum, the coordinator of the program 
who has always been there to listen and give valuable assistance in so many ways. I appreciate 
his initial helpful comments on my first chapters.  I would be remiss without mentioning Frau 
Anja Schepke for the steadfast support, especially in regard to administrative work and needs. 
 
Though a Ph.D thesis may appear to be solitary work, to complete a study of this magnitude 
requires a network of support, and I am indebted to my friends and colleagues, especially 
Windell, for the administrative assistance, collaboration, and various ideas shared. Sosteness, 
Samantha, and Tania also deserve acknowledgement. In particular, Juliet’s friendship, 
encouragement, and discussions during the study period was greatly needed and profoundly 
appreciated. 
 
  
 
 
iv 
 
My deepest appreciation goes to my husband and child. Both of these men provided me with the 
needed moral support and reasons to be happy. They have endured a lot due to my research 
abroad. With their daily encouragement and understanding, I was able to reach heights of this 
research.  I am equally grateful to my Dad Andrew Kagabo, for blessing me with the Rwandan 
identity and Mum Faith Mukakalisa who taught me that even the largest task can be 
accomplished if it is done one step at a time. My mother in law deserves special regard for her 
excellent care to Gisa. Also, my sincere gratitude is owed to the family of Sangano Felix and 
Chantal, whose extreme generosity will always be remembered, they provided me with adequate 
atmosphere conducive for research in their happy home in Berlin. Frau Steffi Werle deserves 
acknowledgement for her ‘warm welcome’ in Charlottenburg. 
 
It is with immense gratefulness that I acknowledge the support and facilitation of various 
institutions towards the reality of this research; particular recognition goes to the staff of Rwanda 
Education Board, The Supreme Court of Rwanda, The National Service of Gacaca Courts, The 
National Commission for the Fight against Genocide (CNLG), The National University of 
Rwanda and The ICTR Documentation Centre, for the research materials, data and for 
facilitating this research in one way or the other. 
 
Finally, the financial support of DAAD is gratefully acknowledged. DAAD has been very 
generous since 2009 by funding my academic pursuits in Cape Town, Berlin and Kigali. The 
scholarship was not only a turning point in my life, but also a wonderful experience. I was 
delighted to interact with various international experts and lecturers organized by the program. 
‘If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of the Giants’ that the Transnational-
Criminal Justice Program exposed me to. 
 
 
Charity Wibabara 
2013. 
 
 
  
 
 
v 
 
 
LIST OF ABREVIATIONS 
 
A.D  : After Death of Christ 
AFP  : Agence France Presse 
AIDS  : Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrom 
Art.  : Article  
ASF   : Avocats Sans Frontières 
AVEGA : Association des Veuves du Génocide d’Avril 
BBC  : British Broadcasting Corporation 
BC  : Before Christ 
Cat  : Category 
CCM  : Centre for Conflict Management  
CCP  : Rwanda Code of Criminal Procedure 
CDR   : Coalition pour la Défence de la République 
CLADHO : Collectif des Ligues et Associations de Défence des des Droits de l’Homme  
CNLG  : National Commission for the Fight against Genocide  
Cpl.   : Corporal 
CPL  : Criminal Penal Law, aka Penal Code 
Cpt.   : Captain 
DAAD : Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst (German Academic Exchange Service) 
Dr.   : Doctor 
DRC  : Democratic Republic of Congo 
e.g  : Example 
ECHR   : European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
  
 
 
vi 
 
ECtHR  : European Court of Human Rights 
Ed(s).  : Editor(s) 
Edn.   : Edition  
et al.  : et alii (and others)      
etc  : et cetera 
FAR   : Forces Armées Rwandaises  
FARG  : Fonds d’Assistance aux Rescapés du Genocide  
FIDH  : Federation Internationale des Droits de L’Homme  
FRW   : Rwandan Francs 
G.A/Res. : General Assembly Resolution 
HIV  : Human Immuno-deficiency Virus   
HRW  : Human Rights Watch 
i.e.  : That is 
ICC  : International Criminal Court 
ICCPR  : International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICG  : International Crisis Group  
ICTR  : International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda   
ICTY  : International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
IDEA  : Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance  
IHL  : International Humanitarian Law 
IMT   : International Military Tribunal 
Inter alia : Among others  
IRIN   : Integrated Regional Information Network 
LIPRODHOR: Ligue Rwandaise pour la Promotion et la Défence Droits de l’Homme 
LLB  : Bachelor of Law (Legum Baccalaureus) 
LLD  : Doctor of Law (Legum Doctor) 
  
 
 
vii 
 
LLM  : Master of Law (Magister Legum) 
MN.  : Marginal Number 
MICT   : Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals  
MRND  : Mouvement Révolutionnaire Nationale pour le Développement 
NGO’s  : Non Governmental Organizations 
N°   : Number 
NSGC  : National Service of Gacaca Courts 
NSGJ  : National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions 
NURC  : National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 
O.G.R.R : Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda 
O.L   : Organic Law 
OAU  : Organization for African Unity 
Para.  : Paragraph 
PARMEHUTU: Parti du Mouvement d’Émancipation Hutu 
Ph.D  : Doctor of Philosophy 
Prof  : Professor 
PRI   : Penal Reform International 
RANU  : Rwandese Alliance for National Unity  
RCN   : Réseau des Citoyens Justice & Démocratie 
RDF   : Rwandan Defence Forces 
Res.    : Resolution 
RPA   : Rwandan Patriotic Army 
RPE  : Rules of Procedure and Evidence   
RPF   : Rwandan Patriotic Front 
RTLM   : Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines 
  
 
 
viii 
 
TIG   : Travaux d’Intérêt Général (community service) 
TRC   : Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
U.K   : United Kingdom 
U.N  : United Nations 
UNSC  : United Nations Security Council 
U.S.  : United States of America 
UDHR   : Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
UN Doc. : United Nations Document 
UN   : United Nations  
UNAMIR  : United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
UNAR   : Union Nationale Rwandaise  
UNDP   : United Nations Development Program 
UNHCR  : United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNIFEM : United Nations Development Fund for Women 
USD  : United States Dollar 
UWC  : University of Western Cape 
V.  : Versus 
Vol.  : Volume 
VStGB   : German Code of Crimes against International Law (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch)  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
ix 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PLAGIARISM DECLARATION................................................................................................. I 
DEDICATION.............................................................................................................................. II 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................................... III 
LIST OF ABREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................ V 
KEY WORDS ............................................................................................................................. XV 
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................................. XVI 
CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION OF THE STUDY ...................................... 1 
A. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY .................................................................................................. 1 
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ................................................................................................. 2 
C. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY...................................................................................................... 4 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY .................................................................................................. 4 
E. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH ................................................................................................ 5 
F. SCOPE OF THE STUDIES ............................................................................................................ 6 
G. DEFINITIONS OF CONCEPTS USED WITHIN THE CHAPTERS ........................................................ 8 
CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE INTERNECINE 
CONFLICT IN RWANDA......................................................................................................... 10 
A. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 10 
B. PRE-COLONIAL ACCOUNTS OF RWANDAN HISTORY .............................................................. 11 
I. Origin of the Twa, Hutu and Tutsi ..................................................................................... 11 
II. The Relationship between Tutsi and Hutu ........................................................................ 13 
C. THE COLONIAL PERIOD ......................................................................................................... 17 
I. The German Colonial Rule ................................................................................................ 17 
II. The Belgian Colonial Rule ................................................................................................ 20 
III. The Fall of the Tutsi Monarchy ....................................................................................... 23 
D. POST-COLONIAL PERIOD ....................................................................................................... 26 
I. The First Republic .............................................................................................................. 26 
II. The Second Republic ......................................................................................................... 28 
  
 
 
x 
 
E. FORMATION OF THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) ..................................................... 30 
F. THE GENOCIDE PERIOD .......................................................................................................... 32 
CHAPTER THREE: THE LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA..................................................................................................... 40 
A. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 40 
B. GENERALITIES ABOUT THE TRIBUNAL ................................................................................... 41 
I. Genesis of the ICTR............................................................................................................ 41 
II. Legal Basis of the ICTR .................................................................................................... 42 
III. Organization of the Tribunal ........................................................................................... 45 
IV. Relationship between Rwanda and the Tribunal ............................................................. 46 
C. STATUS OF THE ICTR CASES ................................................................................................. 51 
D. ANALYSIS OF IMPORTANT JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE THE ICTR ............................................. 53 
I. Prosecutor versus Akayesu................................................................................................. 53 
II. Prosecutor versus Kayishema ........................................................................................... 55 
III. Prosecutor versus Kambanda .......................................................................................... 57 
IV. Prosecutor versus Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze .................................................. 58 
V. Prosecutor versus Ntagerura, Bagambiki, and Imanishimwe .......................................... 61 
VI. Prosecutor versus Colonel Bagosora .............................................................................. 63 
VII. Prosecutor versus Nyiramasuhuko ................................................................................. 65 
E. ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE TRIBUNAL ........................................................................................ 67 
I. Development of International Criminal Law ..................................................................... 67 
II. Accountability for Leaders ................................................................................................ 68 
III. Creation of a Historical Record ...................................................................................... 70 
F. MAJOR SHORTCOMINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA .......... 71 
I. Delayed Justice .................................................................................................................. 71 
II. Location of the ICTR ......................................................................................................... 74 
III. Limited Impact on Rwanda .............................................................................................. 76 
CHAPTER FOUR: PROSECUTION OF GENOCIDE IN NATIONAL COURTS ............ 78 
A. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 78 
B. GENERALITIES ON RWANDA NATIONAL COURTS ................................................................... 79 
  
 
 
xi 
 
I. Genesis of Genocide Prosecutions ..................................................................................... 79 
II. Organisation of Ordinary Courts ..................................................................................... 80 
III. Reparations ...................................................................................................................... 82 
C. STATUS OF CASE LAW WITHIN THE ORDINARY COURT SYSTEM ............................................ 83 
D. ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL COURT CASE LAW .................................................................. 84 
I. Prosecutor versus Cpt Twagiramungu ............................................................................... 87 
II. Prosecution versus Pte Gataza ......................................................................................... 89 
III. Prosecutor versus Cpl Gatorano ..................................................................................... 92 
IV. Prosecutor versus Major Nyirahazimana and Pasteur Ngirinshuti ................................ 93 
V. Prosecutor versus Harelimana et al. ................................................................................ 95 
VI. Prosecutor versus Nzirabatinyi ....................................................................................... 96 
VII. Prosecutor versus Nzisabira ........................................................................................... 98 
VIII. Prosecutor versus Pandasi, Bugeri and Nzajyibwami ................................................ 100 
IX. Prosecutor versus Rurangirwa, Bimenyimana, and Ntawangaheza ............................. 101 
X. Prosecutor versus Sibomana ........................................................................................... 103 
E. ACHIEVEMENTS OF NATIONAL COURT TRIALS .................................................................... 105 
F. MAJOR SHORTCOMINGS OF DOMESTIC PROSECUTIONS ........................................................ 108 
I. Congested Prisons and Insufficient Infrastructure .......................................................... 109 
II. Violation of Fair Trial Rights ......................................................................................... 111 
1. The Right to Speedy Trial ................................................................................................ 111 
2. The Principle of Presumption of Innocence .................................................................... 112 
3. The Right to Counsel of One's Choice ............................................................................. 113 
G. EXCURSUS: PROSECUTION OF GENOCIDE SUSPECTS BY THIRD STATES ............................... 116 
I. Extradition Matters .......................................................................................................... 116 
II. Third State Prosecutions: Case of Rwabukombe in Germany .................................... 119 
CHAPTER FIVE: THE TRADITIONAL GACACA COURT SYSTEM........................... 124 
A. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 124 
B. GENERALITIES ON GRASSROOT COURTS .............................................................................. 125 
I. The Evolution of Gacaca Courts ...................................................................................... 125 
II. Traditional Roots of Gacaca ........................................................................................... 127 
III. Legal Basis of Gacaca Courts ....................................................................................... 129 
  
 
 
xii 
 
IV. A Standard Gacaca Trial ............................................................................................... 135 
C. STATUS OF GACACA CASE LAW .......................................................................................... 137 
D. ANALYSIS OF THE GACACA CASE LAW ............................................................................... 138 
I. Gacaca court of Gahunga Sector versus Turikumana ..................................................... 138 
II. Gacaca Court of Rusebeya cell versus Gakumburwa..................................................... 138 
III. Gacaca Court of Rukoma sector versus Gatera ............................................................ 138 
IV. Gacaca Court of Nyarubuye sector versus Habimana .................................................. 138 
V. Gacaca court of Rukoma sector versus Mbaraga ........................................................... 138 
VI. Gacaca court of Nyakiliba/Kayove sector versus Munyagishari .................................. 138 
VII. Gacaca court of Cyanyanza sector versus Nyirabarinda............................................. 138 
VIII. Gacaca court of Nyakabanda sector versus Musangwa ............................................. 138 
IX. Gacaca court of Kirwa sector versus Twagirumukiza ................................................... 138 
X. Gacaca court of Kirwa sector versus Mbakenge ............................................................ 138 
XI. Gacaca court of Nyarubuye sector versus Kageruka .................................................... 138 
XII. Gacaca court of Nyakabanda sector versus Mwamini ................................................. 138 
XIII. Gacaca Court of Ndaro sector versus Ntawuruhunga ................................................ 138 
XIV.Gacaca court of Rusayo cell versus Sinaruhamagaye ................................................. 138 
XV.Gacaca court of Rusayo cell versus Simpunga .............................................................. 138 
XVI.Gacaca court of Gitega sector versus Kaneza ............................................................. 138 
E. THE NATURE OF GACACA COURTS: ARE THEY RETRIBUTIVE OR RESTORATIVE? ................ 151 
I. Aims of Gacaca Courts .................................................................................................... 154 
II. Sentences ......................................................................................................................... 155 
III. Stakeholders................................................................................................................... 156 
IV. Evaluation ...................................................................................................................... 157 
F. ACHIEVEMENTS OF GACACA COURTS .................................................................................. 157 
I. Speedy Justice .................................................................................................................. 157 
II. Reconciliatory Mechanism .............................................................................................. 159 
III. Affordable Justice .......................................................................................................... 162 
IV. Enhancement of Local Transitional Justice Approaches .............................................. 162 
G. SHORTCOMINGS OF GACACA COURTS ................................................................................. 163 
I. Lack of Legal Representation ........................................................................................... 164 
  
 
 
xiii 
 
II. Absence of Reparations................................................................................................... 165 
III. Inadequate Protection of Witnesses .............................................................................. 166 
IV. Corruption within the System ........................................................................................ 167 
V.  Instability of Gacaca Laws ............................................................................................. 168 
VI. Non-Prosecution of RPA Crimes ................................................................................... 169 
VII. Interim Remarks ........................................................................................................... 171 
CHAPTER SIX: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
ICTR, NATIONAL COURTS AND GACACA COURTS ................................................... 173 
A. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 173 
B. JURISDICTIONAL RELATIONSHIP .......................................................................................... 173 
C. DISPARITIES AMONG THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES ............................................................. 176 
I. Right to Legal Counsel ..................................................................................................... 178 
II. Right to Silence ............................................................................................................... 179 
III. Right to be tried without Undue Delay .......................................................................... 180 
IV. Jurisdiction Disparities .................................................................................................. 182 
V. Discrepancy in Sentences ................................................................................................ 183 
VI. Unequal Detention Facilities ......................................................................................... 185 
D. THE CONTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENT TRIALS TO RECONCILIATION ........................................ 187 
I. Meaning of Reconciliation ............................................................................................... 188 
II. The ICTR, National Courts and Gacaca Contribution to Reconciliation ...................... 190 
1. Official Acknowledgement of the Crimes ........................................................................ 191 
2. Individualization of Guilt ................................................................................................. 194 
3. Truth ................................................................................................................................ 198 
a) Personal and Narrative Truth ......................................................................................... 199 
b) Factual and Forensic Truth ............................................................................................ 200 
III. Interim Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 202 
CHAPTER SEVEN: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS .............................................................. 204 
A. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................... 204 
B. OVERALL CONCLUDING REMARKS AND OPTIMAL APPROACH ............................................. 210 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 214 
  
 
 
xiv 
 
PRIMARY SOURCES ............................................................................................................. 214 
A. LEGISLATION .................................................................................................................. 214 
I. International Instruments ................................................................................................. 214 
II. National Laws ................................................................................................................. 215 
B. CASE LAW ........................................................................................................................ 218 
I. International Case Law .................................................................................................... 218 
II. National Case Law ...................................................................................................... 218 
C. REPORTS AND INTERNET SOURCES .......................................................................... 220 
I. Reports ............................................................................................................................. 220 
II. Electronic Sources ....................................................................................................... 222 
SECONDARY SOURCES ....................................................................................................... 226 
A. BOOKS ............................................................................................................................... 226 
B. ARTICLES IN BOOKS ...................................................................................................... 233 
C. JOURNAL ARTICLES ...................................................................................................... 239 
D. OTHER SOURCES ............................................................................................................ 253 
I. Papers............................................................................................................................... 253 
II.Media/ Press Release ....................................................................................................... 254 
III.Thesis .............................................................................................................................. 255 
IV. Foreign Sources ............................................................................................................. 256 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
xv 
 
KEY WORDS 
Highlighted below, are ten key words that are central to the entire study: 
 Rwanda 
 Complementarity 
 Concurrent Jurisdiction Relationship 
 Core Crimes 
 Gacaca Courts 
 Genocide 
 International Criminal Law 
 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 National Courts 
 Transitional Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
xvi 
 
ABSTRACT 
The 20
th
century witnessed several wars and genocides worldwide. Notable examples include the 
Armenian and Jews genocides which took place during World War I and World War II 
respectively. The Rwandan genocide of 1994 is a more recent example where a large number of 
the population was affected, either as victims or perpetrators. Over 800,000 Tutsis were dead, 
and more than 120,000 suspects were in prison for the genocide. The present study focuses on 
the Rwandan genocide against Tutsi where the scale of the crimes simultaneously dictated the 
overwhelming need for justice at both international and national level. 
 
At the international level, the ICTR was set up by the United Nations to deal with the organisers 
of the genocide while the Rwandan national courts were left to deal with the remaining suspects. 
Yet it became increasingly clear that the national courts lacked themselves the capacity to deal 
with the vast majority of alleged perpetrators. If their impact was to be enhanced, they needed to 
rely on the support of alternative justice mechanisms. So Rwanda introduced a modern version 
of the traditional Gacaca courts as an attempt to deal with the huge backlog of cases in order to 
combat the culture of impunity. 
 
However, having different courts for one and the same situation has had its own limitations. One 
of these issues is the legal and practical disparities that exist between the ad hoc International 
Tribunal and national justice mechanisms in the process of prosecuting perpetrators, such as the 
unequal treatment of the accused. This study therefore attempts to show these discrepancies and 
their impact on the process of accountability and reconciliation. Thus, the study analyses the 
relationship between the ICTR, national courts and Gacaca in prosecution of genocide suspects 
as well as lessons from the adopted ‘multifaceted approaches’ to deal with the crime of genocide. 
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CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION OF THE STUDY 
 
 
A. Background of the Study 
In 1994, the small East African country of Rwanda suffered largest-scale ethnic violence that the 
world had never witnessed since the Second World War.
1
 Within a period of three months 
genocide, the country lost between 800,000 to 1,000,000 Tutsi victims and moderate Hutu out of 
a population of 7,590,235 Rwandans.
2
 The aftermath of genocide posed a unique challenge to the 
criminal justice system given that there were more than 120,000 Hutu suspects in pretrial 
detention awaiting trial.
3
 The magnitude and the nature of the human rights violations that 
engulfed Rwanda in 1994 prompted both the Rwandan government and the international 
community to establish different accountability mechanisms
4
 in order to hold perpertrators 
accountable, achieve justice for the victims and survivors, promote reconciliation, and deter 
future mass atrocities.
5
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Between 250,000 and 500,000 women were raped during the genocide, 20,000 were born out of these rapes, 
50,000 widows, 75,000 orphans, 2 million refugees and about 650,000 internally displaced persons not to mention 
the enormous deaths of victims and huge number of perpetrators. 
2
 P. C. Bornkamm, Rwanda's Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation, (2012), at 16; A. Des Forges, 
Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, (1999), at 187 et seq; N. Jones, The Courts of Genocide, Politics 
and the Rule of Law in Rwanda and Arusha, (2011), at 22 et seq; J. M. Kamatali,  ‘The Challenge of Linking 
International Criminal Justice and National Reconciliation’16 Leiden Journal of International Law, (2003), at 120 et 
seq.; M. P. Scharf and M. Day,  ‘The Ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals: Launching a New Era of 
Accountability’ in W.A. Schabas and N. Bernaz (eds.), Routledge Handbook of International Criminal law, (2011), 
at 58; G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn, (2009), at 17, MN 54. 
3
 P.C. Bornkamm, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation, (2012), at 1 et seq; C. M. 
Carroll,  ‘An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda and the 
Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass Atrocities of 1994,’  18 Boston University International 
Law Journal, (2000), at 163 et seq; M.A Drumbl,  ‘Law and Atrocity: Settling Accounts in Rwanda,’ 31 Ohio 
Northern University Law Review, (2005), at 41-74. 
4
Art. IV of the 1948 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; J.K. Kleffner, 
Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions, (2008), at 66 et seq. 
5
 U.P. Behrendt,  ‘Dealing with the 1994 Genocide: A Comparative Analysis of Usefulness of the ICTR and 
Rwanda’s National Prosecutions,’ University of Western Cape, Thesis, (2001), at  1-3; see Preamble of  the 
establishing instruments for the ICTR (1994), National Courts (1996), and Gacaca (2001). 
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At the international level, the UN established the ICTR to try those bearing the greatest 
responsibility,
6
 and the Rwandan national courts were to deal with Category One offenders,
7
 
whereas Gacaca courts handled the bulk of cases under Category Two and Three,
8
 that clearly 
could not be handled by the ICTR and national courts. 
 
The different judicial approaches were given concurrent jurisdiction over the crime of genocide 
but with primacy of the ICTR over the national processes.
9
 However, the practice of prosecutions 
by the various approaches reveals a number of conflicting values which have crucially 
influenced this study. Therefore Rwanda offers a unique opportunity to analyse the interplay of 
criminal justice systems on different levels. 
 
B. Statement of the Problem 
Although under the principle of concurrent jurisdiction, the ICTR Statute gives primacy to the ad 
hoc Tribunal over national courts,
10
 it is sufficient to mention that the ICTR and Rwandan 
national mechanisms still lack a coherent and organised structure that links all the processes and 
                                                          
6
 In November 1994, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 955 creating the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter the ICTR). See United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 S-RES-
955 (1994) of 8 November 1994.  
7
 In 1996, the Government adopted Organic Law N°   08/96 of 30 April 1996, on the Organization of Prosecutions 
for Offences Constituting the Crimes of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity Committed since 1 October 1990; 
Category one includes individuals whose criminal acts place them among the planners, organizers, instigators, and 
leaders. However this category overlapped somewhat with those over whom the ICTR could attempt to establish 
jurisdiction. 
8
 In 2001, Organic Law N° 40/2000 of 26/01/2001 governing the creation of Gacaca Courts and Organizing the 
Prosecution of Genocide Crimes and other Crimes against Humanity committed in Rwanda entered into force and 
was replaced by the 2004 Organic Law; Category two includes, persons whose criminal participation place them 
among killers or who committed acts against others causing death, together with their accomplices. And Category 
three includes persons who committed offenses against property. 
9
 See, Art. 8 of the ICTR Statute; M. S. Ellis and R. J. Goldstone (eds.), The International Criminal Court: 
Challenges to Achieving Justice and Accountability in the 21st Century, (2008), at 77; G. Werle, Principles of 
International Criminal Law, 2nd edn, (2009), at 82, MN 226-227.  
10
 See detailed discussions in A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd edn, (2008), at 339 et seq; M. M Elzeidy,  
‘From Primacy to Complementarity and Backwards: (Re-) Visiting Rule 11 bis of the Ad hoc Tribunals,’ 57 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, (2008), at 403-415; W.A. Schabbas, An Introduction to the 
International Criminal Court, 3rd edn, (2007), at 171 et seq 
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allows the various systems to play complementary roles.
11
 This has contributed to the overlap of 
international and domestic processes, and both formal and informal processes.
12
 For instance, it 
is a trite fact that the Tribunal and Rwandan courts have often competed for defendants, in 
several instances requesting the same defendants from governments.
13
  
 
Another problem is that the existence of prima facie differences in structure, laws, procedure, 
and sentencing options among these three systems which try genocide suspects for the same 
situation yields inequalities. 
 
For instance, the various systems entail differences in their sentences against genocide convicts. 
While the death penalty was abolished in 2007, the maximum penalty under national courts and 
Gacaca goes up to life imprisonment in solitary confinement, unlike the ICTR Statute which 
limits its maximum penalty to only life imprisonment, without any secondary penalty. In regard, 
to fair trial guarantees, the right to legal representation was not envisaged in Gacaca legislation, 
while the national courts and ICTR acknowledge this right but still in different forms. Therefore, 
these courts present prima facie contradictions such as divergent perceptions on facts constituting 
genocide, sentences and minimum guarantees.  
 
                                                          
11
 U. P. Behrendt,  ‘Dealing with the 1994 Genocide: A Comparative Analysis of Usefulness of the ICTR and 
Rwanda’s National Prosecutions’ University of Western Cape, Thesis, (2001), at 3; B.S. Brown,  ‘Primacy or 
Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals,’ 23 Yale 
Journal of International Law, (1998), at 394 et seq; C. Mibenge,  ‘Concurrent Application of International, National 
and African Laws in Rwanda,’ in R. Yepes-Enríquez and L. Tabassi (eds.), Treaty Enforcement and International 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters, (2002), at 95 et seq; R.Wedgwood, ‘National Courts and the Prosecution of War 
Crimes’ in G. Kirk McDonald and O. Swaak-Goldman (eds.), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International 
Criminal Law:The Experience of International and National Courts, Vol. 1, (2000), at  408 et seq.  
12
 C. Lekha Sriram,  ‘Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses’ 19 American University 
International Law Review, (2003), at 398; see also M. H Morris,  ‘The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdictions: The Case 
of Rwanda,’ 7 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, (1997), at 362 et seq.;  L. Nadya Sadat,  
‘Understanding the Complexities of International Criminal Tribunal Jurisdiction’ in W.A. Schabas and N. Bernaz 
(eds.), Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law, (2011), at 206 and 197 et seq.  
13
 Froduard Karamira became the object of a brief ‘tug of war’ between the ICTR and the government of Rwanda 
but later he was deported to Rwanda from Ethiopia and was convicted to death sentence; see  M. H. Morris, ‘The 
Trials of Concurrent Jurisdictions: The Case of Rwanda,’ 7 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 
(1997), at 365 et seq; In another case, the ICTR, Rwanda and the Belgian governments were engaged in efforts to 
gain custody of the same suspect, by the names of Bagosora  who was held in Cameroon. See C. Tomlinson, ‘Tug of 
War over Rwanda Suspect,’ The Independent, 13 March 1996, at 10; M. Bigg, ‘UN Rwanda Genocide Tribunal 
Adjourns,’ Reuters World Service, 9 January   1997. 
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In view on these discrepancies, the author addresses the following questions: 
 
i) What are the key challenges and lessons emerging from the use of multifaceted 
transitional justice mechanisms in the contemporary international legal order? 
ii) What is the extent of each court’s legitimacy and effectiveness as a tool for 
accountability and reconciliation?  
iii) What are the disparities in the prosecution of the crime of genocide? 
iv) What is the optimal relationship or mechanism in addressing large scale atrocities? 
 
In this respect, the thesis therefore explores these amongst a series of other related questions that 
will be addressed in subsequent chapters.  
 
C. Objectives of the Study 
In view of the above-mentioned research questions, the general aim of this study consists in 
analysing comparatively the approaches adopted by international and national court mechanisms 
to prosecute the crime of genocide, with the aim of bringing to fore their weaknesses and gaps. 
In other words, the study will reveal the discrepancies that exist between the ICTR, national 
courts and Gacaca in terms of respecting the rights of the accused, challenges faced, budget 
differences, the disproportion in number of prosecutions as well as their overall effect on the 
whole process of justice.  
 
It is also the objective of this work to examine the relationship between the Rwandan national 
mechanisms and the ICTR. An assessment of the efficiency of having these different institutions 
to prosecute the same crime but employing their own procedural rules and laws is paramount in 
this regard.  
 
D. Significance of the Study 
The significance of this work lies in its attempt to show the problems that exist in having 
different approaches in the prosecution of the same international crime. It views the problems 
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from all sides revealing the disparities, along with their causes, and makes possible suggestions. 
For instance, though a brief discussion is anticipated, the study reveals how the international and 
national courts are treating suspects in a similar situation differently, which impacts on the rights 
of the accused. By doing so, the work will assist both the national and international community 
to identify areas that need due consideration in the prosecution of genocide to protect the rights 
of the accused. 
 
In fact, taking Rwanda’s approach as a case study offers a number of lessons to be learnt, not 
only by the international courts but also by other domestic jurisdictions. Many of the 
shortcomings it addresses are not exclusive to Rwanda.  Rwanda is merely presented as a ‘guinea 
pig’ for the parallel use of differing justice mechanisms over the crime of genocide. In addition 
to highlighting major achievements of each mechanism, the thesis significantly suggests coherent 
options of how national and international relationship can be structured.  
 
E. Methodological Approach 
The research is mainly library-based, and will explore both primary and secondary sources. The 
primary sources include national laws, international law instruments, resolutions, reports, and 
case law emanating from international and domestic jurisdictions. Secondary sources include 
books by pre-eminent scholars in the field, law journal articles, papers and electronic sources 
such as internet references on the topic.  
 
As the topic itself suggests, a comparative approach is employed by analysing critically 
analysing the ICTR approach as against the two Rwandan justice approaches through reference 
to available literature and documented facts on the subject under study. The author thus uses 
descriptive research to explain how the mechanisms are structured. This is done using the 
relational or correlational method, which discusses each justice approach in relation to other 
mechanisms. 
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F. Scope of the Study 
A precise definition of the ambit is needed in order to keep this research within a manageable 
magnitude. Hence, this study focuses solely on the prosecution of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. 
And concern is limited to the foremost lessons and discrepancies faced by the ICTR, the 
Rwandan national courts and the Gacaca courts in their overall process of ensuring 
accountability of the perpetrators of genocide, with limited reference to war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
Against this background, the whole thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one introduces 
the study and focuses on the background of the study, the statement of the problem, the 
objectives, the significance of the study, the methodological approach and its scope. 
 
Chapter two provides a historical background to the internecine conflict in Rwanda and identifies 
significant developments in the socio-political relationships of Rwandans. It therefore explores 
the relationships between Tutsi and Hutu and the context within which those relationships were 
damaged. Discussing this pre-genocide history is informative to readers without knowledge of 
the circumstances that gave rise to ethnic tensions which later culminated into genocide in 1994.   
 
Chapter three analyses the retributive international approach of the ICTR. It provides a relatively 
concise background of the Tribunal’s establishment, structure and status of cases. The chapter 
further presents the most important milestones of the Tribunal by bringing to fore the ICTR’s 
jurisprudential contribution to the development of international criminal law and other 
achievements from the international criminal prosecution of core crimes. This chapter also 
examines the principal shortcomings and limitations faced by the Tribunal in the process of 
ensuring accountability for crimes in a post-conflict society. 
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Chapter four discusses the prosecution of the crime of genocide under the Rwandan justice 
system and examines the status of genocide trials since 1996. This study also seeks to reveal the 
flaws of classical criminal law on the one hand, along with its achievements on the other hand. 
Concerns over national courts’ adherence to fair trial rights under international law are addressed 
in this chapter. Also, a section is devoted to a discussion on extradition and third state 
prosecutions of Rwandan genocide suspects.  
 
Chapter five is dedicated particularly to the Gacaca court system as a traditional mechanism 
which was adopted and modified by the Rwandan government to deal with genocide crimes. The 
It further analyses the nature of Gacaca courts in the context of transitional justice and 
international criminal law. This chapter also puts forward some of the recognised achievements 
of the system in terms of accountability and reconciliation, and for the most part, it focuses on its 
major shortcomings, such as the lack of legal representation for defendants. 
 
Chapter six critically analyses the interplay between national and international criminal justice 
systems. The chapter seeks to make a comparative evaluation of the concurrent relationship of 
the courts, while identifying the legal incompatibilities and overlaps between the different 
mechanisms of justice.  At the end of this chapter, there will be a discussion on the impact of 
trials of the three mechanisms towards reconciliation. 
 
Chapter seven, as the last part of this thesis, summarises the whole study by drawing the major 
findings. It reviews the shortcomings of the various courts and then provides a summary of the 
positive trends and transformations of the multifaceted approach that the international and 
domestic processes have so far transmitted. Finally, this part also suggests the optimal 
relationship between national and international jurisdiction. 
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In sum, the study basically compares all the justice approaches to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.  
Therefore, the status of the ICTR trials will stand in contrast to those of the Rwandan national 
courts and Gacaca courts. The study questions why the huge difference between the budget of 
the ICTR Tribunal and the Gacaca courts given the huge budget allocated to the ICTR Tribunal 
which has dealt with less than one hundred perpetrators in a period of eighteen years, while the 
Gacaca courts have tried more than 1.9 million genocide cases in  a period of ten years. The 
national courts which have tried not many cases, slightly more than 15,000 trials will also stand 
in contrast to the rest of the mechanisms. 
 
G. Definitions of Concepts used within the Chapters 
It is almost impossible to write on the subject under study without inadvertently being 
ambiguous or causing uncertainty in the understanding of some words. This is why some terms 
and notions will need clarification as to their precise meaning in this particular study. 
a) The phrase ‘complementary approaches/mechanisms’ or ‘multifaceted approach’ in this 
thesis refers to the three judicial responses to the crime of genocide at both national and 
international level: The ICTR, Rwandan national courts and Gacaca courts. It is 
important to note that the use of the word ‘complementary’ is different from the 
‘complementarity principle’ of the ICC as envisaged in article 17 of the Rome Statute. 
The words ‘complementary mechanisms’ and ‘multifaceted approach’ are used 
interchangeably in this thesis. 
b) Semi-restorative Gacaca court, refers to the traditional accountability mechanism adopted 
by Rwanda to deal with individuals accused of genocide. It combines retributive and 
restorative strategies. The major point of difference between Gacaca and the two other 
mechanisms (the ICTR and national courts) lies in the fact that the latter two are 
exclusively retributive, unlike Gacaca which blends restorative measures with retribution. 
The term Gacaca or Gacaca courts are used interchangeably in this study. 
c) National mechanisms of Rwanda refer to the ordinary domestic courts while national 
mechanisms/approaches within the meaning of this particular research embrace both the 
national courts of Rwanda and Gacaca courts. 
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d)  The use of the word ‘Tribunal’ shall refer to the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR). The word ‘Tribunal’ and ‘ICTR’ are used in this study to mean the 
same. 
e) The use of the phrase ‘Rwandan genocide of 1994’ equally refers to the ‘genocide against 
Tutsi’ as variously used in this thesis. And for research delimitation, it is the major focus 
of this study. Whereas, the judicial approaches met the criteria to deal with war crimes 
and crimes against humanity committed in 1994, detailed emphasis is left to prosecution 
of the crime of genocide. 
f) Preference is given to the use of ‘Hutu’, ‘Tutsi’ and ‘Twa’ instead of the plural forms of 
‘Bahutu’, ‘Batutsi’ and ‘Batwa’ to illustrate the three ethnic groups within Rwanda. 
Moderate Hutus refer to those who had interest in power-sharing with Tutsi and opposed 
the hostility against the Tutsi. 
g) Finally, in this study, a victim is someone who was harmed14 or killed during the 
genocide, while a survivor is someone who continued to live despite being a victim. In 
this research, the term victim shall refer to both ‘those killed’ or ‘survivors’, depending 
on the context of the discussion, and in particular instances, both terms are used 
separately in the context of their strict definitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 To be harmed can mean a lot of different things: raped, molested, insulted, demeaned, abused, assaulted, and 
many other options. 
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CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE INTERNECINE 
CONFLICT IN RWANDA 
 
A. Introduction 
Rwanda, the landlocked ‘land of a thousand hills’, consists of only 26,338 square kilometers, 
making it one of Africa’s smallest countries. Its size is comparable to that of Burundi or 
Belgium.
15
 In 1994, Rwanda had a population of 7.5 million, comprising of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa 
ethnic groups, with the Hutu being the majority.
16
 Accordingly, the Hutu comprised roughly 85% 
of the population, the Tutsi, 14%, and the Twa a mere 1%.
17
 The Hutu and Tutsi often had 
differences for many decades as will be expounded in this study.  
 
In 1994, Rwanda burst onto the world's headlines as the site of one of the worst genocides in 
human history where Hutu massacred Tutsi.
18
 The question that arises is what could have been 
the causes of this killing and was there any possibility of justice in the aftermath of genocide. 
Responding to this problem requires a close examination of the Rwandan history and the context 
in which the genocide came to be a reality.
19
 
 
In attempting to gain an understanding of the 1994 genocide, it is important to explore the 
varying relationships between Tutsi and Hutu and the perspective within which those 
                                                          
15
 G. Hankel, ‘Justice in Transition: The case of Rwanda,’ in G. Werle (ed) Justice in Transition-Prosecution and 
Amnesty in Germany and South Africa, (2006), at 175; P. J. Magnarella, ‘How could it happen? The Background 
and Causes of the Genocide in Rwanda’ 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2005), at 801 et seq. 
16
 Republique Rwandaise, Recensement Général de la population et de l’habitat au 15 Août 1991, Décembre 1991, 
Rwanda had a population of 7,590,235; K. Ellicott (ed.), Countries of the World and their Leaders Yearbook, Vol. 2, 
(2006), at 1562. 
17
  A. Twagilimana, Hutu and Tutsi, (1998), at 9. The ethnic percentage of the 1933 census was still applicable in 
Rwanda. 
18
 E. Daly, ‘Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda,’ 34 New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics, (2002), at 35.  
19
 Newbury argues that ‘One can only understand the genocide through an understanding of Rwanda’s history,’ in D. 
Newbury and C. Newbury, ‘Bringing the Peasants Back in: Agrarian Themes in the Construction and Corrosion of 
Statist Historiography in Rwanda,’ 105 American Historical Review, (2000), at 832-877; see also D. Newbury, 
‘Background to Genocide in Rwanda,’ 23 A Journal of Opinion, (1995), at 12-17. 
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relationships developed. Therefore, this chapter provides a detailed examination of the often 
disputed and controversial history of Rwanda and its ethnic groups with emphasis on the two 
dominant ethnic groups, classes, races, and tribes as they have been variously termed. Such an 
inquiry is essential to unveiling the reasons underlying the tribal discrimination, ethnicity and 
hatred that have come to characterise Rwandans. Particular attention will be paid to the historical 
background of the ethnic conflict, right from pre-colonial, to the colonial and post-colonial 
period. 
 
B. Pre-Colonial Accounts of Rwandan History 
The history of Rwanda prior to German penetration in the late 19
th
 century is not well known. 
Those providing an account of Rwandan history generally have not claimed to have reliable 
knowledge of pre-colonial Rwanda, largely due to the lack of historical records and due to 
conflicting oral narratives or accounts.
20
 One of the most contested issues concerns the origin 
and relationship of the Twa, Hutu and Tutsi ethnic group.
21
 
 
I. Origin of the Twa, Hutu and Tutsi  
According to the first account, it is not known when the territory of Rwanda was first inhabited, 
but it is considered that early settlers moved into the area following the last age, either in the 
Neolithic period, 10
th
 millenium BC or long before the Stone Age.
22
  Historians believe that the 
area’s first known inhabitants were a pygmoid people, the ancestors of the present-day Twa, 
Abasangwa butaka.
23
 These were primarily forest dwellers, hunters and potters, characterised as 
                                                          
20
 A. Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, (1999), at 31; P. Gourevitch, We Wish to 
Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda, (1998), at 48-49; see also 
J. Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century, (2002), at 22 
et seq. 
21
 N. Eltringham, Accounting for Horror: Post-Genocide Debates in Rwanda, (2004), at 12 et seq; see also R. 
Lemarchand, ‘Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which Genocide? Whose Genocide?’ 41 African Studies Review, 
(1998), at 5 et seq. 
22
 J. Chrétien, Rwanda: Les Médias du Génocide, (1995), at 44; P. R. Schimdt, A New Look at Interpretations of the 
Early Iron Age in East Africa: History in Africa, (1975), at 127-136. 
23
 J. Lewis and J. Knight, Rapport d’evaluation de La Situation des Twa et Pour La Promotion des Droits des Twa 
dans Le Rwanda d’apres Guerre, (1996), at 35. 
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pygmy-type people who were the sole inhabitants of Rwanda from 2,000 BC until the period of 
the coming of Hutu 3,000 years later.
24
 
 
The Bantu-speaking Hutu agriculturalists arrived, probably from the east, and began clearing and 
settling the hills.
25
 The Hutu, with their sedentary farming lifestyle, soon outnumbered the Twa 
and began to take over their traditional hunting grounds, forcing the Twa to retreat into the 
forests.
26
 Around 1500 A.D, in the fifteenth century, the Tutsi, a pastoral people with herds of 
cattle, moved into the region, most likely from southern Ethiopia, where other pastoralists such 
as the Oromo lived.
27
 The Tutsi, upon their arrival in Ruanda land, elevated themselves above 
the already present groups and established both a monarchy and a feudal system.
28
 The Hutu, 
who were largely farmers, entered into contract (ubuhake) with the Tutsi, in terms of which the 
Hutu promised services to the Tutsi in exchange for the use of cattle and land.
29
 
 
The second accounting of Rwanda’s history is based on the myth that long before colonisation, 
Hutu and Tutsi acknowledged the same ancestor called Gihanga Kanyarwanda, father of Gahutu, 
Gatutsi and Gatwa.
30
 The three children of Kanyarwanda were believed to have been the 
                                                          
24
 F.X Bangamwabo et al., Les Relations Interethiniques au Rwanda à la Lumière de l’Agression d’Octobre 1990, 
(1991), at 26-31. 
25
 P. J. Magnarella, ‘How Could It Happen? The Background and Causes of the Genocide in Rwanda,’ 3 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, (2005), at 801-822.  
26
 A.Twagilimana, Hutu and Tutsi, (1998), at 9; F. X Bangamwabo et al., Les Relations Interethiniques au Rwanda 
à la Lumière de l’Agression d’Octobre 1990, (1991), at 29-30. 
27
 P.J. Magnarella, ‘How Could It Happen? The Background and Causes of the Genocide in Rwanda,’ 3 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, (2005), at 801-822; E.R Sanders, ‘The Hamitic Hypothesis, its Origin and Functions 
in Time Perspective,’ 10 Journal of African History, (1969), at 521-532. 
28
 J.J. Maquet, The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda: A Study of Political Relations in a Central African Kingdom, 
(1961), at 89-91, 170, 103-105; C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 
1860-1960, (1988), at 11; P. J. Magnarella, ‘How Could It Happen? The Background and Causes of the Genocide in 
Rwanda,’ 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2005), at 801-822. 
29
 One way in which Hutu sought protection was through ubuhake, a form of clientage in which a patron grants a 
cow and usufruct rights to a client who in turn would provide some form of labour for the patron. See F. X 
Bangamwabo et al., Les Relations Interethiniques au Rwanda à la Lumière de l’Agression d’Octobre 1990, (1991), 
at 31. 
30
  B. Lugan, Histoire du Rwanda: De la Préhistoire à nos Jours, (1997), at 79; B. Maniragaba, ‘Le Mythe des fils 
de Gihanga ou l’histoire d’une Fraternité Toujours Manquée,’ in FX Bangamwabo et al., Les Relations 
Interethniques au Rwanda à la Lumière de l’agression d’Octobre 1990, (1991),  at 61-129. 
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predecessors of three ethnic groups in Rwanda, as the names suggest. The groups therefore have 
the same founding myth, the same traditional religion, the same social and political organisation, 
the same language and the same agro-pastoral vocation with the prevalence of herding for the 
Tutsi, agricultural farming for the Hutu and hunting or pottery for the Twa.
31
 This is the view 
currently advanced by the Rwandan government.
32
 
 
In support of this narrative, in pre-colonial Rwanda, the primary identity was with the clan, 
where Hutu, Tutsi and Twa constructed their identities, in part, through their clan membership 
rather than tribal or ethnic identity.
33
 Rwandans belonged to one of the eighteen clans, regardless 
of whether they are Hutu, Tutsi or Twa.
34
 However, neither the clans nor the ethnic groups 
predominated or inhabited exclusive geographic areas. The interrelationships between the 
various groups even extended to the most intimate of marital and familial relationships, a fact 
made possible by the emphasis on clan rather than ethnic distinctions.
35
  
 
II. The Relationship between Tutsi and Hutu  
This section begins with an account of significant historical events in the socio-political 
relationships of Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda. As argued by Jones, the distinction between the two 
groups was not as rigid as, commonly stressed.
36
 The difference between Hutu and Tutsi is not a 
                                                          
31
 J. Mukimbiri, ‘The Seven Stages of the Rwandan Genocide,’ 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2005), 
at 824 et seq. 
32
 Government of Rwanda, ‘The Relationship between the ordinary Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa,’ available at 
<http://www.rwanda1.com/government>, accessed in September 2012. 
33
 L. Vansina, Le Rwanda Ancien: Le Royaume Nyiginya, (2001), at 178; P. E Nantulya,  ‘The Gacaca System in 
Rwanda,’ 4 Conflict Trends, (2001), at  53 et seq; B. Lugan, Histoire du Rwanda: De la Préhistoire à nos Jours, 
(1997), at 67-68; A. Purdeková, ‘Building a Nation in Rwanda? De-ethnicisation and its Discontents,’ 8 Studies in 
Ethnicity and Nationalism, (2008), at 502-523. 
34
  ‘Abasinga, Abasindi, Abazigaba, Abagesera, Abanyiginya, Abega, Ababanda, Abacyaba, Abungura, Abashambo, 
Abatsobe, Abakono, Abaha, Abashingo, Abanyakabama, Abasita, Abongera, Abanengwe’; For details, B. Lugan, 
Histoire du Rwanda: De la Préhistoire à nos Jours, (1997), at 68 et seq; see also C. Ndikubwimana, Agatabo 
k’imfanyanyigisho: Ingingo z’ingenzi mu Mateka y’u Rwanda kuva Rubayeho Kugeza mu Mwaka w’1994, (2004), at 
24. 
35
 P. Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from 
Rwanda, (1998), at 47-49.  
36
 N. A. Jones, The Courts of Genocide, Politics and the Rule of Law in Rwanda and Arusha, (2010), at 5 et seq. 
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typically ethnic one but a class or caste distinction.
37
 In fact, at first glance, ethnic differences 
between Tutsi and Hutu seem rather minor or non-existent. Mamdani notes that while there may 
have been some differences in physical characteristics or genotype, it can largely be attributed to 
natural or social selection.
38
 For example, in sofar as the Tutsi maintained a privileged position 
in society, diets rich in meat and milk could be responsible for the differences in stature in 
comparison with other groups.
39
 As noted by Maguire, the divergence between the groups was 
based on economic and socio-political status rather than ethnicity.
40
  
 
Besides, history more generally has demonstrated the absence of boundaries between the 
different groupings in Rwanda. It is suggested that boundaries between Hutu and Tutsi before the 
colonial era were ‘flexible and permeable’ and that the more significant division historically was 
between pastoralists and cultivators, which coincided to some degree with the later developed 
designation of Tutsi and Hutu.
41
 Depending on owned property, an individual could at a given 
moment be a Hutu or a Tutsi. A successful Hutu could become a Tutsi and the reverse was also 
possible. Tutsi nobles or royalty could essentially classify another Tutsi to the social rank of 
Hutu based primarily on a reduction in the number of cows owned or reduction in wealth.
42
 Yet, 
both Hutu and Tutsi considered the Twa as an inferior class and any marriage with them was 
considered as an insult.
43
 However, it was not a choice to belong to a particular group but a 
matter of birth or change of social status.  
                                                          
37
 P. C. Bornkamm, Rwanda's Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation, (2012), at 9. 
38
 See M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, (2001), at 
44-45. 
39
 For example, the average stature of the Tutsi was said to be 1.75 meter; the Hutu 1. 66 meter; and the Twa 1 meter 
but this did not apply collectively to all members, see M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, 
Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, (2001), at 45. 
40
 L. Maguire, ‘Power Ethnicised: The Pursuit of Protection and Participation in Rwanda and Burundi,’ 2 Buffalo 
Journal of International Law, (1995), at 49-60; see M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, 
Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, (2001), at 75-88. 
41
 L. Rutagarama, ‘Le Veil de la Conscience Politique des Masses Populaires au Mayaga de 1931-1957,’ Université 
Nationale du Rwanda, Dissertation, (1988), at 15-16. 
42
 J. K. Rennie, ‘The Precolonial Kingdom of Rwanda: A Reinterpretation’ 2 Transafrican Journal of History, 
(1972), at 33. 
43
 J. Vansina, R. Mauny, and L.V. Thomas, The Historian in Tropical Africa, (1964), at 21 et seq.; N. A. Jones, The 
Courts of Genocide, Politics and the Rule of Law in Rwanda and Arusha, (2010), at 5; C.Vidal,  ‘Colonisation et 
Décolonisation du Rwanda: La Question Tutsi-Hutu?’ 91 Revue Francaise d’Etudes Politiques Africaines, (1973), at 
32-47. 
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In regard to the relationship between the groups, the Hutu and Tutsi lived peacefully, and 
attended the same schools and churches, worked in the same offices, and drank in the same bars. 
From a historical and anthropological perspective, they shared similar religious and cultural 
values, and spoke the same language, Kinyarwanda, without differences in dialect or 
vocabulary.
44
 Similar names were given indiscriminately to Tutsi or Hutu and the lines between 
them were blurred by intermarriage.
45
  
 
Therefore, these groups comprised the ‘Banyarwanda’ people of Rwandan origin with an 
accepted and organised monarchy ruled by the king. A small region settled by all groups 
comprised of chiefdom under Hutu or Tutsi chiefs who were headed by a Tutsi king 
(Umwami).
46
 The Umwami considered all Rwandans as his children and the relationship 
between the ordinary Bahutu and Batutsi was one of mutual benefit, mainly through the 
exchange of their labour and services.
47
 
 
However, during the reign of the Tutsi king, Kigeri Rwabugiri (1860-1895), there was increased 
polarization when he instituted a regime that explicitly favoured the Tutsi population. Most of 
the king's agents were Tutsi and more Tutsi chiefs controlled the rural areas.
48
 The Hutu, who 
                                                          
44
 M. A. Drumbl, ‘Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda,’ 75 New York University 
Law Review, (2000), at 1242-1243. 
45
 See M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, (2001), at 
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were largely farmers, were permitted by the Tutsi chiefs to occupy the land in return for donating 
their labour.
49
  The Tutsi became the political elite, with their hereditary monarchy under a Tutsi 
king from the Abanyiginya clan.
50
  
 
Despite this hierarchical yet relatively harmonious monarchy, Alvarez highlights that the record 
of pre-colonial Rwanda is mostly lacking in any evidence pointing to a history of hatred or 
violence between these groups.
51
 Modern historians also stress that during the pre-colonial 
period, there were no major Tutsi-Hutu conflicts as such.
52
   
 
Early research comfirms that in the Rwandan tradition, the criterion of defining Hutu or Tutsi 
was never a racial or ethnic reference, but rather a socio-economic status.
53
 However, as noted by 
various authors, when the colonialists came to Rwanda, they established the policy of indirect 
rule according to which they relied on the monarchy to administer their colony. This reliance 
exacerbated ethnic segregation and divisions.
54
 Gradually, the mutual relationship between the 
two dominant groups, Tutsi and Hutu, was destroyed, later culminating in ethnic hatred. 
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C. The Colonial Period 
Under colonial rule, the relationship between Hutu and Tutsi identities changed considerably. 
The link established between the two groups was essentially one of serfdom (uburetwa) and the 
majority of those who suffered were Hutu.
55
 The process of patron-client relationship embittered 
the Hutu bitter because of the favouritism Europeans showed towards the Tutsi minority.
56
  This 
ultimately resulted in the first explosion of violence between Hutu and Tutsi in the late 1950s, 
under Belgian colonial rule, 
 
which had taken over the territory of Ruanda from the German 
colonialists.
57
  
 
I. The German Colonial Rule 
European colonisation of Rwanda began with the arrival of Germans as the first explorers in 
Rwanda.
58
 The first European to set foot in Rwanda was Count Gustav Adolf von Götzen, a 
German, who from 1893 to 1894 led an expedition to claim the hinterlands of the Tanganyika 
colony.
59
 Götzen entered Rwanda at Rusumo Falls, and then travelled right through Rwanda, 
meeting the king at his palace in Nyanza, and eventually reaching Lake Kivu, the western edge 
of the kingdom. From 1897 until the end of the First World War, Rwanda, along with Burundi 
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and present-day Tanzania were part of German-East Africa under Germany’s colonial policy.60  
 
The first Europeans who arrived in Rwanda were generally impressed with the ruling Tutsi, 
perhaps, due to their seemingly taller stature which resembled that of Europeans, their more 
honorable manner, and their willingness to convert to Roman Catholicism.
61
 Colonial 
anthropology associated the Tutsi with the Hamitic race, while the Hutu were associated with the 
Negroes or Bantu group.
62
  The German colonisers regarded Tutsi as superior to other native 
groups in Rwanda, since they ruled over the Hutu and Twa. The Germans, therefore showed 
more favour to the Tutsi than to other groups.
63
 ‘Richard Kandt64  wrote in 1905 as follows; 
 If I can analyze and define honestly my feelings, I can say that Tutsis impressed me very much. I have 
even today the same feelings (…) those people are barbarian with an intellectual level abit lower than 
mine.’ Similarly, the Duke of Mecklenburg wrote in 1909, ‘The manner in which Batutsi use their language 
is very distinctive. We have the impression to have another class of people who have nothing in common 
with ‘blacks’except the color of their skin.65 
During their colonial tenure, the Germans chose to govern Rwanda indirectly through the 
existing Tutsi monarch (Mwami) and his chiefs.
66
 The Germans controlled the Tutsi chiefs who, 
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in turn, controlled the rest of the population. The benefit was mutual and advantageous for 
relations between Tutsi and colonialists, to the detriment of Hutu subordinates.
67
 As a result of 
the indirect rule, the Germans used the Tutsi King Musinga to establish their authority in the 
colony, and in return Musinga relied on the Germans to strengthen his own position in Rwanda, 
then called Ruanda.
68
 Tutsi were put in charge of the Hutu in the newly formed principalities, 
and were given basic ruling positions. The German colonialists elevated the Tutsi in political and 
social life, including advancing them to positions of prestige and trust.
69
 This favouritism was 
subscribed to by other institutions like the Catholic Church, which tended to support Tutsi 
children in admission to schools, thereby further entrenching the inequality between Tutsi and 
Hutu.  
 
The Tutsi were also given the responsibility of civilizing the Hutu and supervising labour works, 
which had the effect of creating enmity between the groups. Thus the Hutu hatred toward the 
Tutsi was characteristic of direct rule where the oppressed directed their anger towards the 
visible oppressor.
70
 
 
Until the end of the Germany colonial rule in 1916, the Germans held Rwanda and Burundi as 
provinces, lauding favour upon the Tutsi, thereby widening the separation between the Hutu and 
Tutsi, which made Hutu to develop an inferiority complex.
71
 However short lived the German 
rule was in Rwanda, their policy of indirect rule established a pattern that would come to 
characterise the relations between Europeans and Africans on one hand, and between Rwanda’s 
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two most numerous groups, Tutsi and Hutu on the other hand.
72
 Nevertheless, the indirect 
governance used by Germans involved a considerable degree of liberty for the Rwandan chiefs, 
unlike the Belgian colonial rule which followed. 
 
II. The Belgian Colonial Rule 
In 1916, Belgium succesfully claimed Rwanda from the German control and was officially given 
the League of Nations mandate to govern Rwanda as the territory of Ruanda-Urundi, along with 
its existing Congo colony in the west in 1924. Belgium administered Rwanda pursuant to Article 
22 of the Covenant and, then following the dissolution of the League of Nations on 18 April 
1946, as a United Nations Trust territory until 1962.
73
  
 
During their colonial rule, the Belgians continued the German strategy of indirect rule, but over 
time direct intervention became more frequent when they introduced a policy of divide and rule. 
The Belgians initially promoted Tutsi supremacy, and took Hutu as their subordinates.
74
 This 
created differential treatment ranging from social matters to justice matters in respect of which 
the colonialists included mostly Tutsi in those posts for purposes of controlling them easily. For 
instance, in regard to justice matters, the Belgian colonial government intervened in appointing 
Gacaca judges within the traditional local justice system which predominated in much of the 
territory. The chiefs, who were also arbiters for those cases that were submitted to them,
75
 were 
allowed to continue to govern as long as they reported serious infractions to the colonial 
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government and were obliged to act in conformity with colonial expectations and legal mores.
76
 
This magnified the indirect rule between the coloniser and colonised and the direct rule among 
the colonised themselves because the chiefs had to enforce the will of the colonialists on the 
mass population. 
  
 The Tutsi became a brutal taskmaster of the Hutu who were subjected to forced labor, such as 
construction of catholic churches, public roads, and colonial residences, without any payment.
77
  
If the Tutsi supervisors did not get the job done, their colonial masters whipped or replaced 
them.
78
 Work demands were so cumbersome that they could consume a half day of a native’s 
time, a process which aggrieved many Hutu who provided the manpower under supervision of 
the powerful Tutsi. 
 
The process of ethnicisation was further reinforced in the 1933-1934 census conducted by 
Belgians, which officially categorised the Hutu as indigenous and the Tutsi as non-indigenous.
79
  
Also, during the 1934 census, the Belgians further promoted separation of the groups when they 
required the ethnicity of each citizen to be stated on state issued identity cards.
80
  It is this census 
that determined 85% of the population as Hutu, 14% Tutsi and 1% Twa out of a population of 
1.8 million Rwandans in 1933.
81
 Accordingly, the Belgians used ownership of cows as the key 
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criterion for determining which group an individual belonged.
82
 Those with 10 cows and above 
were Tutsi, together with all their descendants in the male lineage. Those with fewer cows were 
Hutu, who were mainly farmers. The rest were given the status of Twa due to to their craftswork 
and pottery.
83
 Nevertheless, the criterion used here had a pre-colonial precedent, according to 
which Rwandans were classified in different social economic classes based on wealth and 
occupation.   
 
Nevertheless, the explicit mention of ethinicity in public documents created both short-term and 
long-term consequences. In the short-term, mentioning ethnicity in identity cards attached a sub-
national identity to all Rwandans, and enhanced divisions between the ethnicities. The Belgian 
colonialists conferred privileges upon the Tutsi in education,
84
 employment, and in the civil 
service basing on identification.
85
 The long-term consequence was that, 60 years later, the 
identity cards ultimately made it easy for the Hutu to identify and kill Tutsi at roadblocks and 
checkpoints.
86
 These identity cards were, therefore instrumental in identifying who had a right to 
life and who did not during the 1994 genocide. Therefore, Belgian’s colonial administration was 
detrimental to the unity of Rwandans because it always stressed ethnic distinctions, while 
conferring superiority to the Tutsi and their monarchical rule which was nonetheless abolished 
with the support of the same Belgian colonial authority. 
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III. The Fall of the Tutsi Monarchy 
United Nations decolonisation missions began as early as 1949 and during the 1950’s, Belgium 
began to promote democracy.
87
 However, the Tutsi, who viewed such reforms as a threat to their 
dominance, opposed this trend because the Hutu saw democracy as tantamount to majority rule, 
and they constituted the majority in Rwanda.
88
 Nonetheless, Hutu efforts to become involved in 
the democratisation were ultimately thwarted by the power retained by the Tutsi.  
 
From these experiences, the Hutu realised that Tutsi could be overthrown only in a struggle for 
political power and by putting an end to the monarchy. Consequently, a Hutu counter-elite group 
was formed that eventually led the revolt.
89
 Although political activists had formed a series of 
pro-Tutsi and pro-Hutu political parties, the political struggle in Rwanda was never really a quest 
for equality; the issue was who would dominate the ethnically bipolar state.
90
  
  
In 1957, a group of nine Hutu intellectuals published the ‘Hutu Manifesto,’ which complained of 
the political, economic, and educational monopoly of the Tutsi race and characterised them as 
invaders.
91
 The manifesto called for promoting Hutu in all fields and argued for the maintenance 
of ethnic identity cards so as to monitor the race monopoly. Tutsi royalty rejected the manifesto 
and blamed colonial administrators for any interethnic problems. The monarchy also advocated 
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for the eviction of the trust authorities at the earliest possible date so as to reassert their control 
over the destiny of the country.
92
 
 
Nevertheless, on 28 July 1959, the King (Mwami) was deposed in a coup in which the Mwami 
died without an heir and his half brother, a Tutsi aristocrat, was immediately placed in the 
position as the new king without consulting the colonial powers.
93
  This escalated tensions and 
set off an outbreak of violence between the Tutsi dominated political party, Union Nationale 
Rwandaise (UNAR), and the Hutu party, Parti du Mouvement de l ‘Émancipation Hutu 
(PARMEHUTU). In November 1959, PARMEHUTU led a revolt that resulted in a bloody 
ethnic conflict and collapse of the kingdom of Mwami Kigeri V.
94
 
 
Belgium ultimately intervened to bring calmness and order in the society. However, rather than 
merely restore order, the colonialists reversed their support to the Hutu majority, promoting the 
need for stability.
95
 The Belgians, who initially favoured the Tutsi over the Hutu even more than 
the Germans had, then turned their favour to the Hutu.
96
 Possibly, this was because the Tutsi 
minority had pressurised Belgians for independence in the late 1950s and had also abandoned the 
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Catholic Church beliefs.
97
  Instead, in addition to obedience shown to colonial rule, the Hutu 
majority had proved much more receptive to the gospel spread by the missionaries.
98
  
  
In 1960, Belgian administrators organised communal elections where the PARMEHUTU and 
other Pro-Hutu parties won the vast majority of civic posts. Of 229 mayors (Bourgmesters), only 
19 were Tutsi. This immediately facilitated the persecution campaigns against the Tutsi living in 
the neighbourhoods, which were now under Hutu control. On 28 January 1961, Hutu officials 
declared the end of the monarchy and established a republic during a public gathering in 
Gitarama, a town in the southern province. Their coming to power became known as the ‘coup of 
Gitarama.’99  This period marked the end of a five-century monarchy in Rwanda and the 
beginning of the continuous Tutsi harassment by Hutu-led governments.
100
  
 
The ensuing violence left more than 20,000 Tutsi dead and sent more others fleeing to 
neighbouring countries.
101
 Actually, it was concluded that approximately over 160,000 
Rwandans, most of whom were Tutsi, had become refugees in the bordering countries, mainly, 
Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo).
102
 The land and 
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cattle that the fleeing Tutsi left behind were promptly taken by Hutu. The state of insurgence was 
also the first ever documented case of systematic political violence between the Hutu and Tutsi.  
 
D. Post-Colonial Period 
As a result of the national election held under UN supervision in 1961, Gregoire Kayibanda, the 
author of the Hutu Manifesto, became Rwanda’s first president designate. And on 1 July 1962, 
Rwanda was granted independence after the General Assembly ended the trusteeship of 
Belgium. Important to note is that even after independence, tensions among the Tutsi and Hutu 
did not stop because Hutu were resentful of the unequal treatment they had been subjected to for 
a long time although they were the majority.
103
 This inequality was manifested in the oppressive 
rule against Tutsi by both republics. 
 
I. The First Republic 
After obtaining independence on the 1 July 1962, the first republic, headed by president, 
Gregoire Kayibanda from the PARMEHUTU party, adopted the first Constitution which was 
based on the Romano-Germanic legal tradition.
104
  Primarily, the Constitution abolished the 
Mwami regime (monarchy) and established the so called ‘democratic, social and sovereign 
republic.’105 The Constitution also included a limited equality clause, ensuring the equality of all 
its citizens without distinction as to race, origin, sex or religion.
106
 
 
Notwithstanding the equality clause in the Constitution, 
 
Kayibanda did little to resolve ethnic 
imbalances or establish peace in Rwanda.
107
  In fact, from the time, after he came to power, 
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ethnic violence erupted periodically against the Tutsi. For instance, after the 1959 insurgence, 
more suffering, oppression and killing of Tutsis occurred in 1963, 1966, and 1973.
108
 However, 
no one was ever prosecuted or otherwise held accountable for those acts.
109
 Instead the 
systematic isolation of the Tutsi was intensified and many Tutsi were continuously forced to flee 
the country. Also, in the period following the decolonisation of Rwanda, the new republic made 
no attempt to calm the people or repatriate the refugees.  
 
As the head of the state, Kayibanda fostered the notion of Tutsi and Hutu identities as being 
dissimilar races, with the Hutu being indigenous to Rwanda and the Tutsi non-indigenous.
110
 By 
identifying the Tutsi as foreigners in Rwanda, their relationship with Hutu was manipulated. This 
was maintained by retaining the view of racialisation put forth by the Belgian colonialists that 
Tutsi were aliens, with a different race, which justified their treatment as foreign inhabitants.
111
 
However, despite efforts of the first republic to favour the Hutu and establish a Hutu republic, 
there was a growing dissatisfaction with the regime, mainly due to the economic decline, 
regionalism and secterianism of southern Hutu,
112
 which eventually led to a coup d'état in 1973 
by Juvenal Habyarimana, the army chief of staff at the time.
113
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II. The Second Republic 
In July 1973, Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana, a northern Hutu, overthrew Kayibanda, a 
southern Hutu, and declared himself President of the Second Republic under the party, 
Mouvement Révolutionnaire National Pour Le Développement (MRND).
114
 The second republic 
also adopted a new Constitution on 17 December 1978. Among its specific provisions, was the 
inclusion of fundamental liberties identified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
115
 
Compared to its predecessor, the equality clause was further expanded to include, race, colour, 
origin, ethnic group, clan affiliation, sex, opinion, religion, or social position.
116
 
 
Contrary to the above provisions, during the Habyarimana regime, Tutsi people endured different 
human rights violations at various instances though, initially, not widespread. Similar to the 
previous republic, state-inspired violence was often directed against innocent citizens in the form 
of loss or destruction of property, persecution, torture, imprisonment, death, and banishment into 
exile.
117
 Therefore, the policy of Tutsi discrimination was promoted by both republics under the 
leadership of Gregoire Kayibanda and Juvenal Habyarimana respectively.
118
  Through the denial 
of fundamental rights and freedoms to certain citizens, the political structures of both republics 
violated various national and international laws.
119
  Moreover, no attempts were ever made to 
bring perpetrators of such violations to justice, and as a result, a culture of impunity was 
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implanted in Rwandan society.
120
  
 
Habyarimana further reinforced the separation of the dominant groups in Rwanda by putting 
emphasis on the ethnic identity of each citizen to be stated on state issued identity cards 
subsequent to the Belgian colonial policy.
121
 This was intended to marginalise Tutsi in political, 
social, and public life.
122
  
 
Therefore, for many years, politicians in Rwanda used ethnicity as a political tool to prevent 
power-sharing and democracy, while promotion of ethnic hatred was used as a means of power 
consolidation.
123
 For instance, since 1959, the Hutu elites and politicians always abused various 
human rights provisions by arbitrarily arresting and killing Tutsi so as to exclude them from 
leadership positions, and many others were sent into exile and denied repatriation to Rwanda.
124
  
 
Meanwhile, by the late 1980s, the number of Tutsi in exile had increased to over 400,000 
refugees, undergoing difficult situations in exile and unfair treatment as aliens.
125
 And 
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consequently, as their numbers expanded, the Tutsi in exile were concerned about returning to 
Rwanda.
126
 
 
E. Formation of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) 
In response to the repression of Tutsi, in 1988, a group of mostly Rwandan refugees in Uganda 
formed the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) which emerged from the former Rwandese Alliance 
for National Unity (RANU), the first organisation of these refugees.
127
 The goals of RPF were to 
secure the return of all refugees to Rwanda and struggle for political power-sharing in the 
country where Habyarimana had established only a single party system.
128
 By July 1990, in order 
to sabotage the RPF plans, Habyarimana declared that a multiparty system would be instituted in 
Rwanda and arranged an agreement on repatriation between Uganda and Rwanda.
129
 However, 
practice showed that the repatriation of refugees seemed impossible given the negative economic 
constraints in Rwanda along with unwillingness of the regime at the time.
130
 
 
On 1 October 1990, the Tutsi-led RPF began an invasion into Rwanda from the Northern region 
in order to overthrow the dictatorial government and bring the refugees back.
131
 The formation of 
the RPF, with its own armed forces, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), was a direct threat to 
                                                          
126
 For figures of refugees see, F.X Bangamwabo et al., Les Relations Interethiniques au Rwanda à la Lumière de 
l’Agression d’Octobre 1990, (1991), at 185.  
127
 0. Otunnu, ‘Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda,’ in H. Adelman and A. Suhrhe (eds), The Path of a 
Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, (1999), at 31-49. 
128
 A. Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, (1999), at 37 et seq; United Nations 
Department of Public Information, The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, Vol. X, (1996), at 12. 
129
 United Nations Department of Public Information, The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, Vol. X, (1996), 
at 12; Bureau of African Affairs, ‘U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Rwanda,’ at 
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/index.cfm?docid=2861>,  accessed September 2012. 
130
 F. Reyntjens, L’Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crise: Burundi, Rwanda 1988-1994, (1994), at 28; A. Guichaoua, 
Les Crises Politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda 1993-1994, (1995); M. Mamdani,  ‘African States, Citizenship and 
War’ 78 International Affairs, (2002), at 500 et seq. 
131
 G. Rwaka, ‘Imvo n’Imvano y’Urugamba rwo Kubohora u Rwanda, (1 Ukwakira 1990)’ Igihe News, 1 October 
2012; R. Van der Meeren, ‘Three decades in Exile: Rwandan Refugees 1960-1990’ 9 Journal of Refugee Studies, 
(1996), at 252-267. 
  
 
 
31 
 
Hutu power.
132
 Also, the military costs associated with repelling the RPF invasion in 1990 placed 
great demands upon the regime of Habyarimana. The then Rwandan government took steps to 
preserve its power in the face of the Tutsi infiltration.
133 
 
 
As a response to the RPF invasion, various parties were formed, mainly comprising of Hutu 
extremists who consolidated themselves and advocated for their unity in order to fight the Tutsi 
common enemy within and outside Rwanda.
134
 Also, the ‘akazu’, meaning the circle of people 
around president Habyarimana’s wife, found the ideal opportunity to spread the genocide 
ideology.
135
 As a result, they issued the Hutu ‘ten commandments’, forbidding Hutu from 
interacting or entering into a wide range of relations with the Tutsi enemy, whether in marital 
affairs, business, or state affairs.
136
   
 
Meanwhile, the war between the RPF rebel group and the Rwandan armed forces (FAR) 
continued.
137
 After intermittent fighting between the forces, the battle lasted until 31 July 1992, 
when a cease-fire halted the war that had cost many peoples’ lives. The Rwandan government 
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and the RPF then began to engage in political talks which culminated in the signing of the 1993 
Arusha peace agreement, guaranteeing power-sharing between the two factions.
138
  
 
To monitor the implementation and enforcement of the agreement, the UN Security Council 
unanimously authorised the formation of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
(UNAMIR), in October 1993.
139
 The United Nations mission and the accords, however, did not 
result in peace.
140
 Many Hutu extremists who did not believe in making any compromises 
between the Hutu and Tutsi, disagreed with the peace process and were thus at odds with its 
implementation.
141
  They instead decided to torture Tutsis in Rwanda identified as traitors. 
Towards the end of 1993, the human rights bodies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
began reporting serious human rights violations against the Tutsi and political opponents, but the 
international community did little to stop the violence,
142
 until it erupted into the genocide of 
April 1994.
143
 
 
F. The Genocide Period 
On the night of 6 April 1994, Habyarimana was shot down in his private plane by a missile while 
returning to Kigali from a peace conference in Tanzania, together with president Ntaryamira of 
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Burundi.n the board was killed.
144
 The Hutu extremists immediately began slaughtering Tutsi 
and moderate Hutu in Kigali.
145
 The pertinent question is whether these massacres were planned 
or whether they were ignited by the death of Rwanda's president.  
 
According to Behrendt, genocide was the culmination not only of a four year civil war that took 
place during the 1990s, but also of a conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi populations that had 
been escalating for decades, if not centuries.
146
 Historically, apart from frequent arbitrary arrests, 
the government of Rwanda regularly sponsored the broadcast of hate propaganda against the 
Tutsi and government opponents in preparation for the genocide.
147
 
 
 Indeed, long before the massacres began, the government had drawn up lists of people to be 
killed, and established a training camp for Hutu militia to indoctrinate them in ethnic hatred and 
methods of mass killing.
148
  For instance, in 1992, groups affiliated with the Rwandan army 
forces had already established two militias, the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi.
149
 These 
militias, which were trained by the army, periodically attacked Tutsi and eventually played an 
instrumental role in the 1994 atrocities.
150
 In fact, despite the discrimination and torture directed 
against the Tutsi from 1959-1989, accumulation of killings occurred in 1990, through to 1993. 
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Nevertheless, the most serious and massive killings, did not occur until 7 April 1994.
151
  
 
After Habyarimana was killed in a plane crash on 6 April 1994, a radical group of Hutu militants 
succeeded him in the interim government and started the genocide on 7 April 1994. While in 
power, they immediately put in place the previously designed plans for genocide, using the plane 
crash as a pretext to stir anger of Hutu against the Tutsi.
152
 Therefore, the assassination of 
president Habyarimana was undoubtedly the spark which triggered the immediate commission of 
genocide and crimes against humanity by the presidential guard, military, militias and civilians 
in the government.
153
 
 
Although the persons responsible for the assassination of Habyarimana were never identified, it 
is postulated that extremist Hutu were behind it.
154
 Upset with Habyarimana’s decision to share 
power with the Tutsi, they assassinated him and executed the already planned massacres.
155
 
Within a few hours after the plane crash, Hutu militias and the gendarmerie set up roadblocks 
and checkpoints, and state-issued identification cards were demanded. Those identified as Tutsi 
were murdered immediately. The next morning, the prime minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a 
moderate-Hutu, was killed in her home.
156
 This was evidence that not only Tutsi were killed or 
disappeared, but also moderate Hutu in favour of the peace process were targeted.  
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Later the same day, after killing the prime minister, ten Belgian peacekeepers were murdered by 
government soldiers at Camp-Kigali.
157
 Although the U.S. had safely evacuated its entire people, 
Belgium asked for cover from the U.S while it sought to remove its troops.  By 19 April, the 
Belgian withdrawal of its troops was complete, and two days later, instead of authorising 
additional peacekeeping measures, the United Nations Security Council withdrew the majority of 
the UNAMIR forces, reducing them from 2,100 to a mere 270 troops.
158
 And the remaining 
peace keepers could do only little to stop the widespread genocide.
159
  
 
During the following days and weeks, the killing spread, throughout the country. The targets 
were the Tutsi ethnic group and moderate Hutu. Hospitals, churches and schools were turned into 
killing sites.
160
 The massacres were extremely horrific due to the cruel way in which they were 
carried out. Often victims were put to death by simple and brutal means, such as by the use of 
machetes, axes, knives, sticks, tools, iron bars and sometimes firearms.
161
 Several victims were 
systematically raped, tortured and many of them were killed as well, while males were subjected 
to torture and extreme degradation before being killed. Children, particularly males, were also 
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singled out and murdered.
162
 Also, children were extensively used as instruments for committing 
genocide, either as civilians or as soldiers.
163
 In addition to violating the most fundamental 
human right, the right to life, the perpertrators of these crimes violated various international 
human rights laws as well as international humanitarian norms.
164
 
 
Many ordinary Hutu participated voluntarily, indeed enthusiastically, in the massacres. Besides 
the active role played by leaders and the elite people in the genocide, the Interahamwe and 
Impuzamugambi militias tended to recruit mostly among the uneducated and even poor people, 
like street boys, and unemployed citizens.
165
 For these people, genocide was the easiest thing to 
do because they could loot the property of victims, get drunk for free, rape Tutsi women and kill 
with no legal consequence as the government propaganda urged every single Hutu to become 
involved, whether rich or poor in killing all Tutsi.
166
 This was revealed in the Kayishema and 
Ruzindana case before the ICTR, where the trial chamber observed: 
Not only were Tutsi killed in tremendous numbers but they were also killed regardless of gender or age. 
Men and women, old and young were killed without mercy. Children were massacred before their parent’s 
eyes, women raped in the sight of their families.
167
 No Tutsi was exonorated, neither the weak nor the 
pregnant.
168
  
 
About 100 days after the genocide had begun, the RPA army stopped the massacres that were 
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being carried out by Interahamwe, obviously leaving bitter consequences and deep wounds 
behind.
169
 The international community did not prevent the genocide, nor did it stop the killing 
when the violence had begun, but instead withdrew even the troops it had in Rwanda.
170
 It is this 
failure to halt the genocide that initially strained the relationship between Rwanda and the United 
Nations,
171
 and created tensions with countries like France which had generously funded and 
supported the génocidaires.
172
  
 
As put by Dallaire,
173
 each one of the mere 2,100 troops would have been crucial to saving lives 
if the international community had not withdrawn them. This is because Hutu killers were being 
deterred from committing acts of genocide in front of UN peacekeepers. In fact, Samantha Power 
shows how at the Hotel des Mille Collines, ten peacekeepers and four UN military observers 
helped to protect several hundreds of civilians sheltered there for the duration of the crisis.
174
 
Nevertheless, the UN forces that remained in Rwanda were too few to save the massive number 
of victims that were targeted in 1994.
175
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It has not been possible to give an exact number of how many people were exterminated, but it is 
estimated that between 800,000 to 1,000,000 victims out of a population of 7.5 million were 
killed in the three months period following the plane crash. This means that approximately 11% 
of Rwanda’s total population had been killed.176   This tragedy may have set a historic record for 
the largest number of people put to death in such a short time.
177
 Nevertheless, by 18 July 1994, 
the RPF had already gained control over the whole country and declared a unilateral ceasefire.  
Then, on 19 July, the Government of National Unity was sworn in for a transitional period of 
five years. It included both Hutus and Tutsis in the leadership.
178
 After the genocide, the RPF-led 
government outlawed identification of Rwandans according to historical ethnic groups and ruled 
that everyone is to be identified as a Rwandan not as a Hutu, Tutsi or Twa.
179
 
 
In light of the magnitude and the nature of international crimes that had been committed in 
Rwanda, the new government inherited various problems, ranging from infrastructural 
annihilation to justice needs.
180
 It had to institute the rule of law and consider reconciliatory 
efforts by eradicating, inter alia, the culture of impunity where no one had been punished for the 
periodic massacres.
181
 Therefore, in an effort to deal with the past, the ICTR,
182
 national courts
183
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and Gacaca courts
184
 were established to dispense justice and to deal with the enormous number 
of genocide suspects.
185
 The following chapters will therefore critically explore each level of the 
judicial response in post-conflict Rwanda and the associated problems or discrepancies.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 
 
A. Introduction 
Article VI of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
provides for the prosecution of the crime of genocide before a competent tribunal of the State in 
the territory of which the act was committed or by such interested international penal tribunal as 
may have jurisdiction with respect to those contracting parties which shall have accepted its 
jurisdiction.
186
 The Convention establishes no hierarchy or preference between the two regimes. 
In a sense, Article VI was also a mandate to the international community, to the states parties 
and to the United Nations, to ensure the creation of an international jurisdiction.
187
 
 
In compliance with the above, and following the genocide in Rwanda,
188
 the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established in November 1994 by the United Nations in 
Resolution 955
189
 in order to judge people responsible for the genocide and other serious 
violations of international law in Rwanda
190 
or by Rwandan citizens in nearby states, between 1 
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January 1994 to 31 December 1994.
191
 The subject matter jurisdiction of the ICTR incorporates 
genocide,
192
 crimes against humanity
193
 and war crimes.
194
 The creation of the ad hoc Tribunal 
was a landmark move by the international community premised on the core goals of justice, 
accountability, deterrence, and ending impunity.
195
  This Chapter evaluates the legacy of the 
Tribunal with regard to its achievements and shortcomings in prosecuting mainly the crime of 
genocide. 
 
B. Generalities about the Tribunal 
I. Genesis of the ICTR 
The genesis of the ICTR followed several investigations with regard to the civil war in Rwanda. 
Following an earlier Security Council Resolution, then Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
named a commission of experts to go to Rwanda to investigate and assess evidence of grave 
violations of international humanitarian law, including possible acts of genocide.
196
 This 
commission of human rights experts found that genocide and violations of international 
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humanitarian law had occurred.
197
 In addition, the UN Commission on Human Rights convened 
an emergency session in May 1994 and appointed a special rapporteur who was also charged 
with investigating and verifying claims of massive human rights violations, including 
genocide.
198
 The special rapporteur, Ivorian lawyer René Degni-Ségui, submitted two reports to 
the commission in June and August 1994, both of which found that grave violations of 
humanitarian law and genocide had been committed in Rwanda in what was clearly an internal 
and not an international armed conflict.
199
  
 
The UN, following the pattern of the already established International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia,
200
 decided that the genocide in Rwanda required a similar effort to ensure 
prosecution for the most serious crimes, such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.
201
 The definitions of the crimes laid down in the Statute are supposed to reflect 
customary international law existing at the time of the genocide. Therefore, the fact that the 
Statute was enacted after the perpetration of the crimes in question does not mean that the Statute 
imposes retroactive criminalisation.  
 
II. Legal Basis of the ICTR 
In the wake of the genocide in Rwanda, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 955, 
creating the ICTR on 8 November 1994.
202
 The ICTR is governed by its Statute, and by its rules 
                                                          
197
 Letter Dated 1 October 1994 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
S/1994/1125, transmitting the Commission of Experts' Preliminary Report (1 October, 1994). 
198
 Commission on Human Rights, Resolution S-3/1 (May 25, 1994). 
199
 ‘Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda,’ UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7 (28 June 1994); and ‘Report on 
the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda,’ UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/12 (12 Aug. 1994); Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights, Prosecuting War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, (1995), at 22 et seq. 
200
 J.RW.D Jones, The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
(1998), at 116 et seq; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Prosecuting War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia,  
(1995), at 22 et seq. 
201
 J.B. Quigley, The Genocide Convention: An International Law Analysis (2006), at 51 et seq.; G. Werle, 
Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn, (2009), at 100, MN 280 et seq; S. Williams, ‘The Completion 
Strategy of the ICTY and ICTR’in M. Bohlander, International Criminal Justice: A critical Analysis of Institutions 
and Procedures, (2007), at 153 et seq. 
202
 On the creation and work of the Tribunal, see V. Morris and M. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, Vol. 1, (1998), at 638 et seq; L. Gradoni, ‘You will receive a Fair Trial Elsewhere,’ The Ad hoc 
  
 
 
43 
 
of procedure and evidence, which were adopted by the judges and which were subject to 
continual adaptations and amendments.
203
  
 
The Statute of the ICTR establishes its jurisdiction, the types of crimes to be investigated and 
prosecuted, the Tribunal’s relationship with national courts, the organisation of the Tribunal, the 
Prosecutor’s and Registrar’s offices, the conduct of investigations, the rights of the accused, 
witness protection, rules of procedure, appeals and enforcement of sentences, which are largely 
similar to the ICTY provisions.
204
 In its Article 2, the Statute incorporates the customary law 
crime of genocide as laid down in identical wording in the Genocide Convention.
205
 The 
definition of crimes against humanity in Article 3 dispenses with the requirement that crimes 
must be committed in armed conflict, an element found in the classical definition of crimes 
against humanity in the Nuremberg Charter.
206
 In this regard, the ICTR Statute reflects the status 
of customary international law at the time. Instead, Article 3 of the Statute requires that crimes 
against humanity be committed ‘on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.’ 
 
However, this element is not supposed to limit the scope of the crime as compared to the 
customary definition. Rather, the element describes the form that crimes against humanity took 
in Rwanda.
207
 Regarding the individual crimes against humanity, the Statute, just like the ICTY 
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Statute and the Control Council Law N° 10, incorporates the crime of rape, which played an 
important role in the Tribunal’s jurisprudence.208 The war crimes definition in Article 4 of the 
Statute is limited to violations of common Article 3 and of the 1977 Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions, and thus to war crimes committed in non-international armed conflict, which is 
consistent with the UN special rapporteur’s characterization of the conflict as an internal one. 
 
The Tribunal’s rules of procedure and evidence adopted on 29 June 1995 develop the 
fundamental fair trial guarantees specified in Article 20 of the ICTR Statute. Article 20 of the 
Tribunal’s Statute contains international fair trial standards found in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), such as the presumption of innocence, the right to 
counsel, the right to remain silent and the right to confront and call witnesses.
209
 The Tribunal 
has always been required to adhere to general principles of criminal law in its prosecutions and 
trials. 
 
The ICTR jurisdiction is limited to natural persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens 
responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring states between 1 
January 1994 and 31 December 1994.
210
 The maximum penalty imposed by the trial chamber is 
limited to life imprisonment.
211
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III. Organization of the Tribunal 
The ICTR, modeled after the ICTY, has three principal organs; the chambers, office of the 
prosecutor and the registry.
212
 The Tribunal’s chambers comprise three trial chambers in Arusha 
and an appeals chamber in The Hague.
213
 The office of the prosecutor is in charge of 
investigations and prosecutions.
214
 While initially, the ICTR and ICTY had the same prosecutor, 
the ICTR has had its own prosecutor since 2003.
215
 The prosecutor is based in Arusha and has a 
sub-office in Kigali. The registry is responsible for providing overall judicial and administrative 
support to the chambers and the office of the prosecutor.
216
 The geographical dispersal of the 
Tribunal’s activities obviously impedes the activities of the Tribunal and makes difficult 
communication and coordination between the different offices and organs. 
 
 In total, the chambers consist of sixteen permanent judges and nine ad litem judges, all elected 
by the United Nations General Assembly.  There are three permanent judges for each of the 
three trial chambers, and seven permanent judges for the appeals chamber. However, only five 
of these seven permanent judges sit in the appeals chamber at any given time. To ensure legal 
consistency between the two tribunals, the appeals chamber of the ICTY also serves as the 
appeals chamber of the ICTR
217
 and is therefore based in The Hague. Having been set up by a 
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binding Resolution of the UN Security Council, the ICTR has concurrent jurisdiction with 
national courts but asserts primacy over the latter, and has the ability to force the surrender of an 
accused, whether a Rwandan citizen or not, located in Rwanda or any third State.
218
 
 
IV. Relationship between Rwanda and the Tribunal 
Rwanda, being a member of the Security Council at the time, was the only state to vote against 
Resolution 995 creating the ICTR,
219
 even though it had initially requested the establishment of 
an international tribunal.
220
 What prompted its negative vote was its disapproval of the likelihood 
of enforcing ICTR sentences outside Rwanda,
221
 the Tribunal’s limited temporal jurisdiction,222 
the inability to impose capital punishment,
223
 the poor equipment of the Tribunal,
224
 and finally 
its location outside Rwanda. All these proposals were rejected by the Security Council.Despite 
                                                          
218
 Thus the full force of Chapter VII underlies the Tribunal's authority and compliance with its decisions is 
mandatory, see Art. 8 of the ICTR Statute; see Art. 25 of the United Nation Charter; see Rule 9 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence of both the ICTY and the ICTR; A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd edn, (2008), 
at 341. 
219
 UN Security Council Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994. For details on ICTR establishment, see M.C 
Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law, (2003), at 431 et seq.; V. Morris and M. Scharf, The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Vol. 1, (1998), at 4; see also G. Werle, Principles of International 
Criminal Law, 2nd edn, (2009), at 17, MN 54 et seq. 
220
  Letter dated 28 September 1994 from the permanent representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed 
to the president of the Security Council,’ (S/1994/1115, 29 September 1994), at annex Para 6 (c)and Para 10 (c). 
221
 J.A Frowein and R. Wolfrum (eds.), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 5, (2001), at 260 et seq; 
P. Akhavan,  ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics  and Pragmatics of Punishment,’ 90 
American Journal of International Law, (1996), at 501 et seq. 
222
 The Tribunal’s jurisdiction was limited to crimes committed between 1 January and 31 December 1994. This 
would not cover the lengthy period, during which preparations were made for the genocide, see UN Doc. S/PV.3453 
1994, at 14-16. 
223
 At the time, National courts applied death penalty in their laws, see Public Prosecutor v. Charles Karorero et al., 
Judgment of 31/03/2000 (R.M.P 78.752/S2/KRL), (R.P 26/96), Urukiko rwa mbere rw’iremezo rwa  Cyangugu, 
Western province. Karorero and others were sentenced to death penalty; see also Art. 23(1) ICTR Statute) Security 
Council Res. 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994, as amended to date; Also  ‘Statement to the Security Council by the 
Rwandan Representative on 8 November 1994’ at the Tribunal’s website, <http://www.unictr.org/default.html>, 
accessed in March 2012. 
224
 Initially, there were only two trial chambers until the 1998 amendment of the Statute which added a third trial 
chamber, UN Security Council Res. 1166 (1998) of 13 May 1998. See also ‘Report of the Security Council on the 
Situation Concerning Rwanda,’ (8 November 1994), UN Doc. S/PV. 3453, available at 
<http://www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-3453.pdf>, accessed July 2011, at 13-16. 
  
 
 
47 
 
the rejection of all its suggestions, Rwanda nevertheless expressed its support and willingness to 
cooperate with the Tribunal.
225
 
 
At the start, the country’s interaction with the ICTR during the Tribunal’s first years of existence 
was minimal until its first arrests. Rwanda was probably surprised that the Tribunal was serious 
about prosecuting génocidaires. Also, the presence of a special representative of Rwanda in 
Arusha to follow up the activities of the Tribunal since 1999 facilitated communication between 
Kigali and Arusha in matters of transfer of witnesses and the like. However, the relationship 
between Rwanda and the Tribunal remained unstable. 
 
In November 1999, disagreement arose over the release of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, after the 
appeals chamber had ordered his release because of violations of his due process rights in 
connection with his arrest and transfer to the ICTR.
226
 The Rwandan authorities, clearly 
dissatisfied with the decision, threatened to cut their relations with the Tribunal. Following a 
request for review filed by the ICTR prosecutor, the Tribunal’s appeals chamber reversed its 
previous decision, allowing the trial to proceed.
227
 The appeals chamber noted that the due 
process violations would be remedied by reducing the sentence in the case of conviction, or 
providing compensation in the case of an acquittal. After that, Rwanda resumed cooperation with 
the Tribunal. 
 
In 2002, the relationship between the ICTR and Rwanda deteriorated once again, leading to 
partial suspension of cooperation by Rwanda.
228
 This was fuelled by two prominent genocide 
survivors’ organizations229 which severed cooperation with the ICTR, accusing it for mistreating 
witnesses before the court. This referred to an incident where the judges had reportedly laughed 
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at a rape victim.
230
 In addition, they accused the Tribunal of employing genocide suspects,
231
 and 
denounced the slow pace of the Tribunal.
232
 Due to these reasons, two powerful genocide 
survivors’ associations IBUKA and AVEGA boycotted ICTR proceedings by instructing their 
members not to testify before the Tribunal.
233
 This undoubtedly prevented the Tribunal from 
gaining public legitimacy in Rwanda. From then on, the relationship between the Tribunal and 
Rwandan government remained tense.
234
 However, following several reciprocal visits by ICTR 
and Rwandan officials in 2003, the relationship improved. 
 
Nevertheless, the relationship remained unstable. In 2004, tension between Rwanda and the 
ICTR arose over the Tribunal’s acquittal of former préfet Emmanuel Bagambiki and André 
Ntagerura, former minister of transport and telecommunications, on charges of genocide and 
crimes against humanity. The acquittal enraged the Rwandan government and population, who 
accused the préfet of responsibility in the killings of the Tutsis in the Bugesera region. As a 
result, a communiqué from the ministry of justice firmly denounced the decision to acquit 
Bagambiki and Ntagerura. In addition, an estimated 10,000 people turned up on the streets of the 
town of Cyangugu in the defendants’ home province to demonstrate against the acquittal.235 It is 
important to note that this was only the second time that the ICTR had delivered an acquittal. 
The first suspect to be acquitted was former mayor of Mabanza commune, Ignace Bagilishema, 
in 2001. The Rwandan government on that occasion appeared to accept the decision of the ICTR. 
Another incident which heightened the tensions revolved around Rwanda’s accusations in 2006 
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that the ICTR appointed a Rwandan genocide suspect as a defence counsel.
236
 In fact, the ICTR 
was often accused of scandalous acts of employing genocide suspects.
237
 This affected the public 
trust and in turn seriously minimized the ICTR’s role in the reconciliation process in Rwanda.238 
 
A relatively recent case that shocked the Rwandan public as well as the government was the 
acquittal of Protais Zigiranyirazo.
239
 In December 2008, the trial chamber of the ICTR had 
sentenced Zigiranyirazo to twenty years’ imprisonment for genocide and extermination as a 
crime against humanity.
240
 However, in November 2009, the verdict was overturned by the 
appeals chamber of the ICTR, which acquitted him of all charges, ordering his immediate 
release.
241
 In the view of the appeals chamber, his acquittal was based on the fact that his 
involvement in the crimes charged could not be proven. This was criticized on the Rwandan 
national radio by the Rwandan minister of justice, Tharcisse Karugarama, and by the national 
press, as well as by victims’ associations who regard Zigiranyirazo as one of the masterminds of 
the genocide.
242
 
 
The most recent case that has attracted criticism in Rwanda was the acquittal of former ministers 
Justin Mugenzi and Prosper Mugiraneza by the appeals chamber in 2013. On 30 September 
2011, the trial chamber had found both men guilty and sentenced them to 30 years in prison for 
conspiracy to commit genocide, and direct and public incitement to commit genocide. The 
appeals chamber overturned the conviction on 4 February 2013 and ordered their release, an act 
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which was not well received by the Rwandan victims associations and which was criticized by 
the prosecutor general Martin Ngoga.
243
 
 
Arguably, the reasons for these regular tensions with the Tribunal can be attributed to Rwanda’s 
general distrust of UN institutions, following the failure of the international community to 
prevent the genocide,
244
 and Rwanda’s desire to be self-sufficient, by having its own institutions 
to prosecute génocidaires. 
 
Notwithstanding such tensions, Rwanda has been cooperative with the Tribunal and vice versa. 
In fact, the Tribunal has had an enormous impact on the reform of the judiciary within Rwanda, 
especially since the adoption of the Tribunal’s completion strategy in 2004.245 Under the 
completion strategy, the Tribunal may refer cases to national jurisdictions for trial if the Tribunal 
has satisfied itself that the accused will receive a fair trial.
246
 This has created an incentive for 
Rwanda to improve relations with the Tribunal and to improve due process standards, which also 
included the abolition of the death penalty in 2007 and the sentence of life imprisonment under 
solitary confinement being inapplicaple for ICTR transferees. Currently, eight cases have been 
referred to Rwanda by the Tribunal.
247
  
 
Furthermore, there has been a steady flow of witnesses, as well as regular access to documents in 
Rwanda by the officials of the Tribunal. This has undeniably been crucial for the Tribunal’s 
functioning. It is noted that Rwanda assists the ICTR usually through its prosecution authorities. 
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For instance, when the ICTR seeks information on a certain case, it usually passes through the 
Rwandan prosecution authorities, which, in turn, request the information from the relevant 
ordinary or Gacaca courts with parallel jurisdiction over the crime of genocide.
248
 On the other 
hand, the ICTR organizes seminars and workshops to train Rwandan judges and prosecutors in 
criminal justice matters which, is important in building the Rwandan judiciary. 
 
C. Status of the ICTR Cases 
While the ICTY is widely regarded as a ‘war crimes’ Tribunal, the ICTR is commonly known as 
a ‘Genocide Tribunal.’249 This is because it has taken a notable status as the first international 
criminal tribunal to prosecute many suspects for genocide.
250
 
 
Currently, eighteen years after its establishment, the ICTR has indicted ninety two individuals 
and arrested eighty three of them accused of genocide and other crimes. The Tribunal has 
finalised proceedings of seventy-five individuals, among whom eleven have been released after 
serving their sentences and three died while serving prison sentences. Seventeen are appealing 
their sentences and ten have been acquitted. Proceedings against four individuals were 
terminated after two died and after indictments against two were withdrawn.
251
 Nine individuals 
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remain at large as fugitives.
252
 The cases against ten individuals have been referred or transferred 
to national jurisdictions mainly Rwanda
253
 and France,
254
  following Rule 11 bis of the 
Tribunal’s rules of procedure and evidence on transfer of cases. Noting that the penalty imposed 
by the Tribunal is limited to imprisonment,
255
 the majority of convicts are currently serving their 
prison sentences in Mali and Benin. The Tribunal is bound to close its work on 31 December 
2014, according to the ICTR completion strategy,
256
 and will transfer its responsibilities to the 
International Residual Mechanism which already began functioning for the ICTR branch in July 
2012.
257
 
                                                          
252
 So far among the indicted persons, 9 fugitives remain at large; Bizimana Augustin, Kabuga Félicien, Kayishema 
Fulgence, Mpiranya Protais, Munyagishari Bernard, Munyarugarama Pheneas, Ndimbati Aloys, Ntaganzwa 
Ladislas,  Ryandikayo Charles, Sikubwabo Charles. 
253
 Cases referred by the Tribunal to Rwanda include that of Jean-Bosco Uwinkindi, Charles Ryandikayo, Fulgence 
Kayishema, Aloys Ndimbati, Charles Sikubwabo, Ladislas Ntaganzwa, Pheneas Munyarugarama, and Bernard 
Munyagishari (transfer pending appeal); see E. Musoni,  ‘ICTR Transfers another Case to Rwanda,’ The New Times 
Rwanda, 09 October 2012; see  ‘Status of ICTR cases,’ available at 
<http://www.unictr.org/Cases/tabid/204/Default.aspx>,  accessed October 2012; for discussion on referral, see H. 
Brady and B. Goy,  ‘Current Developments at the Ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals,’ 6 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, (2008), at 606. 
254
 Cases referred by the Tribunal to France include, Bucyibaruta Laurent, Former Préfet of Gikongoro; 
Munyeshyaka Wenceslas a Catholic Priest but French courts have remained inactive since the referral; see H. Brady 
and B. Goy,  ‘Current Developments at the Ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals,’ 6 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice ,(2008), at 606; see  ‘Status of ICTR cases,’ available at 
<http://www.unictr.org/Cases/tabid/204/Default.aspx>, accessed October 2012. 
255
 Details on penalties are in Art. 23, ICTR Statute; Rule 101 ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence; M.C 
Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law, (2003), at 324; see also J. Philipp Book, Appeal and 
Sentence in International Criminal Law, (2011), at 29 et seq.; S. Szoke-Burke, ‘Avoiding Belittlement of Human 
Suffering: A Retributivist Critique of ICTR Sentencing Practices’ 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
(2012), at 562. 
256
 T. Pittman, ‘The Road to the Establishment of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals: 
From Completion to Continuation,’ 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2011), at 797-817; F. Pocar, 
‘Completion or Continuation Strategy?’ Appraising Problems  and Possible Developments in Building the Legacy of 
The ICTY, 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2008),  at 655 et seq; S. Williams, ‘The Completion Strategy 
of the ICTY and ICTR,’ in M. Bohlander, International Criminal Justice: A critical Analysis of Institutions and 
Procedures, (2007), at 153 et seq. 
257
 Statute of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals; The Mechanism for International 
Criminal Tribunals (the MICT) was established by the United Nations Security Council on 22 December 2010. The 
Tribunal became a residual UN Court On 1July 2012 with mandate to carry out essential functions and to maintain 
the legacy of the ICTY and ICTR. In fact the case file of Pheneas Munyarugarama was referred to Rwandan courts 
by the Appeals chamber of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals in October 2012; see 
details on the Residual mechanism in G. Acquaviva, ‘Was a Residual Mechanism for International Criminal 
Tribunals Really Necessary?’ 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2011), at 789-796; T. Pittman, ‘The 
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D. Analysis of Important Jurisprudence before the ICTR  
The entire case law of the ICTR cannot be examined in the context of this study. However, some 
exemplary cases of high profile defendants shall be dealt with in order to demonstrate the 
contribution of the Tribunal’s jurisprudence to bringing justice to Rwanda. The selected cases are 
groundbreaking either for their contribution to the development of international criminal law or 
for their role in clarifying the organization and the execution of the genocide. Their 
jurisprudential legacy is the principal subject discussed below.  
 
I. Prosecutor versus Akayesu 
On 9 January 1997, the ICTR commenced one of the most historic cases in international law, 
prosecutor versus Jean-Paul Akayesu.
258
 During the 1994 Rwandan genocide, Akayesu was the 
mayor of Taba, a district where many Tutsi were systematically raped,
259
 tortured and 
murdered.
260
 In 1998, the Tribunal set a precedent by convicting the defendant of genocide, for 
acts of rape, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and crimes against humanity, 
namely, extermination, murder, torture, rape, and other inhumane acts.
261
 He was acquitted of 
complicity in genocide and war crimes. On 2 September 1998 Akayesu was sentenced to a single 
sentence of life imprisonment, which was upheld on appeal on 1 June 2001.
262
 He is at the time 
of writing serving his sentence in Mali. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Road to the Establishment of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals: From Completion to 
Continuation,’ 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2011), at 797-817.  
258
 See, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case N° ICTR-96-4-T, September 1998; G. Werle, Principles of International 
Criminal Law, 2nd edn, (2009), at 100, MN 282. 
259
 Akayesu aided and abetted acts of sexual violence by allowing them to take place on or near the premises of the 
communal bureau while he was present on the premises and by facilitating the commission of these acts through his 
words of encouragement. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case N° ICTR-96-4-T, September 1998, Paras 32, and 416. 
260
  Between April and June 1994, atleast 2,000 Tutsis were slaughtered in Taba commune headed by Akayesu. For a 
commentary on the case see, A. Cassese et al., International Criminal Law: Cases and Commentary, (2011), at 201 
and 220 et seq. See G.W Mugwanya, The Crime of Genocide in International Law: Appraising the Contribution of 
the UN Tribunal for Rwanda, (2007), at 85 et seq. 
261
  See Analyis in C. Aptel, ’The Intent to Commit Genocide in the Case Law of the International Criminal 
Tribunals,’ 13 Criminal Law Forum, (2002), at 273 et seq; D.D Nersessian, ’The Contours of Genocidal Intent: 
Troubling Jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunals,’ 37 Texas International Law Journal, (2002), at 
231 et seq. 
262
 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case N° ICTR-96-4-A, 1 June 2001. 
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This case is important because it was the first trial in which an international tribunal was called 
upon to interpret the definition of genocide contained in the Genocide Convention.
263
 The court 
based its findings on Article 2(2) of the ICTR Statute which is drawn verbatim from Articles II 
and III of the Genocide Convention.
264
 In the Akayesu case, the ICTR had to do pioneering work 
in interpreting the elements of the crime of genocide.
265
 
 
Apart from elucidating the elements of this offence, this case was also groundbreaking for its 
affirmation of rape and other forms of sexual violence which were common during the genocide 
as constituent acts of genocide.
266
 The trial chamber found that rape and sexual violence 
constitute serious bodily or mental harm which, if committed with the requisite intent to destroy 
a protected group, amount to the crime of genocide.
267
 In the Akayesu trial, the ICTR, expressly 
mentioned that sexual assault formed an integral part of the process of destroying the Tutsi 
ethnic group and that rape was systematic and had been perpetrated against Tutsi women only, 
manifesting the specific intent required for those acts to constitute genocide.
268
 In particular, it 
                                                          
263
 See, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case N° ICTR-96-4-T, September 1998, Para 520 and 522; see G. Verdirame, ‘The 
Genocide Convention in the Jurisprudence of the Ad hoc Tribunals,’ 49 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, (2000), at 578 et seq. 
264
 G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn, (2009), at 255, MN 698; for details on the 
Genocide Convention and Definition, see L. Kuper, Genocide: Its Political use in the Twentieth Century, (1981), at 
19 et seq; C.W. Isreal, ‘Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide,’ in J. Andreopoulus (ed.), Genocide: Conceptual 
and Historical Dimensions, (1994), at75 et seq.; for the origin of the word Genocide, see R. Lemkin, ‘Genocide as 
an International Crime,’ 41 American Journal of International Law, (1947), at 145-147. 
265
 G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn, (2009), at 18, MN 55. 
266
 The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case N° ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (TC), 2 September 1998, Para 731. Prior to this 
case, there was no internationally accepted definition of the crime of rape. In the Akayesu case, rape was defined as 
‘a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances, which are coercive.’ The 
Akayesu definition was adopted by the ICTY in the Celebici trial chamber Judgment. See Prosecutor v. Delalic, 
Judgment (Trial Chamber), Case N° IT-96-21-T, Para 394. Furthermore, the Tribunal has prosecuted rape and 
sexual crimes in various cases. For instance, in the case of Prosecutor v. Musema, Prosecutor v. Semanza and 
Prosecutor v. Muhimana (Judgement and Sentence) ICTR- 95-1B-T, 28 April 2005; M. Gasheegu,  ‘UNIFEM, RDF 
Decry Gender Violence,’ The New Times Rwanda, 29 September 2007, it was estimated that about 500,000 women 
were raped during the genocide; C. W. Mullins,  ‘We are Going to Rape you and Taste Tutsi Women: Rape during 
the 1994 Rwandan Genocide,’ 49 The British Journal of Criminology, (2009), at 719-735. 
267
 C. Aptel, ’The Intent to Commit Genocide in the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunals,’ 13 Criminal 
Law Forum, (2002), at 273 et seq; D.D Nersessian, ’The Contors of Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudence from 
the International Criminal Tribunals,’ 37 Texas International Law Journal, (2002), at 231 et seq.  
268
 The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case N° ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (TC), 2 September 1998, Paras 731-732; see also 
R. L. Haffajee, ‘Prosecuting Crimes of Rape and Sexual Violence at the ICTR: The Application of Joint Criminal 
Enterprise Theory,’ 29 Harvard Journal of Law and Gender, (2006), at 201-221. 
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was found that sexual violence causes serious bodily and mental harm.
269
 This finding was 
widely commended
270
 and was adopted in the subsequent jurisprudence of the Tribunal.
271
 It may 
be regarded as well-established case law today.
 272
  
 
II. Prosecutor versus Kayishema 
Clément Kayishema was the former préfet of Kibuye province. He was charged with various 
counts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, together with his co-accused.
273
 
When he was préfet of Kibuye, he committed different acts of genocide, where he involved 
himself as a superior in various sets of massacres
274
 which occurred at various sites, the Catholic 
Church and Home St. Jean complex, the stadium, the church in Mubuga, and in the area of 
Bisesero.
275
 He allegedly encouraged more than 10,000 Tutsi to seek shelter in the stadium and 
church by promising protection, then fired the shot that launched their mass murder.
276
 On 21 
May 1999, Kayishema was found guilty of four counts of genocide, and acquitted of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. He was sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder of his life 
                                                          
269
 G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn, (2009), at 266, MN 728.  
270
 The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case N° ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (TC), 2 September 1998, Paras 706, 731; The 
Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case N° ICTR-2000-55-A-T(TC), 12 September 2006, Para 487. See discussions on sexual 
violence in K.D Askin, ‘Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International Law: 
Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles,’ 21 Berkeley Journal of International Law, (2003), at 288; K.D 
Askin, ‘Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status’ 93 
American Journal of International Law, (1999), at 97 et seq. 
271
 The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case N° ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (TC), 2 September 1998, Paras 731-732; The 
Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case N° ICTR-2000-55-A-T(TC), 12 September 2006, Para 487; K.D Askin, ‘Gender 
Crimes Jurisprudence in the ICTR: Positive Developments,’ 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2005), at 
1007 and 1011; W. A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, (2000), at 578; G. Werle, Principles of International 
Criminal Law, 2nd edn, (2009), at 266, MN 728 et seq. 
272
 See R. Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, (2007), at 173 et seq; G.W 
Mugwanya, The Crime of Genocide in International Law: Appraising the Contribution of the UN Tribunal for 
Rwanda, (2007), at 85; D.L. Nersessian, Genocide and Political Groups, (2010), at 28 et seq; W. A Schabas, 
Genocide in Internatinal Law: The Crime of Crimes, 2nd edn, (2009), at 117 et seq. 
273
 See The Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case N°ICTR-95-I-T, 21 May 1999. 
274
 W. Zhu, ‘The Doctrine of Command Responsibility as applied to Civilian Civilian Leaders: The ICTR and the 
Kayishema Case,’ in S. Yee and T. Wang (eds.), International Law in the Post-Cold War World: Essays in Memory 
of Li Haopei (2001), at 373 et seq; J.A Williamson, ‘Command Responsibility in the case Law of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,’ 13 Criminal Law Forum, (2002), at 365 et seq. 
275
 Kayishema, was accused of Genocide, pursuant to Art.2 (3) (a) of the ICTR Statute, Crimes against humanity, 
pursuant to Arts. 3 (a), 3 (b) and 3 (i) of the Statute; Violations of Art.3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 
1949, and Violations of Additional Protocol II, pursuant to Art.4 (a) of the Statute. See also Art. 6 (1) and (3) of the 
ICTR Statute; The Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case N° ICTR-95-1-A, 1 June 2001, Para 5 et seq. 
276
 The Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case N° ICTR-95-1-A, 1 June 2001, Para 274-275. 
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and the sentence was upheld on his appeal on 1 June 2001. At the time of writing, he is serving 
his sentence in Mali.
277
  
 
This case law is significant because it helps to define Tutsi as an ethnic group protected by the 
Genocide Convention,
278
 despite the fact that Hutu and Tutsi shared the same language and 
culture.
279
 The Kayishema case, defined an ethnic group more broadly as one whose members 
share a common language and culture, or a group which distinguishes itself as such, ‘self 
identification,’ or a group identified as such by others, including perpetrators of the crimes 
‘identification by others.’280 The chamber then found that the Tutsis were an ethnic group, which 
is supported by the fact that since 1933, Rwandans were required to carry identification cards 
which indicated the ethnicity of the bearer as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa as was confirmed by various 
laws.
281
 Subsequent to this case, different chambers’ decisions, took judicial notice of the 
existence of the Tutsi as an ethnic group falling under protected groups within the Genocide 
Convention, based on a mixture of objective and subjective criteria.
282
 
 
                                                          
277
 Rule 101 of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE); The Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, 
Case N° ICTR-95-1-A, 1 June 2001, Paras 363, and 370. 
 
278
 F. Jessberger, ‘The Definition and the Elements of the Crime of Genocide,’ in P. Gaeta (ed.), The UN Genocide 
Convention: A Commentary, (2009), at 118-119; D.D.N. Nsereko, ‘Genocide: A Crime against Mankind,’ in G. Kirk 
McDonald and O. Swaak-Goldman (eds.), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law: The 
Experience of International and National Courts, Vol. 1, (2000), at 130-131; G. Verdirame, ‘The Genocide 
Convention in the Jurisprudence of the Ad hoc Tribunals,’ 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
(2000), at 578 et seq. 
279
 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case N° ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (TC), 2 September 1998, Paras, 701, 702 and 510; P. 
Akhavan,  ‘The Crime of Genocide in the ICTR Jurisprudence,’ 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice, at 989-
1006. 
280
 The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Judgement, Case N° ICTR-95-1-A, 1 June 2001, 
Para 98; see K. Askin (2001),  ‘Legal Precedents in Rwanda, Crimes of War Project,’ available at 
<http://www.crimesofwar.org/tribun-mag/rwanda_print.html>, accessed April 2012; G.W Mugwanya, The Crime of 
Genocide in International Law: Appraising the Contribution of the UN Tribunal for Rwanda, (2007), at 90-104; G. 
Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn, (2009), at 259, MN 712 et seq.  
281
 See Arts.57 and 118 of the Rwanda Civil Code of 1988; see also Art. 16 of the Constitution of 10 June 1991. 
Rwanda’s 1991 constitution, identified all Rwandans by ethnic group, and then required every Rwandan to carry an 
identity card bearing his/her ethnic group; see UN Doc. S/1994/1405 (1994), Final Report of the Commission of 
Experts at 55 et seq.; see, The Prosecutor v. Akayesu (TC) Para 702 and 171; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema (TC), Para 
65; C. Kreß, ‘The Crime of Genocide Under International Law,’ 6 International Law Review, (2006), at 461. 
282
 R. Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, (2007), at 173 et seq; G.W 
Mugwanya, The Crime of Genocide in International Law: Appraising the Contribution of the UN Tribunal for 
Rwanda, (2007), at 85; D.L. Nersessian, Genocide and Political Groups, (2010), at 28 et seq; W. A Schabas, 
Genocide in Internatinal Law: The Crime of Crimes, 2nd edn, (2009), at 117 et seq. 
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III. Prosecutor versus Kambanda 
In 1994, Kambanda was prime minister of the interim government in which he actively 
participated in the genocide as a head of government. Kambanda pleaded guilty to all the charges 
and acknowledged that he had failed to prevent or even punish his subordinates for committing 
the crimes.
283
 He was found guilty of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity (murder, and 
extermination). 
 
Kambanda’s guilty plea and subsequent conviction marked not only the first time under 
international law that a former head of government was convicted of genocide, but also that an 
accused person acknowledged his guilt for genocide before an international criminal tribunal.
284
 
Notwithstanding his guilty plea which, importantly, recognised that genocide had occurred in 
Rwanda, the Tribunal sentenced him to life imprisonment on 4 September 1998. The sentence 
was upheld on appeal on 19 October 2000.
285
 The judges in the case described genocide as the 
‘crime of crimes.’286 Like Akayesu, Kambanda is at the time of writing, serving life 
imprisonment in Mali. 
 
This judgment that was pronounced on such a high ranking official is significant because it 
reaffirmed the principle under international law that no individual enjoys immunity for such 
crimes on account of their official position.
287
 The Kambanda case thus indisputably backs up 
                                                          
283
 By Kambanda’s acts or omissions, he was accused of Genocide, Conspiracy to Commit Genocide, Direct and 
Public Incitement to Commit Genocide, Complicity in Genocide, Crimes against Humanity (Murder, 
Extermination).  The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Case N° ICTR-97-23-S, (TC), 4 September 1998, Para 3. 
284
 The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Case N° ICTR-97-23-S, Judgement and Sentence (TC), 4 September 1998, 
Para 4-9; see also G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn, (2009), at 100, MN 282. 
285
 Kambanda v. The Prosecutor,  Case N° ICTR 97-23-A, 19 October 2000. 
286
 See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case N° ICTR-97-23-S, 4 September 1998, Para 16; M.C. Bassiouni, ‘A 
Functional Approach to General Principles of International Law,’ 11 Michigan Journal of International Law, 
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New England Law Review, (2001), at 300. 
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 Art. IV of the the 1948 Genocide Convention; Art. 6 (2),  ICTR Statute; K. Ambos,  ‘International Criminal Law 
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(eds.), Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, (2010), at 195; Y.Q. Naqvi, Impediments to 
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the motives in establishing the Tribunal. It expressed a profound condemnation of the 
overwhelming scale of atrocities committed in Rwanda and established the certainty that 
impunity for such crimes was no longer tolerable, hence the replacement of a culture of impunity 
with accountability.
288
  
 
IV. Prosecutor versus Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze 
Also noteworthy were the ICTR prosecutions of Ferdinand Nahimana, the former director of the 
‘hate-radio’ station, Radio Television Libre des Mille collines (RTLM),289 Hassan Ngeze, the 
former owner and editor-in-chief of the ‘extremist’ Kangura newspaper290 and Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza, the former director of political affairs in the Rwandan ministry of foreign affairs, 
RTLM official and founding member of Coalition pour la Défence de la République (CDR).
291
 
The ICTR consolidated the indictments of these three men into a single trial, commonly referred 
to as ‘The Media Case.’292  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Exercising Jurisdiction over International Crimes, (2010), at 243; see G. Werle, Principles of International 
Criminal Law, 2nd edn, (2009), at 237, MN 650 et seq; see N. Pillay, President of the ICTR, African Dialogue II, 
‘Promoting Justice and Reconciliation in Africa: Challenge for Human Rights  in Collaboration with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,’ available at 
<http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/africandialogue/papers/pillay.pdf>, accessed February 2012;  Prosecutor 
v. Kambanda, Judgment and Sentence, Case N° ICTR 97-23-S4, September 1998, Para 61-62. 
288
 T. Gallimore, ‘The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and its Contributions to 
Reconciliation in Rwanda,’ 14 New England Journal of International and Comparative Law, (2008), at 239; E. 
Møse, ‘Appraising the Role of the ICTR, Main Achievements of the ICTR,’ 3 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, (2005), at 920; O. Olusanya, Double Jeopardy without Parameters: Re-Characterisation in International 
Criminal Law, (2004), at 124. 
289
 The RTLM extremist ‘hate-radio’ station encouraged Hutus to kill Tutsis. See D.A. Mundis and F. Gaynor, 
‘Current Developments at the Ad hoc International Tribunals,’ 2 Jounal of International Criminal Justice, (2004), at 
642-698; D.A. Mundis and F. Gaynor, ‘Current Developments at the Ad hoc International Tribunals,’ 4 Jounal of 
International Criminal Justice, (2006), at 623-658. 
290
 The Kangura newspaper published editorials and articles inciting ethnic hatred and violence against the Tutsi 
population in 1994. See, D.A. Mundis and F. Gaynor, ‘Current Developments at the Ad hoc International Tribunals,’ 
2 Jounal of International Criminal Justice, (2004), 642-698. 
291
 Barayagwiza was accused of many acts including public incitement to genocide and was among the steering 
committee of RTLM which broadcasted ethnic hatred messages. Also CDR and its youth wing, the 
Impuzamugambi, which he controlled, created a political framework for the killing of Tutsi. They established 
roadblocks, distributed weapons, and carried out the killings. See, D.A. Mundis and F. Gaynor, ‘Current 
Developments at the Ad hoc International Tribunals,’ 2 Jounal of International Criminal Justice, (2004), at 642. 
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 The Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case N° ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence (TC), 3 December 2003; 
Nahimana et al. v. the Prosecutor, Case N° ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement (AC), 28 November 2007; see commentary 
on the case in A. Cassese et al., International Criminal Law: Cases and Commentary, (2011), at 405. 
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The trial chamber found that Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze 
were guilty of conspiracy to commit genocide, genocide, direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide, as well as the crimes against humanity of persecution and extermination.
293
 Nahimana 
and Ngeze received a life sentence, while Barayagwiza was convicted to a term of 35 years in 
prison. On appeal, some of the trial chamber’s findings were overturned and the sentences 
reduced to 30 years for Nahimana, 35 years for Ngeze and 32 years, for Barayagwiza 
respectively.
294
 At the time of writing, Nahimana and Ngeze are serving their sentence in Mali, 
where Barayagwiza, died on 25 April 2010. 
 
Since the conviction of Julius Streicher at Nuremberg,
295
 the ICTR media case was the first ever 
conviction concerning hate speech in the media before an international tribunal.
296
 It was also the 
first time an international tribunal convicted defendants for the crime of incitement to genocide. 
The ICTR set a test for distinguishing statements protected by virtue of freedom of expression, 
from incitement to genocide, which is not protected by freedom of expression.
297
 Put differently, 
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(2007), at 143. 
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Mediatizing the Media Case: Elements of a Critical Approach,’ 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2005), 
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this famous case addressed the boundary between the right guaranteed under international law to 
freedom of expression and incitement to serious international crimes. Hate speech is not 
protected speech under international law.
298
 In fact, states have an obligation under international 
law to prohibit any advocacy for national, ethnic, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement of discrimination, hostility or violence.
299
 
 
In 1994, RTLM broadcasts engaged in ethnic stereotyping in a manner that promoted contempt 
and hatred for the Tutsi population and explicitly called for the extermination of the enemy.
300
 
The enemy was defined to be the Tutsi and Hutu political opponents.
301
 Both before and after the 
death of Habyarimana, the RTLM radio used to broadcast the names of Tutsi individuals and 
their families, as well as Hutu political opponents who supported the Tutsi ethnic group.
302
 In the 
same vein, the editorials and articles published in Kangura activated hatred for Tutsi as was 
portrayed in the publication of the ten Hutu commandments.
303
 The cover of Kangura news 
paper N° 26 promoted violence by conveying the message that the machete should be used to kill 
the Tutsi.
304
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This case raises important principles concerning the role of the media which have not been 
addressed at the level of international criminal justice since Nuremberg. Mainly, the Tribunal 
clarified the scope of the elements of incitement to genocide.
305
 This case law also clarified that 
hate speech can amount to persecution where it is done on discriminatory grounds or targeting a 
population on the basis of ethnicity.
306
 The power of the media to create and destroy fundamental 
human values thus calls for accountability.
307
  Reasonably, the chamber ruled that ‘without a 
firearm, machete or any physical weapon, these media statements caused the deaths of thousands 
of innocent civilians.’308 
  
V. Prosecutor versus Ntagerura, Bagambiki, and Imanishimwe 
The accused persons held high positions in during the genocide period. Ntagerura was the 
minister of transport and communications in the interim government. Bagambiki was the préfet 
of Cyangugu, and Lieutenant Imanishimwe was the acting commander of the Cyangugu military 
camp.
309
 The prosecutor accused Ntagerura and others of genocide under Article 2 of the Statute, 
complicity in genocide, killing and causing serious bodily or mental injuries to members of the 
Tutsi group, crimes against humanity like murder, extermination, imprisonment, and torture in 
Article 3 of the Statute.
310
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However, the trial chamber found that the operative paragraphs underpinning the charges against 
Ntagerura and Bagambiki, as well as the charges themselves, were unacceptably vague.
311
 It 
further found that the formulation of the counts in the Bagambiki case were problematic because 
the counts did not clearly identify whether Bagambiki and co-accused were being charged as 
principals or as accomplices, nor did they specify what particular form of complicity was 
charged.
312
 And as a result they were acquitted on all counts in the indictments, mainly genocide, 
complicity in genocide and crimes against humanity, and the court ordered for their immediate 
release from detention on 25 February 2004,
313
 with judge Williams dissenting in the Bagambiki 
case.
314
 Yet, the co-accused Imanishimwe was found guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity 
of extermination, murder, torture, imprisonment, and war crimes and was sentenced to 27 years’ 
imprisonment, later reduced to 12 years on appeal on 7 July 2006.
315
 On 8 August 2011, he was 
released after serving his sentence in Mali. 
 
This case of acquittal serves as a lesson for states and the international community not to regard 
all acquittals as partiality or failure of the Tribunal but instead to consider the Tribunal to have 
succeeded in dispensing justice.
316
  The case sends a message that an impartial court must seek 
fair justice for both victims and suspects and not only convict defendants. Although the acquittal 
triggered controversy in Rwanda, the case law demonstrates the ICTR’s independence and 
attentiveness to matters of due process and the procedural rights of defendants.
317
 Importantly, 
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even if the trial resulted in an acquittal, the case law still remains relevant because it established 
considerable facts regarding the genocide and still creates a significant historical record.
318
 It is 
important to note that acquittals do not mean that crimes were not committed in the alleged 
provinces or areas where the accused persons operated; actually the detailed judgments could 
establish many facts about the human rights violations in those areas. 
 
VI. Prosecutor versus Colonel Bagosora 
Colonel Bagosora, the alleged military mastermind of the genocide, was directeur de cabinet in 
the Rwandan ministry of defence, and later acting minister of defence.
319
  The colonel failed in 
his duty to prevent or punish his surbodinates for the crimes that were directed mainly against 
Tutsi civilians and moderate Hutu.
320
 In the judgment, he was convicted of crimes committed 
during the genocide, based on both direct and superior responsibility.
321
  
 
Actually, the trial chamber held Bagosora responsible as a superior for genocide, crimes against 
humanity (murder, extermination, persecution, rapes and other inhumane acts), as well as serious 
violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II (violence 
to life and outrages upon personal dignity).
322
 Therefore, he was held responsible for the killings, 
acts of rape, and sexual violence committed by Rwandan army soldiers and militiamen under his 
command.
323
 This was pursuant to the fact that he exercised effective control over the armed 
forces and had the requisite knowledge of his subordinates’ crimes.324  
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Controversially, although he was indicted for conspiracy, the ICTR trial chamber acquitted 
Bagosora, often depicted in the media as the architect of Rwanda’s genocide, of the charge of 
conspiracy to commit genocide.
325
 On 18 December 2008, Bagosora was sentenced to life 
imprisonment which was reduced to 35 years on appeal on 14 December 2011, with Judges 
Pocar and Liu dissenting.
326
 At the time of writing, he is serving his sentence in Mali. 
 
The relevance of this case is that it confirms the notion of ‘command responsibility’, particularly 
of superiors who often hide away from the scene of the crime, yet use other people as human 
instruments or who commit crimes through their surbodinates.
327
 The fact that the acts were 
committed by the surbodinates does not relieve the commander of criminal responsibility if he 
knew or had reason to know that the surbodinates were about to commit such acts or did not 
punish the perpetrators thereof.
328
 Nevertheless, command responsibility is entrusted not solely 
to persons with a military background but civilians too can be accused and convicted of superior 
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responsibility
329
 as evidenced in the case of Nyiramasuhuko, a female civilian who held a high 
post in the government.
330
  
 
VII. Prosecutor versus Nyiramasuhuko 
Pauline Nyiramasuhuko was the former minister of women and family welfare. She was the first 
woman to be prosecuted before the ICTR for both direct and superior responsibility.
331
 
Nyiramasuhuko, as an authority in the government, extended the genocide to her home 
prefecture of Butare, which had initially been resistant to carry out killings. Tutsis and Hutus in 
Butare had co-existed for years without any ethnic violence that was common in other 
prefectures.  Nyiramasuhuko and five other accused allegedly became the main instigators of 
genocide in Butare
332
 by distributing weapons to the Hutu and publicly inciting the population 
for the extermination of Tutsi.
333
  
 
In particular, the evidence established that Nyiramasuhuko, indeed, had superior responsibility 
over interahamwe militia at the Butare prefecture office, principally those who committed rape 
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on Tutsi women.
334
 She was then sentenced to life imprisonment on 24 June 2011 for conspiracy 
to commit genocide, genocide, the crimes against humanity of extermination, rape, persecution, 
and the war crimes of violence to life as well as outrages upon personal dignity.
335
 Her case 
commonly referred to as the ‘Butare trial’ is pending on appeal.336  
 
The significance of this case specifically lies in the fact that it was an important clarification of 
the doctrine of superior responsibility outside the military context, extending its reach to the 
civilian work place too.
337
 Given that the defendant was in position of authority at the time the 
crimes were committed, she failed to observe the duty to protect the population and ensure its 
security.
338
 As a result, she was convicted of superior responsibility for the core crimes in 
accordance with the Statute of the Tribunal which provides that a person, who planned, 
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or 
execution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, shall be held individually 
responsible.
339
 Nyiramasuhuko was therefore held liable as a superior for the acts carried out by 
the surbodinates over whom she was found to have had legal control.
340
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E. Achievements of the Tribunal 
From the above analysis of representative cases, it is evident that amongst the Tribunal’s main 
achievements, was the arrest and prosecution of high-ranking persons with a view to deciding 
their guilt or innocence, the creation of important historical records and the establishment of 
judicial precedents.
341
 Additionally, in performing its tasks, the Tribunal has conformed to fair 
trial standards envisaged under international instruments.
342
 
 
I. Development of International Criminal Law 
As demonstrated in the jurisprudence above, the ICTR has made an enormous contribution to the 
clarification of international criminal law. The judgments have clarified important aspects and 
principles of international law.
343
 This is true, in particular, for the elements of the crime of 
genocide.
344
 Thus, the Tribunal has single-handedly developed the criteria for group 
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classification that may now be regarded as widely accepted.
345
 It has also made clear that the 
psychological consequences of rape can amount to serious mental harm in terms of the genocide 
definition.
346
 Therefore, the Tribunal has characterized rape as a possible means of committing 
genocide. In addition, the Tribunal has elaborated on the legal qualification of incitement to 
genocide among media personalities.
347
 The trial chamber has confirmed that racist propaganda 
can amount to the crime against humanity of persecution.
348
 Finally, the Tribunal has refined the 
criteria for determining superior responsibility of both civilian and military leaders.
349
 
 
II. Accountability for Leaders 
In an effort to punish those responsible for genocide, the ICTR was established in 1994 by the 
UN Security Council to try people who bear the greatest responsibility for the genocide. From 
the outset, the prosecutor focused on investigating and prosecuting individuals who had held 
important positions in Rwanda in 1994.
350
 The Tribunal’s focus on leadership is illustrated by the 
fact that the accused who were apprehended included the former prime minister, fourteen 
ministers, seven prefects, twelve bourgmestres (mayors), high media personalities and several 
high-ranking military personnel.
351
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This implies that, had it not been for the Tribunal's investigations, insistence upon their arrest 
and subsequent requests for transfer to Arusha, many of the master minders of the genocide who 
fled Rwanda would not have been brought to justice. After all, most countries have long been 
unwilling to extradite suspects to Rwanda due to fear of violation of fair trial rights.
352
  There can 
be no doubt that the Tribunal’s proceedings relating to persons in very high positions have sent a 
strong signal to the world, including the African continent, that the international community will 
not accept impunity for serious crimes.
353
 In this sense, the ICTR helps to promote accountability 
for human rights abuses and combating impunity at both national and international level.
354
 
 
In fact, two decades back, most of those accused of international crimes could seek refuge in 
other countries, quite convinced that that they would not be required to stand trial for their 
conduct. So, the establishment of the ICTR, along with that of the ICTY, has revived the idea of 
individual criminal responsibility as applied in the trial of German war criminals.
355
  Such a view 
is adequately supported by the statement of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (IMT) 
that ‘crimes against international law are committed by men, not abstract entities, and only by 
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be 
enforced.’356 One can therefore credit the Tribunal for the international recognition of the crime 
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of genocide committed in Rwanda, and for prosecuting some of the ‘big fish’ who could not 
have been apprehended by Rwanda.
357
 
 
III. Creation of a Historical Record  
The ICTR has been important in creating a historical record through its trials. The most 
comprehensive archives accessible today on the internet about the conflicts which engulfed 
Rwanda in 1994, and the consequences that resulted, are those held by the ICTR.
358
   The whole 
of the ICTR’s jurisprudence is therefore a significant component of the country’s history.  
 
Establishing a historical record of what occurred during the conflict is an important contribution 
of the Tribunal in order to prevent historical revisionism.
359
 The ICTR has repeatedly determined 
that the crimes committed in Rwanda against the Tutsi were in fact genocide. This authoritative 
finding has set a clear course for the way the history of the conflict has been and will be written. 
This is particularly important given the very common perception in the late 1990s among large 
parts of the ‘negationists’ that the conflict was nothing more than a civil war.360 
 
Many judgments contain long discussions of the historical context in which the genocide was 
organised and executed.
361
 These judgments, especially of high ranking officials and politicians, 
have huge potential to help victims and the public in general to know the facts of massive crimes, 
and to contribute to mankind’s collective memory of mass atrocity.362 Therefore, even when the 
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defendants are acquitted, the facts regarding the massacre itself remain intact, demonstrating that 
trials can help to create a significant historical record.
363
  
 
Therefore, the jurisprudence of the ICTR has clarified the framework of genocide as a core 
crime.
364 
 And as put by Bornkamm, ‘although the actual number of trials conducted in Arusha 
has been negligible; they have played a major part in shedding light on the anatomy of genocide. 
When taken as a whole, the judgments provide the most comprehensive account of the 
machinery of genocide.’365 
 
F. Major Shortcomings of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
This part explores the main shortcomings faced by the ICTR in attempting to deliver 
international justice. Some of the weaknesses were inevitable, given the complexity of 
investigating and prosecuting serious crimes like genocide. 
 
I. Delayed Justice 
Certainly, one of the criticisms faced by the Tribunal was the amount of time it took to bring 
those responsible for the 1994 genocide to justice. The first trial, which was the Akayesu case, 
took place only in 1997, three years after the genocide.
366
  While some of the causes of the delay 
could have been avoidable, the major cause of the delay resulted from the need to build an entire 
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international institution from the ground up.
367
 Actually, before any investigations could begin, 
the ICTR had to sort out one problem after another, from fitting out premises and recruiting 
qualified staff to defining a strategy and negotiating a framework of cooperation with the 
Rwandan government and other states.
368
 Officials had to be elected or appointed, staff had to be 
recruited and trained, funds had to be appropriated, offices, courtrooms, and detention facilities 
had to be put in place, and legal documents had to be promulgated before investigations, 
indictments, and trials could commence.
369
  Yet the delay to bring perpetrators to trial could have 
been avoided altogether if there had existed a permanent international criminal court at the time 
of the genocide. Such an institution could have immediately launched investigations in 1994 and 
begun prosecutions within months, not years.
370
   
 
However, even after its establishment, the ICTR has been slow in dispensing justice.
371
 In 
eighteen years of operation, it has arrested and tried less than 100 persons.
372
 Compared to its 
counterpart courts in Rwanda, this small proportion of genocide suspects tried in relation to the 
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number of perpetrators is one of the major weaknesses of the Tribunal.
373
  For a period of almost 
two decades, the Tribunal has tried only seventy-five suspects despite the huge budget allocated 
to it, where an annual budget of US$270 million (RWF 167.4 billion).
374
 
 
Therefore, in terms of dealing with the problem of the large number of genocide suspects that 
needed to be arrested, there was need for national courts to supplement the international 
Tribunal.
375
 International trials have proved to be more protracted and lengthy than trials 
conducted at the national level.
376
  For instance, hearings in the Nyiramasuhuko case commonly 
known as the ‘Butare trial,’377 began on 12 June 2001 and ended on 24 June 2011.378 The trial 
was on-going for ten years with over 189 witnesses. The judgement, excluding the annexes, is 
approximately 1500 pages long.
379
 In the Bagosora case, much of the material was translated or 
interpreted into three languages.
380
 Investigations were conducted and many witnesses were 
brought from all over the world.
381 
As noted by Schabas, the Tribunal’s proceedings are more 
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complex and lengthy because of the higher due process standard applied in international 
tribunals in comparison to the standards before the national courts of many countries.
382
 
 
II. Location of the ICTR 
The ICTR was situated outside the territory of Rwanda, far from the scene of the crime, meaning 
that genocide trials were to be conducted in the absence of the society that suffered the 
violence.
383
 Though Rwandans are generally aware of the existence of the ICTR in Arusha, the 
knowledge about its trials is limited because the Tribunal is too far removed geographically.
384
 
Media coverage of ICTR trials is very scarce.
385
 Even if the ICTR is internationally reputable, it 
remains unpopular among ordinary Rwandans and is considered ineffective.
386
 This is due to the 
fact that Rwandans are unable to physically follow the proceedings of key perpertrators of 
genocide from their home areas, which is arguably problematic for the legitimacy of the Tribunal 
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in Rwanda.
387
 Therefore there is a need to disseminate information about proceedings in Arusha 
to the Rwandan population.
388
  
 
In 2000, the Tribunal opened up an information and documentation centre in Kigali, commonly 
known as ‘Umusanzu mu Bwiyunge ’or ‘contribution to reconciliation’, as part of the ICTR’s 
outreach programme.
389
 The center offers a variety of books and documents on genocide and 
international criminal justice which are highly informative to academics, members of the 
judiciary, and legal practitioners, but insufficient in disseminating knowledge about the 
Tribunal’s activities to the rest of the population. Therefore the Tribunal runs a less effective 
outreach programme, which concentrates on a library centre in Kigali that is not widely relevant 
in a country with a big illiterate population. 
 
The far away distance of the Tribunal also affects the operation of the ICTR. Thus, the slow pace 
of the trials and excessive use of funds could partly be attributed to operating from a triple 
geographical location, The Hague, Arusha and Kigali.
390
 However, the location of the Tribunal 
outside Rwanda may at times portray its independence from influence of the Rwandan 
government and earns international credibility in this regard. 
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III. Limited Impact on Rwanda  
The ICTR Statute states that prosecuting Rwandan genocide suspects is intended to contribute to 
the process of reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace.
391
 However, 
different authors question the ICTR’s genuineness in achieving this key objective of 
reconciliation.
392
 The term national reconciliation appears just once in the ICTR Statute,
393
  with 
no definition or description of how punishing high-ranking génocidaires might contribute to 
reconciliation, which requires delivering justice that has a direct, tangible impact on the parties 
involved.
394
  
 
It is reported that there is an overall lack of knowledge regarding the Tribunal’s work within the 
respective communities concerned.
395
 As mentioned earlier, the ICTR is detached from day-to-
day realities in Rwanda and provides limited outreach in Rwanda.
396
 So, the ICTR does not have 
an impact on the life of most Rwandans and thus contributes little to the process of 
reconciliation.
397
  Instead, it is argued by different authors that the Arusha Tribunal focuses more 
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on legal processes and contributions to international law than on its potential impact within 
Rwanda.
398
  However, this research does not allow the conclusion that criminal trials can never 
facilitate reconciliation,
399
 because any decent trial even if purely retributive, has positive aspects 
towards reconciliation, as will be discussed in Chapter six of this study.  
 
While the Tribunal has primacy of jurisdiction over national courts, it does not have exclusive 
jurisdiction over genocide suspects,
400
 as seen in the following chapter which examines the role 
and status of domestic genocide prosecutions in Rwanda. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: PROSECUTION OF GENOCIDE IN NATIONAL COURTS 
 
A. Introduction  
On the basis of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, perpetrators of genocide must be prosecuted by the courts of the state where the crime 
took place or by a competent international criminal court.
401
 Whereas various international 
criminal courts have emerged to prosecute the crime, it remains the duty of states to prosecute 
international crimes.
402
  
 
In recent years, Rwandan national courts have engaged in prosecution of the atrocious human 
rights abuses committed in Rwanda.
403
 The prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes was organised in accordance with three international conventions, to which 
Rwanda is a signatory, that is, the 1948 Genocide Convention on Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide, the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
and the 1968 Convention of the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and 
Crimes against Humanity.
404
 This chapter explores the current practice and developments in the 
prosecution of core crimes at the national level.
405
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Domestic Prosecution of Genocide,’ Leuven centre for Global Governance studies and Institute for International 
Law, (2010), N° 55, at 2. 
403
 M. A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, (2007), at 21 et seq; W.A. Schabas, ‘National 
Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide, the ‘Crime of Crimes,’ 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
(2003), at 44; G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd edn, (2009), at 111, MN 297 et seq. 
404
 See Art. 2, Organic Law N° 08/96 of 30 August 1996; M.A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International 
Law, (2007), at 21-30; D. De Beer, Ikurikiranwa mu Nkiko Ry’Ibyaha by’Itsembabwoko  n’Itsembatsemba: 
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B. Generalities on Rwanda National Courts  
I. Genesis of Genocide Prosecutions 
The 1994 genocide devastated the justice system in Rwanda. Most judges, prosecutors and 
lawyers fled the country or were killed. Courts, records, and all types of equipment were 
destroyed or looted.
406
 At the same time, there was a dire need for well-trained investigators and 
judges in order to investigate what had happened and render justice to victims and perpetrators. 
In 1995, the government convened an international conference in order to develop ideas for 
dealing with the tens of thousands of suspects, approximately over 120,000 in prisons.
407
 The 
idea of setting up a special court was rejected but instead specialised chambers were established 
in ordinary and military courts to deal with the crimes related to genocide.
408
 
 
In 1996, while still short of some necessities, the government, with the support of international 
donors, had managed to provide most of its legal personnel with the required minimum of 
necessities, such as equipment, furnishings, and a decent work place.
409
 Towards the end of 
1996, national courts began prosecuting genocide suspects. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Amategeko Rishingiyeho, Editions RCN (1995), at 11-12; W.A. Schabas,  ‘National Courts Finally Begin to 
Prosecute Genocide, the ‘Crime of Crimes,’ 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2003), at 45 et seq. 
405
 It is important to note that the 1996 Organic Law did not distinguish Genocide and Crimes against Humanity; it 
covered the crimes as if it was one group. However, in 2003, Art. 2 of Law N° 33bis/2003 was cited virtually 
identical to Art.II of the Genocide Convention. The only difference is that it adds regional groups as protected 
groups. See Law N° 33bis/2003 of 6 June 2003 repressing the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and 
War Crimes, O.G.R.R. N° 21 of 1 November 2003. 
406
 K. Nash, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Justice in Post-Genocidal Rwanda: Fostering a Sense of Peace and 
Reconciliation,’ 1 Africana, (2007), at 79 et seq. 
407
 J. Stromseth, ‘Justice on the Ground: Can International Criminal Courts Strengthen Domestic Rule of Law in 
Post-Conflict Societies?’ 1 Hague Journal of Rule of Law, (2009), at 87 et seq. 
408
 P. C. Bornkamm, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation, (2012), at 24 et seq; see Art. 
19 of the 08/96 Organic Law. 
409
 A Lawyers’ Committee Report on the ICTR and National Trials July 1997, ‘Prosecuting Genocide in Rwanda,’ at 
<http://www.unwatch.com/rwanda.html>, accessed December 2012. 
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II. Organisation of Ordinary Courts 
To begin with, this study shows how Rwandan law was wholly unequipped for the situation after 
the genocide.
410
  Rwandan domestic law in 1994 did not provide for the crime of genocide 
despite the fact that Rwanda had acceded to the Genocide Convention in 1975.
411
 As in many 
other countries, the Genocide Convention cannot be applied directly in domestic law and in order 
to fully operate, it needs to be completely implemented into national law.
412
  
 
In a bid to plug this gap, and given the overwhelming demands created by the genocide and the 
ensuing arrests of thousands of suspects, the legislative national assembly passed a law in 1996 
creating specialized chambers within the first instance courts to try people accused of 
genocide.
413
 The chambers were competent to try genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes.
414
 To avoid retroactivitity, the organic law did not introduce new crimes but based its 
prosecutions on ordinary crimes in the penal code
415
 which were carried out in relation to the 
events surrounding the genocide or the crimes against humanity committed.
416
 Such crimes 
                                                          
410
 W.A Schabas, Genocide in Internatinal Law: The Crime of Crimes, 1st edn, (2000), at 389; Y. De Wolf, R. De 
Wolf, and C. Ntampaka, Itsembabwoko n’Itsembabtesemba mu Mategeko y’Rwanda,  ASSEPAC Editions, (1997), at 
26-29. 
411
 P. Quayle,  ‘Unimaginable Evil: The Legislative Limitations of the Genocide Convention,’ 5 International 
Criminal Law Review, (2005), at 371; W.A Schabas, Genocide in Internatinal Law: The Crime of Crimes, 1st edn 
(2000),  at 175; Rwanda ratified the Convention by Décret-loi N° 08/75 du 12 Février 1975 Approuvant et Ratifiant 
Diverses Conventions Internationales Relatives aux Droits de l’Homme, au Désarmement, à la Prévention et à la 
Répression de Certains Actes Susceptibles de Mettre en Danger la Paix entre les Hommes et les Nations, Journal 
officiel de la République Rwandaise, (1975), at 230. 
412
 The Genocide Convention is presently ratified by 141 States; for discussion, see M. Milanovic, ‘State 
Responsibility for Genocide,’ 17 European Journal of International Law, (2006), at 553-604; J. Webb, ‘Genocide 
Treaty-Ethnic Cleansing-Substantive and procedural Hurdles in the Application of the Genocide Convention to 
Alleged Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia,’ 23 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, (1993), at 
337 et seq. 
413
 Organic Law N° 08/1996 of 30 August 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses Constituting the 
Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity. 
414
 Art. 1 of the Organic Law N° 08/1996 of 30 August 1996; K. McCourt, ‘Judicial Defenders: Their Role in 
Postgenocide Justice and Sustained Legal Development,’ 3 International Journal of Transitional Justice, (2009), at 
272-283; L. Werchick, ‘Prospects for Justice in Rwanda's Citizen Tribunals,’ 8 Human Rights Brief, (2001), at 15 et 
seq. 
415
 The Penal Code however did not expressly punish genocide or crimes against humanity but the courts instead 
relied on ordinary crimes committed with genocidal intent. 
416
 Art. 1(b) of Organic Law N° 08/1996 of 30 August 1996. For a detailed discussion, see P.C. Bornkamm, 
Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation, (2012), at 54-55.  
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included murder, inflicting physical injury, rape, deprivation of liberty as well as theft and other 
offences against property.
417
 
 
The organic law established four categories based on the accused’s acts during the conflict, 
which formed a basis for determining the penalties.
418
 The penalties ranged from imprisonment 
to the death penalty until its abolition in 2007. Articles 14 and 17 of the 08/96 organic law give 
detailed provisions of the sentencing regime of the ordinary courts where the highest penalty was 
death penalty for those falling under Category One. Persons whose acts placed them in category 
Two were liable to life imprisonment. Acts committed by persons placed in Category Three 
would give rise to varying imprisonment terms, whereas Category Four crimes led to civil 
damages.  
 
The organic law further described the confessions procedure, which offered defendants a reduced 
sentence in return for a detailed account of the offences committed.
419
 However confession and 
guilty plea was only applicable and beneficial to Category Two and Three defendants which 
would lead to a substantial reduction of the sentences they would normally receive. 
 
Organic law N° 08/96 was repealed in 2004 in the context of the reform of the Gacaca system.
420
 
Subsequently, national trials were governed by general criminal law as complemented by the 
specific provisions of the Gacaca law which will be discussed in the chapter on Gacaca. The 
Gacaca law significantly reduced the caseload for the ordinary courts which remained with only 
                                                          
417
 The 1977 Rwandan Penal Code, Arts. 312 et seq, Arts. 318 et seq, Arts. 360 et seq, Arts. 388 et seq, Arts. 396 et 
seq ; For a detailed discussion of the crimes under the Penal Code in the jurisprudence of the specialized chambers 
under Organic Law N°  08/96, see Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF), Vade-Mecum: Le Crime de Génocide et Les 
Crimes Contre L’humanité devant Les Juridictions Ordinaires du Rwanda Kigali/Bruxelles, (2004), at 109 et seq; 
see also P.C. Bornkamm, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation, (2012), at 52-56; For 
Non-retroactivity Principle, see Art.15 of the ICCPR. 
418
 Art. 2, of the Organic Law N°08/1996 of 30 August 1996; see also P.C. Bornkamm, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: 
Between Retribution and Reparation, (2012), at 41. 
419
 Art. 6, of the Organic Law N°08/1996 of 30 August 1996. 
420
 Art. 105 of Organic Law N° 16/2004. 
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Category One suspects after merging the categories and extending the competence of the Gacaca 
courts to deal with Category Two and Three suspects.
421
  Some of vital elements in the 1996 
organic law were retained in the Gacaca laws, mainly the confession procedure and the 
categorization of suspects according to the gravity of their crimes.
422
 
 
The temporal jurisdiction of the ordinary courts covered the period from the beginning of the 
civil war in October 1990 to the end of December 1994. This chapter discusses genocide trials by 
national courts that took place both before and after the reform.
423
  
 
III. Reparations  
Specialised chambers were given competence to hold trials for victims’ reparations in criminal 
trials.
424
 The 1996 organic law provided that convicted persons whose acts placed them within 
Category One would be held liable for all damages caused in the country by their acts of criminal 
participation, regardless of where the offences were committed.  Persons whose acts placed them 
within other categories, were to be held liable for damages for the criminal acts they committed, 
hence civil responsibility for criminal acts.
425
  However, practice shows that the reparation of 
victims was less effective as will be discussed in the course of this study. Apart from limited 
property reparations for Category Three crimes in Gacaca, many victims did not receive 
                                                          
421
 Categories were merged and reduced to only three depending on the gravity of committed crimes i.e Category 
one, two and three were established. 
422
 Arts. 2 and 4 et seq, Organic Law N° 08/1996 of 31 August 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for 
Offenses constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity committed since 1 October 1990, P.C. 
Bornkamm, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation, (2012), at 24. 
423
 The reform in genocide trials came with the introduction of Gacaca courts.  
424
 For a detailed discussion on reparations in Rwanda, see P.C. Bornkamm, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between 
Retribution and Reparation, (2012), at 132 et seq. 
425
 Art. 30 Organic Law N° 08/1996 of 31 August 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses 
constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity committed since 1 October 1990. 
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reparations for violent crimes committed by perpetrators in other categories, particularly those 
tried by ordinary courts.
426
 
C. Status of Case Law within the Ordinary Court System  
In 1996, there were only thirteen courts of first instance in the country, each with a specialised 
chamber to try genocide crimes in Rwanda from all the four categories of suspects.
427
 Out of the 
120,000 people awaiting trial in the prisons, the courts managed to accomplish 7,181 cases 
between December 1996 and June 2002.
428
  And by the end of 2004, a total of 10,026 individuals 
had been tried by the ordinary courts.
429
 So, the task was still daunting given that the courts had 
to deal with daily ordinary cases too. However, when Gacaca courts started trials in the pilot 
phase in 2005,
430
 ordinary courts continued prosecuting only Category One genocide cases, but 
at a significantly lower rate
431
 and no longer by the specialised chambers.
432
 From January 2005 
to March 2008, the courts merely tried 222 genocide suspects.
433
 Thus, the total number of 
                                                          
426
 For a detailed discussion on reparations in Rwanda, see P.C. Bornkamm, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between 
Retribution and Reparation, (2012), at 131 and 133 et seq. 
427
 Art. 2 Organic Law N° 08/1996 of 31 August 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses constituting 
the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity committed since 1 October 1990; Urukiko rw’Ikirenga, Umutwe 
Ushinzwe Inkiko-Gacaca, Imfashanyigisho Ku Nkiko-Gacaca, (2001), at 2. 
428
 See Amnesty International, 17 December 2002, ‘Gacaca: A Question of Justice,’ at 17 available at 
<www.amnesty.org/en/library>, accessed July 2012.  According to Amnesty International, 379 defendants were 
tried for genocide in 1997, and 895 defendants were tried in 1998; Similar statistics are provided in J. Fierens, 
‘Gacaca Courts: Between Fantasy and Reality,’ 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2005), at 899; In 
addition, for statistics relating to the total number of genocide trials until late 1999, see UN Human Rights Report on 
Rwanda, (2000), Para 136. 
429 B. Ingelaere, ‘The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda,’ in L. Huyse and M. Salter (eds.), Traditional Justice and 
Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences, (2008),  at 45; Schabas also estimated that 
around 10,000 cases were dealt with by the end of 2004, see W.A. Schabas, ‘Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts,’ 3 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2005), at 888. 
430
 Gacaca trials were initially conducted in 752 pilot cells but from 15 July 2006, trials were held in over 9,000 cells 
throughout the whole country. 
431
 In 2002, Amnesty International reported that with exception of Category 1 cases that still remained under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of ordinary courts, all other suspects were transferred to the jurisdiction of Gacaca courts. 
However, by 2008, about 9,000 cases, amounting to over 90% of all remaining Category I cases were also 
transferred to Gacaca courts as a result of the 2008 Amendment, Para. 7. Around 1,000 suspects remained under the 
jurisdiction of ordinary courts. See Rwandan Development Gateway, ‘Gacaca Courts to get more powers’ 7 March 
2008, available at <http://www.rwandagateway.org/Art...php3?idArt.=8283>, accessed November 2011. 
432
 Art. 96(1) of Organic Law N°  40/2000.The Specialized Chambers competent for genocide trials under Organic 
Law N°  08/96 were repealed; see Arts.2 and 96 of 2001 Gacaca Law. 
433 
According to Human Rights Watch, 62 persons were tried by ordinary courts in Rwanda in 2005, then 73 persons 
were tried in 2006, more 83 persons were tried in 2007, and 4 persons were tried in the first quarter of 2008. See 
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persons tried for genocide-related crimes in Rwanda’s ordinary courts from December 1996 to 
March 2008 was 10,248. After March 2008, very few genocide trials were heard in ordinary 
courts since most of the cases had been transferred to Gacaca courts to reduce the caseload.
434
 
With this alternative model, a few accused remained to be prosecuted by the ordinary criminal 
courts for category one offences, while the rest of the backlog in Category Two and Three was to 
be tried by the community in Gacaca.
435
 For statistics of all genocide trials that took place from 
1996 to 2012, the Rwandan ministry of justice provides a total of 15,286 genocide cases that 
were handled by the ordinary courts in Rwanda.
436
 
 
D. Analysis of the National Court Case Law  
Currently, within the national court system of Rwanda, the alleged leaders and high profile 
perpetrators of the genocide are tried in either the ordinary courts
437
 or military tribunals, based 
on the territoriality and nationality principles of jurisdiction.
438
 The Supreme Court is the highest 
court of jurisdiction that has competence to deal with appeal cases from both the high court of 
the republic
439
 and the military high court.
440
 The discussion below will thus assess a number of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
statistics compiled by the ‘Supreme Court of Rwanda, Urukiko rw’Ikirenga, ‘Raporo y’Urwego rw’Ubucamanza 
2006, 2007, and 2008.  
434
 See Arts.2 and 51 of the 2004 Gacaca Law as modified by Arts. 1 and 9 of Organic Law N°  13/2008; Also any 
genocide cases transferred to Rwanda from the ICTR or a third states were to be prosecuted in ordinary courts 
whereas low profile suspects in Rwanda were tried by Gacaca. However, after the closure of Gacaca courts, on 18 
June 2012, new genocide cases are to be prosecuted by ordinary courts irrespective of the category of suspects. 
435
 D. Magasm, in P.C. Bornkamm, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation, (2012), at 45; 
see also B. Oomen, ‘Rwanda’s Gacaca: Objectives, Merits and their Relation to Supranational Criminal Law,’ in R. 
Haveman and O. Olusanya (eds.), Sentencing and Sanctioning in Supranational Criminal Law, (2006), at 161 et seq. 
436
 Statement by Honourable Tharcisse Karugarama, Minister of Justice and Attorney-General of Rwanda, available 
at <http://www.minijust.gov.rw/MoJ/AX_Articles.aspx?id=1315&cid=14>, accessed April 2013. 
437
 Ordinary court system comprises of Primary courts, Intermediate courts, High court of the Republic and then the 
Supreme Court which is the highest court of jurisdiction that mainly deals with genocide cases on appeal level. 
438
 R. Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, (2007), at 40. 
439
 Appeals before ordinary courts go to the High Court of the Republic, Arts. 87, 105(1) of Organic Law N° 
51/2008. Since 2004, a second appeal to the Supreme Court against an appeal judgment by the High Court of the 
Republic is admissible in cases of blatant miscarriage of justice, or a sentence of at least 10 years of imprisonment, 
Art. 108 of Organic Law N° 51/2008 O.G.R.R. N° 5 of 1 March 2008; Art.43(2)(2) to (6) and (8) of Organic Law 
N°  01/2004 of 29 January 2004 establishing the Organisation, Functioning and Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 
O.G.R.R. N°  3 of 1 February 2004, as modified by Art. 3 of Organic Law N°  58/2007 of 16 December 2007 
Modifying and Complementing Organic Law N°  01/2004 of 29 January 2004. 
440
 Crimes committed by military personnel are tried by the Military Tribunal and appealed before the Military High 
Court. An appeal or second appeal can be lodged with the Supreme Court, Art. 137(2), 138(2), 140 of Organic Law 
N° 51/2008, Art. 43(2) of Organic Law N° 01/2004 as modified by Art. 3 of Organic Law N° 58/2007. 
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of these genocide cases that reached the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on the second appeal, 
in order to reveal some of their strengths and weaknesses.The author selected leading cases that 
were before the Supreme Court of Rwanda. 
Table showing an Overview of Genocide Trials within the Supreme Court  
 ACCUSED SUMMARY OF ACCUSATIONS DATE AND JUDGMENT 
 
1 Cpt Twagiramungu Theophile Planned and incited interahamwe to kill 
Tutsis, non assistance of persons in danger,  
and criminal group  formation. 
24/02/2006: Overturned the previous death 
penalty and was acquitted on appeal.  
2 Gataza Noel Murder of many people, torture, 
dehumanizing acts, and violent crimes 
resulting in death of many Tutsis. 
12/01/2007: Same imprisonment of 30 
years as the previous court but was to pay 
higher reparations of 57.117.296 FRW. 
3 Gatorano Didace He was in position of authority, supervised 
and led criminal attacks, notorious murderer, 
and looting.  
12/01/2007: The case was inadmissible on 
appeal in the Supreme Court but the prior 
court had sentenced him to death penalty.    
4 Gd Anne Marie Nyirahazimana  
and Ngirinshuti Athanase 
Instigated others, committed and encouraged 
genocide, gave orders to kill, complicity, 
aiding and abetting, voluntary destruction of 
Tutsi houses, criminal group formation, 
promoting divisions, and violation of 
domicile.  
27/06/2008: On appeal, the case was sent 
to Gacaca appeal court yet previously he 
had been sentenced to death penalty and 
reparations.   
5 Harelimana Etienne, Rudodo 
Joseph, Mutabaruka Joseph, 
Harindwintwali Antoine and 
Bimenyimana  Emmanuel  
Genocide in Butare, systematic attacks and 
violent crimes resulting in death of Tutsis in 
the Southern Province. 
20/06/2008: Inadmissible case on appeal 
but the prior court had sentenced 
Harelimana and 3 others to death while 
Bimenyimana to life imprisonment. 
6 Nzirabatinyi Felecien Torture, notorious murderer, looting, 
participated in attacks and committed violent 
crimes resulting in deaths.  
18/04/2008: Same sentence of life 
imprisonment as the former appeal court.   
7 Nzisabira Jean Baptiste  Murder of many Tutsis, dehumanising acts, 
and participated in criminal attacks. 
04/05/2007: Overturned life sentence to 19 
years sentence on appeal.   
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8 Pandasi, Bugeri J. Baptiste and 
Nzajyibwami Eugene Alias 
Gahini 
 
Committed various genocide acts leading to 
deaths of several Tutsis and moderate Hutus 
in the Northern Province (Ruhengeri). 
17/04/2006: Application for review of 
judgment was inadmissible while the 
earlier court had sentenced Pandasi and 
Bugeri to death then life imprisonment to 
Nzajyibwami.  
9 Rurangirwa Hycinthe, 
Bimenyimana  
and Ntawangaheza 
Criminal group formation, destruction of 
Tutsi houses, rape, sexual torture, unlawful 
gun possession, non assistance of persons in 
danger. 
20/06/2008: The case was inadmissible on 
appeal but the prior court had sentenced 
them to death penalty and deprival of civil 
liberties.  
10 Sibomana J.M Vianney Committed genocide and other crimes 
against humanity with a particular zeal.  
13/06/2008: Inadmissible on appeal but 
before he had been sentenced to death and 
reparations of    Frw 42.527.900. 
 RELEVANT CASES WITHIN THE SPECIALIZED CHAMBERS PRIOR TO ESTABLISHMENT OF GACACA 
1 Banzi Wellars et al., Genocide within the Western Province 
(Gisenyi). 
25/05/2001: Death sentence and 
reparations.  
2 Hanyurwimfura Epaphrodite Genocide within the Sothern Province 
(Butare). 
08//08/2001: Not guilty. 
3 Kalisa Ignace et al., Genocide within the Northern Province. 31/01/2002: Not guilty. 
4 Karorero Charles et al Genocide within the Western Province 
(Cyangugu). 
31/03/2000: Death and loss of civic rights. 
5 Muzatsinda Emmanuel Genocide within Kigali (Kigali City). 17/03/1998: INot guilty. 
6 Mvumbahe Denys Genocide within the Western Province 
(Kibuye). 
16/07/2000: Life sentence and loss of civic 
rights. 
7 Nyilishema Andre Genocide within Kigali Province 
(Nyabisundu). 
14/11/1997: Life imprisonment but the 
case was inadmissible on appeal. 
8 Sibomana J.B et al., Genocide within the Southern Province 
(Gitarama). 
08/04/2002: Not guilty. 
9 Ukezimfura Jean Genocide within the Eastern Province 
(Kibungo). 
29/09/2000: 9 years imprisonment. 
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As is apparent from the above cases,
441
 various defendants were sentenced to capital punishment 
but Rwanda carried out executions of only 22 convicts.
442
 The abolition of the death penalty 
abolition in 2007 meant that people sentenced to death were spared to serve life imprisonment.
443
 
Therefore, the analysis below will focus on these cases from various trial courts that reached the 
the Supreme Court on their second appeal, and where applicable, references will be made to 
related cases by the specialised chambers in ordinary and military courts
444
 which tried genocide 
cases prior to the establishment of Gacaca courts. 
 
I. Prosecutor versus Cpt Twagiramungu  
The case started from the military court in Kigali
445
 where the defendant was acquitted on all the 
prosecution’s charges of planning genocide, non-assistance to persons in danger,446 formation of 
a criminal group and inciting Interahamwe to kill Tutsis and moderate Hutus.
447
 The lawyer for 
the civil parties appealed against the decision but the prosecution did not appeal. The military 
high court then found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to the death penalty and deprival of 
                                                          
441
 The above cases are all in Kinyarwanda, and translation was done by the author. 
442
 A. Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, (1999), at 761; see Amnesty International, 
Rwanda:  ‘22 People, executed on 24 April,’AI Index: AFR 47/15/98, 27 April 1998, available at 
<http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/asset/AFR47/015/1998/es/285a93fd-f880-11dd-b378-142bfbe1838/ 
afr470151998en.pdf>, accessed January 2012; see also ‘Rwanda executes genocide convicts, (24 April 1998) 
’available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/82960.stm>, accessed in December 2011; see J. Busingye, Reality 
and Challenges of Legal and Judicial Reconstruction in Rwanda, (2006), available at 
<www.cilc.nl/Post_Conflict_Situations.pdf>, December 2006, at 21 et seq. 
443
 Art. 2 of Organic Law N°  31/2007 of 25 July 2007 relating to the abolition of the death penalty, O.G.R.R. N°  
special of 25 July 2007. According to LIPRODHOR, 606 convicts were sentenced to capital punishment, and only 
twenty-two of them were executed. The rest were sitting on death row awaiting execution which was later converted 
to life imprisonment after the 2007 abolition of death penalty, see LIPRODHOR, Situation des droits de la personne 
en 2005, Kigali, December 2006, at 112, available at <www.liprodhor.org.rw/rapports.html>, accessed September 
2011. 
444
 Accordingly, Art.19 of the 08/96 Organic Law, established Specialized Chambers, within the Tribunals of first 
instance and the military courts, with exclusive jurisdiction over genocide and other  core  crimes; For a detailed 
discussion of the crimes under the Penal Code in the jurisprudence of the specialized chambers under Organic Law 
N°  08/96, see Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF), Vade-Mecum: Le Crime de Génocide et Les Crimes Contre 
L’Humanité Devant Les Juridictions Ordinaires du Rwanda, Kigali/Bruxelles, (2004), at 109 et seq. 
445
  The Prosecutor v. Cpt Twagiramungu Theophile (RP 0045/CG-CS/2000), judgment of 20/06/2000 
446
 See Arts. 256 of the Rwandan Penal Code which imposes an obligation on every Rwandan citizen to provide 
assistance to persons in danger where it would not cause risk to oneself, and failure to do so is a criminal offense  
447
 Art. 2 and 25, Organic Law N° 08/1996 of 31 August 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses 
constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity; Art.256, Arts.281, 282 and 283 of the 1977 Penal 
Code. 
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all civil liberties.
448
 In regard to the civil claim, the defendant was to pay to the victims an 
amount of 142,000,000 Rwandan francs (RWF), equivalent to (215,151 USD). 
 
The convict was not content with the first appeal decision and as a right, he appealed to the court 
of cassation for cancellation of the decision. However due to modifications of laws and the 
competency issues related to the other courts, the matter was referred to the Supreme Court.
449
  
Both the defendant and victims were present and represented by their lawyers as well as the 
prosecution. The defendant’s request was also in compliance with the procedures of appeal.450 
This law gave the right to convicted persons to request for cassation of the judgment in case they 
had been sentenced to death penalty on appeal although they had been acquitted at first 
instance.
451
 
 
Like in the cases of Hanyurwimfura, Kalisa, Muzatsinda, and Sibomana trials before the 
specialized chamber,
452
 Twagiramungu was acquitted by the Supreme Court which ordered the 
immediate removal of former charges and sentence.  
 
                                                          
448
 Prosecutor v. Cpt Twagiramungu Theophile (RPA 0189/CM/2001), judgment of 10/01/2003. See also Art. 14 of 
the Organic Law N° 08/1996 of 31 August 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses constituting the 
Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity. 
 
449
 Before the judicial reform in 2004, the Supreme Court was made up of several chambers: the Department of 
Courts and Tribunals, the Court of Cassation, the Constitutional Court, the Council of State, and the Public Accounts 
Court, but reform removed some departments like court of cassation and merged others. For details, see W.A 
Schabas and M. Imbleau, Introduction to Rwandan Law, (1997), at 23. 
450
 Art. 25 of the Organic Law N° 08/1996 of 31 August 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses 
constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity. 
451
 Urukiko rw’Ikirenga, Icyegeranyo cy’Ibyemezo by’Urukiko rw’Ikirenga, Imanza za Jenocide iz’Ibyaha 
byakozwe n’Abana n’iz’Inshinjabyaha, (2006). 
452
 Prosecutor v. Hanyurwimfura Epaphrodite, (R.M.P 42.088/S8, R.P 52/2/200), judgment of 08/08/2001, Urukiko 
rwa mbere rw’Iremezo rwa Butare. Prosecutor v. Kalisa Ignace et al., (R.P 065/S1/CH.SP/RSHI), judgment of 
14/11/1997, (Urugereko rwihariye rwa Rushashi). Prosecutor v. Muzatsinda Emmanuel, (R.M.P 900/S11/NG/KE/ 
R.P.041/CS/KIG), judgment of 17/03/1998, (Urugereko rwihariye rwa Kigali). Prosecutor v. Jean Baptiste 
Sibomana et al., (R.M.P 27811/S4/M.P R.P. 89/GIT/CH.S/3/99), judgment of 08/04/2002, (Urugereko rwihariye 
rwa Gitarama). All these defendants were found not guilty of the genocide charges. 
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Just like the norm in ordinary courts, the case demonstrates that criminal appeals can be lodged 
by any party to the conflict, that is, the defendant, a civil party and the prosecution.
453
  The case 
is important because it demonstrates observance of the rights of defendants, where 
Twagiramungu appealed and was consequently acquitted by the Supreme Court despite the prior 
death sentence pronounced on the defendant.  
 
Though Twagiramungu was not subjected to any prison term, the case reveals facts about the 
death of the Tutsi during the genocide and the high participation of the militia, civilians and 
soldiers which is significant for history studies. In analysing the case law, it is noted that the 
national court trials do not generally deal with legal issues, but rather focus mostly on factual 
issues which nevertheless provide an insight into the dynamics of the genocide.
454
 
 
II. Prosecution versus Pte Gataza  
Gataza was accused of various genocide crimes between April and July 1994,
455
 and the first 
court sentenced him to death and to pay reparations of 57,117,296 RWF (86,541 USD) to 
victims.
456
 Then he appealed to a higher court and was sentenced to 30 years and reparations of 
5,000,000 RWF (7,575 USD) to be paid jointly with the government of Rwanda.
457
 Not satisfied 
with the decision, the defendant and the prosecution as well as the civil claimant Muhimpundu 
Lillian appealed the decision.  
 
The Supreme Court retained the sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment and the amount of 
reparations was 57,117,296 FRW (equivalent to 86,541 USD) as had been prescribed by the first 
                                                          
453
 Urukiko rw’Ikirenga, Icyegeranyo cy’Ibyemezo by’Urukiko rw’Ikirenga, Imanza za Jenocide Iz’Ibyaha 
Byakozwe n’Abana n’iz’Inshinjabyaha, (2006). 
454
 W.A. Schabas, ‘Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts,’ 3 Journal of/ International Criminal Justice, (2005), at 889. 
455
 Biteganywa n’Amasezerano Mpuzamahanga y’Umuryango w’Abibumbye yo kuwa 9/12/1948. Arts. 312, 281, 
282, 283, 22, 24, 89, 90, 91, the 1977 Rwanda Penal Code and  Organic Law N° 08/1996 of 31 August 1996 on the 
Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity. 
456
 Prosecution v. Gataza Noel (RP 5053/CG-CS/00), judgment of 24/5/ 2002. 
457
 Prosecution v. Gataza Noel (RPA/GEN 003/04/HCM), judgment of 05/10/2005. 
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court and was to be jointly paid with the Rwandan government.
458
 With this judgment, all parties 
lost their demands, for instance the prosecution lost its demand for a heavier sentence, while the 
defendant remained guilty and the civil plaintiff did not get the whole amount of reparations 
claimed.
459
  
 
However due to extreme poverty in Rwanda, reparations are often not paid in practice.
460
 Though 
each case had to always identify the property of the defendants in order to cover any claims for 
reparations, there is often no available property or too little of it to compensate the victims.
461
 Of 
course, there can be no enough reparation for the value or loss of a loved one, apart from 
symbolic payments as mentioned by the judges in this case, where they emphasized that 
reparations should be claimed and accorded in accordance to the country’s economy. 
 
To be allocated reparations, there is need to sue for them and the court has to examine whether 
the complainant merits them. Simply put, without a civil case, no reparations are made as 
manifested in this case of Gataza where Mukamurenzi was not allocated compensation despite 
the fact that the defendant had killed her husband, yet other victims were entitled to reparations. 
Even so, there is always need for victims to show the link and loss suffered to be entitled to 
reparations.
462
 
 
                                                          
458
 Prosecution v. Gataza Noel (RPAA0010/GEN/06/CS), judgment of 12/11/2007. See Art. 312, Rwandan Penal 
Code, Decree-Law N°  21/77 of 18 August 1977 instituting the Penal Code as completed, Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Rwanda, Special N° 13 bis of 1 July 1978. 
459
 For details see, Icyegeranyo cy’Ibyemezo by’Urukiko rw’Ikirenga, Imanza z’Inshinjabyaha n’iza Jenocide 
(2007), Ubushinjacyaha na Gataza Noel, Urupapuro 1-11. 
460
 A. Storey, Economics and Ethnic Conflict: Structural Adjustment in Rwanda, 17 Development Policy Review, 
(1999), at 43-63; K. Nash, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Justice in Post-Genocidal Rwanda: Fostering a sense of 
Peace and Reconciliation,’ 1 Africana, (2007), at 79 et seq; S. Stewart, Conflict Resolution: A Foundation Guide, 
(1998), at 7 et seq. 
461
 Similarly, see Prosecutor v. Pandasi, et al., (RS/Rev 0007/06/CS). In this case, it is indicated that Nzajyibwami 
had only two goats while Pandasi and Bugeri J. Baptiste had no property at all. 
 
462
 See also C. Tomuschat, ‘Reparation for Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations,’ 10 Tulane Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, (2002), at 168. 
  
 
 
91 
 
This jurisprudence is significant because it shows Rwanda’s responsibility for genocide which in 
most cases is a state-sponsored crime organized by governments. The failure of the state to 
observe its duty to protect the citizens
463
 may lead to payment of damages or reparations for the 
victims as seen in Gataza’s case. Though the government was reluctant to comply with these 
judgments, this case indicates that the state and the accused were liable in solidum to pay 
damages, accepting the state’s general responsibility for the genocide.464 Actually, the 
government of Rwanda, through the minister of justice has always stated that the government did 
accept political responsibility for the genocide, but not criminal liability for the genocide because 
the current government did not commit genocide but instead took the political responsibility of 
the government it replaced.
465
 It is noted that the crime of genocide against a protected group can 
be the responsibility of a state or state-like organization.
466
 
 
Another contribution of this case, at least at the level of domestic law enforcement, is the ruling 
made by the judges where the prosecution accused the defendant of command responsibility, but 
the judges acquitted him of this responsibility because the prosecution failed to establish the 
power of influence or control that Gataza had on the alleged surbodinate known as Innocent, who 
had killed Tutsi during the genocide. The Prosecution also failed to prove that Innocent had 
killed the victims because of obeying orders. The court was hence unable to find that the 
defendant knew or should have known about the acts of the alleged surbodinate. 
                                                          
463
 Following the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute), The ICTY and ICTR Statutes, The 
four Geneva Conventions,  The 1948 Genocide Convention, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Conventions, and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; all these instruments recognise the rights 
of innocent people to be free from atrocities conducted either in armed conflicts or under more covert circumstances 
where states lend support to illegal acts or crimes,  or at times are unable and unwilling to protect their population 
from such occurrences. 
464
 The government had given up the idea of individualized compensation awards by courts and was now rather 
inclined towards a solution involving administrative compensation distributed by a fund,  P.C. Bornkamm, 
Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation, (2012), at 155 et seq. 
465
 Minister of Justice, Tharcisse Karugarama, interview with F. Kimenyi, ‘Rwanda should celebrate Gacaca legacy-
Karugarama,’ The New times, on the 18, June 2012. 
466
 See G. Werle, and B. Burghardt, ‘Do Crimes against Humanity Require the Participation of a State or a ‘State-
like’ Organisation?’ 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2012), at 1158 et seq; see Art. 6 of the ICC 
Statute. 
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III. Prosecutor versus Corporal Gatorano  
The prosecution accused Gatorano of killing a large number of Tutsis during the genocide and of 
various other crimes in furtherance of the genocide plan.
467
 And on the 17 November 2001, the 
first instance hearing found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to death. 
468
 On his first 
appeal, the court upheld the same death sentence and thereafter he took the matter to the court of 
cassation for re-examination. However following modifications in the law, the matter was 
referred to the Supreme Court which declared the appeal inadmissible.
469
  
 
The inadmissibility of the case was due to the violation of the procedural requirements stipulated 
in Article 25 of the 08/96 organic law which only allowed defendants to submit their case to the 
court of cassation, and only if the defendant had received death penalty on appeal while the first 
court had declared the suspect innocent. This was not the case with the defendant in question 
because the first appeal court simply confirmed the death sentence as had been ruled by the 
previous court. So the judges found that the case was not in the competence of the court and 
consequently could not be examined by the Supreme Court which then had jurisdiction over 
cases that were previously handled by the Cassation court that was no longer in existence.
470
  
 
Therefore, this judgment shows the defendant’s ignorance about procedural and substatntive 
matters since he did not have legal counsel. For this reason, since 1997, Amnesty International 
often criticized the fact that state-funded counsel was not made available to defendants.
471
 
                                                          
467
 Art. 2 Organic Law N° 08/1996 of 31 August 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses constituting 
the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity; Arts.89, 90, 911, 312, 317 of the 1977 Rwanda Penal Code. 
468
 As already noted, death sentences were converted to life imprisonment sentences with special provisions. Life 
imprisonment with special provisions was challenged before the Supreme Court of Rwanda in 2008, but was found 
not to be unconstitutional. 
469
 Prosecutor v. Gatorano Didace on the 17/11/2001 (lower court), 07/1/2002 (higher court), 01/06/2007 (Supreme 
Court). 
470
 For details, Urukiko rw’Ikirenga, Icyegeranyo cy’Ibyemezo by’Urukiko rw’Ikirenga, Imanza z’Inshinjabyaha 
n’iza Jenocide (2007), Ubushinjacyaha na Gatorano Didace, Urupapuro rwa 1-4. 
471
 Amnesty International, Unfair Trials: Justice Denied, (8 April 1997), at 14, AI Index AFR 47/008/1997, available 
at <http://www.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AFR470081997ENGLISH/$File/AFR4700897.pdf>, accessed December 
2012; M. Cousineau, ‘L’établissement de l’État de Droit au Rwanda: Un but Irréalisable,’ 28 Ottawa Law Review, 
(1997), at 185 et seq. 
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Alhough ignorance of the law is no excuse, this has been manifested in various cases, in the form 
of making late appeals, and suing for the wrong cause in contradiction to the law. As will be seen 
below, the Sibomana, Rurangirwa, and Harelimana’s cases were similarly inadmissible because 
of submitting claims that were contrary to the law, specifically in contradiction with Article 25 of 
the 08/96 organic law.
472
  
 
IV. Prosecutor versus Major Nyirahazimana and Pasteur Ngirinshuti  
The prosecution accused the above defendants of various genocide acts, such as superior 
responsibility, given that Nyirahazimana had the rank of a major in the military where he 
engaged in genocide and encouraged others to kill Tutsi. As for Ngirinshuti, he was a pastor and 
acted as an accomplice in killing victims. Both defendants were accused of incitement to commit 
genocide, voluntary destruction of Tutsi houses, criminal group formation, violation of domicile 
and complicity in the killings.
473
 Just like Banzi Wellars et al., in the specialized chamber,
474
 and 
based on Articles 2, 14, 89, 90, 91, 312, 166, and 444 of the Rwandan penal code,
475
 the court 
found the above defendants guilty.
476
 They were sentenced to death and ordered to pay 
reparations equivalent to 12,483,317 FRW (18,915 USD) to be paid jointly with the government 
of Rwanda.
477
 Not content with the decision of the court,
478
 the defendants appealed the 
                                                          
472
 Art. 25 of the 08/96 Organic Law allowed examination for cassation, only if the defendants had been sentenced 
to death penalty on appeal yet at first instance they were declared innocent. 
473
 Art.2 part IV of the 1948 Genocide Convention; Arts. 89, 90, 91, 312 and 317 of the 1977 Rwandan Penal Code; 
see also H.G. Van Der Wilt, ‘Genocide, Complicity in Genocide and International v. Domestic Jurisdiction,’ 4 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2006), at 240. 
474
 Prosecutor v. Banzi Wellars et al., (R.M.P 61099/S5/ML/KRE/KD, R.P. 221/R2/2000), the defendants were 
sentenced to death and reparations to victims; Art.14 of the Organic Law N° 08/1996 of 31 August 1996 on the 
Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity. 
475
 Decree-Law N° 21/77 of 18 August 1977 instituting the Penal Code as completed, Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Rwanda, Special N° 13 bis of 1 July 1978. 
476
 For details, see Urukiko rw’Ikirenga, Icyegeranyo cy’Ibyemezo by’Urukiko rw’Ikirenga, Imanza za Jenocide 
(2008), Ubushinjacyaha na Major GD Anne Marie Nyirahakizimana na Ngirinshuti Athanase, Urupapuro rwa 20.  
477
 Arts. 89, 90, 91, 166, 444, 1, and 12 of the 1977 Rwandan Penal Code; Arts.1 and 14 of the Organic Law N° 
08/1996 of 31 August 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses constituting the Crime of Genocide or 
Crimes against Humanity. 
478
 Prosecutor v. Gd Anne Marie Nyirahazimana  and Ngirinshuti Athanase (RP.0001/CM-CS/KGL/99), judgment 
of 3/06/1999. 
  
 
 
94 
 
verdict.
479
 However, due to subsequent changes in the law and after the Supreme Court found 
that there was yet no definitive decision on the matter, the Supreme Court referred the case to the 
competent Gacaca court of appeal.
480
  Gacaca courts of appeal were endowed with competence 
to resume appeal cases awaiting trial before the high court of the republic, the military high court 
and the Supreme Court.
481
 
 
Although this case shows certain instability and regular modifications of laws, it nevertheless, 
illustrates how national courts solved the problem of retroactive punishment as seen in the 
previous trial within the high court.
482
 The 08/96 organic law organised prosecution and 
punishment of genocide suspects based on existing crimes under domestic criminal law.
483 
Different paragraphs in the judgement refer to articles within the penal code as the motivation for 
the accusations and basis for decisions rendered. 
 
Therefore genocide suspects were tried for ordinary crimes in the penal code if they were carried 
out with intention to commit genocide or crimes against humanity.
484
 The special intent degree is 
what distinguishes for instance the ordinary crime of murder from the crime of genocide.
485
 In 
                                                          
479
 Prosecutor v. Gd Anne Marie Nyirahazimana  and Ngirinshuti Athanase (RPA.003/GEN/06/CS) 27/06/2008), 
judgment of 27/06/2008. 
480
 This was in reference to Organic Law N° 13/2008 of 19/05/2008 modifying Organic Law N° 16/2004 of 
14/06/2004 determining the competence of Gacaca courts in its Art.26 which allowed national courts to transfer 
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481
 P.C. Bornkamm, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation, (2012), at 44; Art. 9(2) and (3) 
of Instructions N° 16/2008. 
482
 See D. De Beer, Ikurikiranwa mu Nkiko Ry’ibyaha by’itsembabwoko n’itsembatsemba: Amategeko 
rishingiyeho, Editions RCN, (1995), at 1-2; R. Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and 
Procedure, (2007), at 66. 
483
 P.C. Bornkamm, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation, (2012), at 54-55; J.B. Quigley, 
The Genocide Convention: An International Law Analysis, (2006), at 65-66. 
484
 P.C. Bornkamm, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation (2012), at 55; F. Kabatsi, 
‘Defining or Diverting Genocide: Changing the Comportment of Genocide,’ 5 International Criminal Law Review, 
(2005), at 394. 
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 H. Kreicker, ‘National Prosecution of Genocide from a Comparative Perspective,’ 5 International Criminal Law 
Review, (2005), at 323-324; L.J. LeBlanc, ‘The Intent to Destroy Groups in the Genocide Convention: The Proposed 
U.S. Understanding,’ 78 American Journal of International Law, (1984), at 370; D.L. Nersessian, ‘The Razor’s 
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fact it is considered that the perpetrators’ intent is a central requirement to commit genocide.486 
Another important element seen in this case, though not elaborate, is the notion of superior 
responsibility under domestic law and complicity where the accomplice may incur the same 
punishment as the perpetrator. 
 
V. Prosecutor versus Harelimana et al. 
All the defendants
487
 were accused of various genocide acts as indicated in the table above. 
Harelimana, Rudodo, Mutabaruka, and Harindwintwali were sentenced to death whereas 
Bimenyimana was sentenced to life imprisonment.
488
 On appeal, in the Nyanza appellate court, 
the defendants having a lawyer from Avocats Sans Frontiers received the same sentence as in the 
prior court.
489
  Still not content with the decision of the court, the defendants applied for 
cassation of the case at the supreme level. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found the case 
inadmissible.
490
  
 
As pointed out earlier, this case like many others examined in this study denotes how ignorance 
of the law by defendants and their lawyers would lead to inadmissibility of cases. Particularly, in 
the context of the issue at hand, the defendants could have perhaps applied for review other than 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Edge: Defining and Protecting Human Groups under the Genocide Convention,’ 36 Cornell International Law 
Journal, (2003), at 311-312. 
486
 Art. II et seq of the 1948 Genocide Convention; see J.R.W.D. Jones, ‘Whose Intent is it Anyway? Genocide and 
the Intent to Destroy a Group,’ in L. Chand Vohrah et al. (eds.), Man’s Inhumanity to Man, Essays on International 
Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese, (2003), at 478; L. Van Den Herik, ‘The Schism between the Legal and the 
Social Concept of Genocide,’ in R. Henman and P. Behrens (eds.), The Criminal Law of Genocide, International, 
Comparative and Contextual Aspects, (2007), at 159-161; G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd 
edn, (2009), at 271, MN 743 et seq. 
487
 Harelimana Etienne, Rudodo Joseph, Mutabaruka Joseph, Harindwintwali Antoine and Bimenyimana  Emmanuel 
488
 See Prosecutor v. Harelimana Etienne et al., (RP 10/1/97), judgment of 22/10/1997(Specialised chamber), 
15/05/2003 (1st appeal), 20/06/2008 (2nd appeal in Supreme Court). See, related case in the specialised chambers, 
Prosecutor v. Nyilishema Andre, (R.M.P 98228/S2/HJD/ R.P. 0010/1/GIRO RMPA 2/4170/PROGERAL, RPA 
16/I/97/NZA), judgment of 14/11/1997. 
489
 However, it should be recalled that at one stage Avocats Sans Frontiers (ASF) provided foreign defense attorneys 
to represent genocide suspects in court, W.A. Schabas, ‘Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts,’ 3 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, (2005), at 886. 
490
 For details, Urukiko rw’Ikirenga, Icyegeranyo cy’Ibyemezo by’Urukiko rw’Ikirenga, Imanza za Jenocide (2008), 
Ubushinjacyaha na Harelimana, urupapuro rwa 31. 
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appeal as suggested by the judges, for the reason that the appellants claimed that one of the panel 
members in the previous appellate court was no longer a judge.
491
  
 
In regard to penalties by the courts, this case shows how national courts often handed down 
maximum penalties for the convicts, unlike the ICTR where most convicts got prison terms. For 
instance, the higher court had sentenced Harelimana and three others to death and Bimenyimana 
to life imprisonment. In comparison to international trials conducted by the ICTR, it is found that 
the sentences imposed by national courts were more severe, i.e life imprisonment or the death 
penalty, though the latter was abolished in 2007.
492
 The suspects tried by national courts were 
not as prominent as the high profile perpetrators tried in Arusha, but when it came to sentences, 
they received either equal or higher sentences than their commanders or superiours who 
instigated and encouraged them to commit genocide. Most of the accused in national 
prosecutions were mere counsellors, military personnel and civil servants, but not the master 
minders or conspirators. 
 
VI. Prosecutor versus Nzirabatinyi  
When the case of Nzirabatinyi reached the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
493
 the judges 
prescribed the same sentence of life imprisonment as the other first two inferior courts.
494
 The 
defendant, who was a medical assistant, was accused of instigating and encouraging genocide, 
giving orders to kill, complicity, aiding and abetting. Witnesses testified that he used to reveal 
Tutsis in hiding places, attended roadblocks and would accompany killers by guarding the 
victims so that no one would escape the killing, thus aiding others to commit crimes. After 
                                                          
491
 See Prosecutor v. Harelimana Etienne et al., judgment of 15/05/2003 (Nyanza appeal court), 20/06/2008 
(Supreme Court). 
492
 Amnesty International, (2007),  Rwanda Abolishes Death Penalty, available at, 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/good-news/rwanda-abolishes-death-penalty-2007080>, accessed 
January 2013. 
493
 See Prosecutor v. Nzirabatinyi Felecien (RPA/GEN/0235/05/HC/KIG), judgment of 17/07/2003. Icyegeranyo 
cy’Ibyemezo by’Urukiko rw’Ikirenga, Imanza za Jenocide (2008), Urupapuro rwa 2. 
494
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hearing many prosecution witnesses and arguments by his lawyer, the Supreme Court judges 
found that, although the defendant did not himself hold a gun to shoot, he nevertheless greatly 
aided and abetted the criminal group which attacked some Tutsi families, through accompanying 
and assisting them in killing, and so must be punished like anyone who killed. In this way, the 
defendant is not necessarily required to kill with his own hands in order for him to be held 
criminally liable.
495
 Therefore the court maintained the prior court’s sentence of life 
imprisonment against Nzirabatinyi, which is comparable to Mvumbahe law in the former 
specialised chambers.
496
  
 
A lesson from this case is that any role played in committing genocide should be considered and 
criminalised. As a criminal law norm, criminal responsibility does not require an offender 
himself to have executed the killing but any form of participation incurs liability. In such a 
scenario, the case depicts the need to establish the individual criminal responsibility of each 
accused person. The focus on the individual rather than the group removes the possibility for 
collective blame.
497
 This case further clarifies and brings to light various important notions, such 
as, incitement to genocide, complicity, aiding and abetting as well as superior responsibility. 
 
 This case also shows a close relationship of Gacaca courts with national genocide trials where 
the judges sought Gacaca files to get information on the defendant that was collected during the 
Gacaca information gathering phase.
498
 In several cases there was much reference to Gacaca 
witnesses and alleged accomplices, as manifested in Pandasi’s trial. 
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Rights Journal, (2008), at 263. 
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A problem that is evident in a number of national court cases is that several witnesses used to 
give hearsay evidence and sometimes contradictory witness testimony. This affected the value of 
available evidence before the courts. This is also apparent in Gataza’s case, where there was 
hearsay testimony and contradictory statements in regard to dates, victims and perpetrators. 
 
VII. Prosecutor versus Nzisabira  
Nzisabira Jean Baptiste was charged with genocide crimes that occurred in various places in 
Rwanda.
499
 He participated in criminal groups and committed genocide against a great number of 
people because they belonged to the Tutsi ethnic group.
500
 
 
The prosecution’s accusations against the defendant were confirmed and the court sentenced him 
to life imprisonment and ordered that, reparations be paid jointly with the government of 
Rwanda. When the defendant appealed to the higher court he received the same punishment of 
life imprisonment with deprival of civil liberties. After the matter was taken to the Supreme 
Court, the claim was found to be in compliance with the legal requirements for appeal. 
Nevertheless, after examining the matter and hearing many witnesses, the judges confirmed the 
genocide charges against the defendant and overturned the sentence to 19 years’ imprisonment. 
Although there were more incriminating or prosecution witnesses than defense witnesses, the 
judges emphasized that it is not about the number of witnesses but the substance of evidence 
given.
501
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500
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Quite clearly, this case shows that there is a significant level of independence of the judges from 
the prosecution and vice versa.
502
 The prosecution does not influence the judges, as seen in 
several denials of their requests towards the accused like in the Pandasi case.
503
 Likewise, the 
prosecution can appeal against any decision of the judges as seen in Nyirahazimana case.
504
 
Also, as evidenced in all the cases, the number of judges to adjudicate a matter is three. This 
helps in fostering impartiality of the court and makes the decision more democratic.
505
  
 
Thus, this case portrays the fairness of the national court system where it provides for a triple 
degree jurisdiction for parties to the case. The defendant, prosecution or civil parties have a right 
to appeal in the various competent courts following their hierarchy, of course depending on the 
subject matter at hand.
506
 As seen in this case, the same subject matter was examined in three 
various courts at different periods and at the end, the sentence of life imprisonment was 
overturned to 19 years’ imprisonment. It is important to note that the final decision of the last 
superior court always remains binding on all parties. 
 
The trial also manifests the tedious and slow nature of the ordinary process of justice. The trial 
was postponed several times due to the fact that the defendant had to look for a lawyer. Later, the 
appointed lawyer also requested a postponement in order for him to read his client’s dossier and 
in another scheduled hearing, the trial did not take place due to the absence of one of the judges 
adjudicating the matter because of other official functions. Postponement of hearings has been a 
                                                          
502
 S. Rugege, ‘Judicial Independence and Legal Infrastructure: Essential Partners for Economic Development-
Judicial Independence in Rwanda,’ Pacific McGeorge Global Business and Development Law Journal, (2007). The 
2003 constitution of Rwanda also recognises judicial independence. 
503
 Prosecutor v. Pandasi et al. (RS/Rev 0007/06/CS), judgment of 17/04/2006. See also judges’ denial of the 
prosecution’s requests in the specialised chambers; see, Prosecutor v. Kalisa Ignace et al., (R.P 
65/S1/CH.SP/RSHI), judgment of 14/11/1997, Prosecutor v. Muzatsinda Emmanuel, (R.M.P 900/S11/NG/KE/ R.P. 
041/CS/KIG), judgment of 17/03/1998. All these defendants were found not guilty of genocide contrary to the 
prosecution’s requests. 
504
 Prosecutor v. Gd Anne Marie Nyirahazimana and Ngirinshuti Athanase (RPA.003/GEN/06/CS) 27/06/2008), 
judgment of 27/06/2008. 
505
 For characteristics of impartiality see, P.C. Bornkamm, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and 
Reparation, (2012), at 104 et seq; Art.1 of Organic Law N° 20/2006 of 22/04/2006 provides that criminal 
judgements must be held in public audience, be fair, impartial, comply with the principle of self defence, cross 
examination, treat litigants equal in the eyes of the law, base on evidences legally produced and be rendered without 
any undue delay. 
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common feature of the ordinary court process. This is disadvantageous particularly for victims 
who want to see justice done. 
 
VIII. Prosecutor versus Pandasi, Bugeri and Nzajyibwami  
Like other national court cases, the judgment began by mentioning full identification of the 
defendants, the property of the defendants, seized court as well as the accusations.
507
  In the 
Ruhengeri court, the defendants were accused of genocide, where the first two accused persons 
were sentenced to death and Nzajyibwami was sentenced to life imprisonment.
508
  They appealed 
to the appellate court of Ruhengeri which upheld the previous sentence. Then they applied for 
review of the case but the case was dismissed.
509
 The defendants claimed to be declared innocent 
because their alleged accomplices in Gacaca had not mentioned them in their confessions.
510
 
 
However, on the 17/04/2006, the Supreme Court ruled that the motivation of the request for 
review was baseless,
511
 because it was just writing errors in the judgment where the former court 
mistakenly included the civil plaintiff among the people killed by defendants. In regard to the 
claim that Gacaca defendants did not mention them as accomplices, the court advanced that this 
was not enough evidence or probable truth to make them innocent. The defendants hence lost the 
case and were therefore bound by the prior court’s decision where Pandasi and Bugeri were 
sentenced to death and Nzajyibwami was to serve life imprisonment. 
 
Apparently, this case shows the retributive nature of classical justice within the national court 
system. A lesson from several national court cases as the one at hand is that such cases can 
                                                          
 
507
 Urukiko rw’Ikirenga, Icyegeranyo cy’Ibyemezo by’Urukiko rw’ikirenga, Imanza za Jenocide iz’Ibyaha 
byakozwe n’Abana n’iz’Inshinjabyaha (2006). 
508
 Prosecutor v. Pandasi Bugeri J. Baptiste and Nzajyibwami Eugene Alias Gahini (RP 016/R98), judgment of 
28/10/1998.  See also the Specialized Chamber cases, Prosecutor v. Nyilishema Andre, (R.M.P 98228/S2/HJD/ R.P. 
0010/1/GIRO RMPA 2/4170/PROGERAL, RPA 16/I/97/NZA), judgment of 14/1/1997. 
509
 Prosecutor v. Pandasi et al., (RP 016/R98), judgment of 28/10/1998 (Lower court), (RPA 45/R1/GC/RUH) 
judgment of 18/08/1999 (Higher court), (RS/Rev 0007/06/CS), judgment of 17/04/2006 (Supreme Court). 
510
 For details on complicity, see H.G. Van Der Wilt, ‘Genocide, Complicity in Genocide and International v. 
Domestic Jurisdiction,’ 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2006), at 240. 
511
 Art. 180 Organic Law N° 13/2004 of 17/5/2004. 
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hardly contribute to reconciliation because of the adversarial way in which they are conducted.
512
 
In fact, the defendants are always seeking to be declared innocent rather than revealing their role 
in the genocide, while the victims are longing for punishment of the perpetrators for the losses 
suffered. There is little confession of defendants because they want to avoid punishment and win 
the case other than telling the truth. This is different from Gacaca, where the process is more 
oriented to truth telling, confession and reduced sentences with aim of reconciliation. It is thus 
submitted that the kind of justice achieved through national courts has fostered limited 
reconciliation for Rwandans.
513
 
 
As already seen in a few other cases, the defendants in this trial suffered from lack of legal 
representation, yet the state was always represented by the prosecution. This contradicts the 
principle of equality of arms where the prosecution and defendant must be on equal footing.  
Though Rwandan law clearly allows for defence counsel in criminal matters but not at the 
expense of the government, most suspects were too poor to afford lawyers. For instance Pandasi 
and Nzajyibwami were mere subsistence farmers, and Bugeri was a guard in the National Park. 
In other instances, some lawyers were personally unwilling to represent genocide defendants in 
courts of law.  
 
IX. Prosecutor versus Rurangirwa, Bimenyimana, and Ntawangaheza  
These defendants were accused of various acts of genocide, like criminal group formation,
514
 
destruction of Tutsi houses, rape, torture, unlawful gun possession, and non-assistance of persons 
in danger among other crimes.
515
 On the 23/03/1998, the above defendants were sentenced to 
death and deprival of civil liberties as was done by the specialized chamber in Karorero Charles 
                                                          
512
 D. Pankhurst, ‘Issues of Justice and Reconciliation in Complex Political Emergencies: Conceptualising 
Reconciliation, Justice and Peace,’ 20 Third World Quarterly, (1999), at 239-256; G. Mukherjee, ‘Achieving 
Reconciliation through Prosecution in the Courts: Lessons from Rwanda,’ 28 Conflict Resolution Quarterly (2011), 
at 331-348. 
513
 K. Nash, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Justice in Post-Genocidal Rwanda: Fostering a Sense of Peace and 
Reconciliation,’ 1 Africana, (2007), at 59-100. 
514
 See Arts. 281, 282, 283, Decree-Law N°  21/77 of 18 August 1977 instituting the Penal Code as completed, 
Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, Special N° 13 bis of 1 July 1978. 
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et al.
516
 Then they lodged an appeal in the appellate court of Nyanza which removed some 
charges like unlawful gun possession and non-assistance of persons in danger, but still 
pronounced the same death sentence as the inferior court.
517
 Subsequent to the modification of 
laws and competence of the Supreme Court, the defendants’ second appeal was inadmissible.518 
 
Like many other cases discussed, this particular case shows how retributive justice is 
characterized by prolonged cases, for instance, it started on the 23 March 1998 from the first trial 
in the Butare court in the south, and the final decision was pronounced by the Supreme Court on 
the 20 June 2008, which is really a lengthy period before justice can be fully obtained. Therefore 
retributive justice in the national courts seems to be a slow and tedious process, perhaps due to 
the fact that, it is the same courts which have to deal with ordinary crimes too. 
 
In this specific case, the accused persons were tried for rape, among other crimes because it was 
a Category One crime, but after 2008 those accused of the crime remained in Category One but 
were transfered to the jurisdiction of Gacaca. So rape cases before the 2008 amendment
519
 fell 
within the jurisdiction of national courts. This shows constant alteration of genocide laws and 
suspects in various jurisdictions, sometimes affecting the credibility of the courts. 
 
As noted earlier, this case shows that absence of civil claims meant no reparation to victims by 
offenders.  Although the defendants mentioned above destroyed Tutsi houses, there were no civil 
parties to the case, and hence no judgment on reparations.  
 
                                                          
516
 Prosecutor v. Charles Karorero et al. (R.M.P 78.752/S2/KRL., R.P 26/96), judgment of 31/03/2000, Urukiko 
rwa mbere rw’Iremezo rwa Cyangugu. 
517Urukiko rw’Ikirenga, Icyegeranyo cy’Ibyemezo by’Urukiko rw’Ikirenga, Imanza za Jenocide (2008), 
Ubushinjacyaha na Rurangirwa, Urupapuro rwa 28. 
 
518
 See Prosecutor v. Rurangirwa Hyacinthe, Bimenyimana, and Ntawangaheza (RPAA 003/GEN/06/CS), judgment 
of 23/03/1998, (First trial), judgment of 25/07/2001(First appeal), judgment of 20/6/2008 (Second Appeal). The 
appeal violated Art. 25 of the 08/96 Organic Law which required the defendants to have been sentenced to death 
penalty on appeal yet innocent at first trial. 
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X. Prosecutor versus Sibomana  
The prosecution accused the defendant of genocide and other crimes against humanity as 
indicated in the table above.
520
 Upon examination of both incriminating and exonerating 
evidence by the judges, the Kigali specialised chamber, declared the defendant guilty of the 
charges and sentenced him to death and deprival of all civil liberties. The defendant was also to 
pay 4,257,900 RWF (6,451 USD) as reparation to the civil plaintiff or victims because of his 
criminal acts, which were perpetrated with the intention to destroy Tutsis in whole or in part as 
defined by the Genocide Convention, ICTR Statute and the 08/96  organic law.
521
  
 
The defendant appealed to the court in Kigali, which then confirmed the charges and imposed the 
same sentence as the former specialised chamber. When the matter was taken to the Supreme 
Court on the 13 June 2008, it was found inadmissible because the matter could not be examined 
in more than two instances as provided by the 08/96 organic law.
522
 So the parties were still 
bound by the judgment of the previous court. 
 
In viewing genocide sentences, this particular case, like many others in the national courts, 
shows that there is possibility of a secondary punishment added to the principal one, as ruled by 
the appeals court in Kigali. In addition to the main sentence, a genocide convict may incur loss 
of civic rights.
523
 However, a brief look at the ICTR jurisprudence shows that it does not impose 
                                                          
520
 Prosecutor v. Sibomana J.M Vianney (RP 065/CS/KIG), judgment of 30/04/1999, (RPA89/99/R1/KIG), 
judgment of 8/02/2003, (RPA0017/GEN/07/CS/), judgment of 13/06/2008. 
521
 Icyegeranyo cy’Ibyemezo by’Urukiko rw’Ikirenga, Imanza za Jenocide (2008), Ubushinjacyaha na Sibomana 
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522
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accessory punishment where they are deprived of their rights to be elected to public office and to serve in certain 
official functions. However in the course of the 2007 amendment of the Gacaca Law, this sanction was mitigated. 
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supplementary sentences.
524
 This also applies in the case of defendants transferred by the ICTR 
or extradited by third states to Rwanda, which eventually shows some inequality in the treatment 
of genocide convicts.
525
  
 
Also, from this judgment, it is evident that the judges have always to motivate the court decisions 
and sentences through reference to various laws dealing with the crime of genocide. In other 
words, the case illustrates how the judges have to always give a legal motivation for each 
finding, right from admissibility or inadmissibility of the case to the final judgment, relying on 
both national and international law.
526
 Hence every accusation goes along with a legal provision 
to avoid violation of the principle of legality, which provides that there can be no crime without 
law, and no punishment without law (nullum crimen nulla peona sine lege). The same 
requirement applies to the prosecution which is always required to provide the legal basis of each 
accusation.  
 
Finally, despite reference to various national and international legal provisions within the 
judgments, there is little reference to international case law, particularly ICTR case law.
527
 In 
clear instances, the national court cases have not drawn much inspiration from existing 
international jurisprudence, which could have facilitated harmonisation of case law on related 
                                                          
524
 Life imprisonment is the maximum sentence given to ICTR convicts according to the ICTR Statute, see The 
Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Case N° ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence (TC), 4 September 1998. 
525
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1994;  2003 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda; Organic Law of  07/2004  of 24/04/2004 on Organization, 
Functioning and Competence of the Supreme Court; Organic Law N°  10/2007 of  01/03/2007 on Organization, 
Functioning and Competence of Gacaca Courts; Law N°  13/2004 of 17 May 2004 relating to the Code of Criminal 
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18 August 1977 instituting the Penal Code of 1978. 
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 W.A. Schabas, ‘Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts,’ 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2005), at 889. 
He views the Tribunal’s jurisprudence to have had such a limited impact on the national court trials which could be 
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matters. Even so, cases from national courts present various lessons that can be drawn from their 
achievements and shortcomings as presented below.  
 
E. Achievements of National Court Trials  
Since the 1994 genocide which devastated the national judicial system, Rwanda has worked hard 
to rebuild its judiciary.
528
 In the aftermath of the genocide, the Rwandan government has 
developed the courts’ human and material resources, as well as court structures.529  More 
importantly, the ordinary courts have tried a significant number of genocide suspects, punished 
convicts, acquitted those not guilty and reintegrated vast numbers of genocide perpetrators 
within the society, thereby ensuring justice for both victims and perpetrators.
530
  So far, over 
15,000 genocide suspects have been tried by the ordinary courts from the time when the 
genocide law was adopted in 1996. 
 
The genocide trials held since 1996 have produced an important body of case law on core crimes 
which provides information on the dynamics of genocide.
531
 These judgments will be of 
significance to researchers and criminal lawyers who deal with an assessment of factual issues.
532
 
They are therefore of great practical use to Rwandan judges and lawyers engaged in the ongoing 
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prosecutions, and the cases establish principles for interpretation of the national legislation 
dealing with genocide prosecutions.
533
  
 
Moreover, though not as lengthy as the ICTR judgments, the case law reports of national courts 
will be without doubt of interest to historians because some of the more lengthy judgments 
provide informative and detailed accounts of specific episodes during the months of April, May 
and June 1994.
534
 Some judgments have gone to over fifty pages, providing useful facts and 
information on the crime of genocide, as seen in the case of Banzi Wellars.
535
 However, all the 
judgments and documents in the archives are in the national language, Kinyarwanda. This 
constitutes a barrier for researchers from outside Rwanda. 
 
Importantly, as far as national trials are concerned, domestic case law forms part of state practice 
and could thus influence future prosecutions.
536
 On a broader note, national legislation and 
genocide case law may give effect to the obligations enclosed in the 1948 Genocide 
Convention.
537
 Therefore, the Rwandan domestic practice has not only clarified a number of 
issues of the crime of genocide, but it has further shaped domestic application of the Genocide 
Convention. What seems most reasonable is the fact that national application of the Convention 
leads to a better understanding of the Convention itself, more specifically, what genocide means 
and how to deal with the crime domestically.
538
 Based on the experience of Rwanda, it can be 
asserted that by incorporating the crime of genocide into the domestic legal system and applying 
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et seq. 
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it, the scope of the crime will be fixed.
539
 The courts have therefore promoted the domestic 
application of international criminal justice and legislation. 
 
Another crucial lesson to be learnt from this process is that mounting large scale prosecutions in 
the post-conflict environment ensures accountability, deterrence and justice at the national level, 
thus meeting the justice demands of victims and suspects.
540
  The Rwandan experiment thus is 
contributing a new element, namely that there is no tolerance or compromise in dealing with 
impunity that characterised the past decades.
541
 This is because domestic systems principally 
stand as primary forums for prosecution of international crimes rather than international 
mechanisms. Authors like Cassese argue that these international mechanisms are just back-up 
institutions which will be unable to prosecute all perpetrators.
542 
 Even after the creation of the 
ICC, direct enforcement of international criminal law is primarily for domestic jurisdictions and 
the ICC will intervene only in case of inability or unwillingness of states to prosecute.
543
 States 
with their own police forces, structured court system, adequate legislation offer better places for 
this task, at least if they are willing to use their potential in combating international crimes.
544 
 
 
This factor, combined with greater access to evidence, witnesses, victims and perpetrators, 
makes national courts indispensable in developing international criminal justice. It is therefore 
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submitted that even where a prosecution is brought to an international tribunal, national courts 
will retain a fundamental role in the process of arresting defendants, taking testimony under oath, 
authorizing searches and seizures, and freezing the proceeds of crimes, in cooperation with 
international courts.
545
  
 
Furthermore, as already said, trials held in the affected country may have greater relevance to 
victims and the society than distant trials conducted far abroad.
546
  Therefore Rwanda’s 
experience in dealing with the legacy of the genocide and other human rights abuses offers 
lessons to other societies that may have to deal with the aftermath of atrocity.  
 
In sum, one cannot neglect the function of national courts in determining international criminal 
law.  This is due to the fact that their practices may comfirm or create customary law and 
contribute to the formation of general principles of law. Their judgments can also serve as aids in 
recognising international criminal law, helping to determine the content of the norms of 
international criminal law.
547
 
 
F. Major Shortcomings of Domestic Prosecutions 
Generally, national trials also feature many legal inconsistencies in the application of 
international law and practical pitfalls in dealing with the core crimes. The case of Rwanda 
presents its own weaknesses, perhaps due to the horrific nature of the violence, large-scale 
participation in the genocide, complexity of the crime itself, inability of the courts and 
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unprecedented experience in the region.
548
 Therefore state prosecution of the crime was prone to 
face different shortcomings as discussed below. 
 
I. Congested Prisons and Insufficient Infrastructure 
Given the fact that prior to April 1994, the national judicial system had many serious flaws, one 
wonders about the standard of the judicial system after the massacres.
549
 Without delving into 
detail, it is much easier to figure out that, in a country where the massacres ceased without a 
peace agreement but with the use of force, and where the war had anihilated the judiciary's 
human and material resources, state structures, including courts had also been destroyed.
550
  
 
When the current government took over power in July 1994, the judicial system was totally 
shattered through the killing of judges and administrative staff, the flight of others usually due to 
their involvement in acts of genocide, the destruction of working materials and equipment, loss 
of archives, collapse of the state machinery and judicial police.
551
 The urgent task in the area of 
justice was to train judges, prosecutors and support staff.
552
  
 
For instance, before the genocide started on 7 April 1994, there were 758 judges but only 44 
among them had a law degree. The prosecution had 70 prosecutors in total, but only 22 had a law 
degree. Following the genocide, of the 758 judges, only 244 remained, and of the 70 prosecutors, 
only 12 were in the country.  With support from various donors and countries, the country had to 
                                                          
548
 A. Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, (1999), at 748; Y. De Wolf, R. De Wolf, and 
C. Ntampaka, Itsembabwoko n’Itsembabtesemba mu mategeko y’Rwanda, ASSEPAC Editions, (1997), at 28-29. 
549
 G. Prunier, ‘Rwanda: The Social, Political and Economic Situation in June 1997,’ (Report, Writenet (UK), July 
1997); Amnesty International, ‘The Troubled Course of Justice,’ (London, 26 April 2000). 
550
 J. Fierens, ‘Gacaca Courts: Between Fantasy and Reality,’ 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005), at 
898. 
 
551
 For details see, M. Cousineau, L’établissement de l’État de Droit au Rwanda: Un But Irréalisable, 28 Ottawa 
Law Review, (1997), at 176; A. Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, (1999), at 748; C.J. 
Ferstman, ‘Rwanda’s Domestic Trials for Genocide and Crimes against Humanity,’ 1 Washington College of Law 
(1997), at 1-15; K. McCourt,  ‘Judicial Defenders: Their Role in Postgenocide Justice and Sustained Legal 
Development,’ 3 International Journal of Transitional Justice, (2009), 272-283. 
552
 National Service of Gacaca Courts, Summary of the Report presented at the Closing of Gacaca Court Activities, 
Kigali, June 2012, at 5. 
  
 
 
110 
 
train judicial staff. After the training, judges increased to 841, whereas the prosecutors numbered 
210 and the support staff numbered 910.
553
  
 
What was more challenging is that the 120,000 suspects in prison after the genocide implied 
thousands of prosecutions which would then require a judge, prosecutor, legal defence, and court 
infrastructure.
554
 Quite obviously, the ordinary courts could not deal with the backlog of cases 
and keeping the vast majority of the suspects in prison without a trial proved to be simply 
difficult due to various reasons such as prison overcrowding, the demands for justice by the 
victims and suspects.
555
  
 
Five years after commencement of the genocide trials, an assessment of their progress showed 
that only 6,000 cases had been tried.
556
 Therefore, trying all the genocide detainees would have 
taken more than 100 years according to different estimates, and probably no trials would have 
taken place because suspects and eye witnesses would no longer be living.
557
 At this pace, 
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national courts would not be able to deal with all the genocide suspects in the overcrowded 
prisons hence the need for an alternative mechanism such as Gacaca.
558
 
 
II. Violation of Fair Trial Rights 
Another principal shortcoming of national court trials is inadequate guarantees of due process 
and fair trial rights, largely due to poor economic capacity and inefficiency
559
 that characterizes 
developing countries. The courts have sometimes failed to meet not only international standards 
but also national law on fair trial guarantees. 
 
1. The Right to Speedy Trial  
This is perhaps not easy to address because there are no fixed days, weeks or years to establish 
the duration of a trial or determine a delayed proceeding.
560
 So the time is determined depending 
on each particular case, based on the complexity of the matter, conduct of the defendant and 
performance of the judicial personnel.  
 
For example, to date, it has taken more than eighteen years to try genocide suspects in Rwanda. 
Prior efforts to address some of these defects through programs including pre-trial detention 
hearings and the vast release of extremely old, young, or ill detainees have been applied but 
without notable success of speeding up trials for the remaining detainees.
561
 In fact, before the 
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transfer of suspects to Gacaca, a number of them had been detained for years without being tried, 
while others had already served more time than the maximum prison sentence they would 
receive if they had been convicted earlier, and others were found innocent after long periods of 
detention. However, it is sufficient to note that this is comprehensible, given the caseload, 
economic constraints and the fact that conventional justice is limited capacity wise. 
 
2. The Principle of Presumption of Innocence  
In regard to the genocide cases within the competence of ordinary courts, the principle relating to 
the presumption of innocence is adequately provided for under the law; in other words ‘a suspect 
is innocent until proven guilty.’  However, after the genocide, pre-trial detention had become a 
principle rather than an exception. This was because of the inability of the national system to 
either carry out extensive investigations or render hearings to all suspects. 
 
After subsequent complaints, the situation was rectified during trials, and when the prosecution 
did not give sufficient evidence on the criminal suspect, it became a reason for acquitting the 
suspect as indicated in the case of Kabirigi Anastase et al, where the specialized chamber of 
Kibuye court of first instance found the co-accused Muhayimana Cyprien not guilty of the 
alleged crimes because of lack of sufficient evidence from the prosecution as cited below. 
‘Rusanze Muhayimana Cyprien ibyaha aregwa bya Jenocide, Ubuhotozi, Gusahura no Kurema Umutwe 
w’Abagizi banabi byose bijyana n’igitero yagiyemo kwa Dansira Kamberuka ntabimenyetso 
ubushinjacyaha bwagaragarije Urukiko.’ 562 
The specialized chamber of Kibuye court of first instance found Muhayimana Cyprien not guilty 
of the alleged crimes because the prosecution could not prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the alleged accusations. However, such investigations and proceedings to 
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establish a fair verdict have sometimes led to protracted hearings in violation of the right to 
speedy justice.
563
  
 
3. The Right to Counsel of One's Choice 
The right of defendants to call upon a lawyer of their choice in order to protect their interests and 
defend them against charges is guaranteed under various instruments such as the ICCPR and 
African Charter.
564
 This right is a central feature of the principle of equality of arms, which 
ensures that the defence will have a reasonable opportunity to prepare its case on an equal 
footing with the prosecution.
565
 Also, as in most matters of criminal law, Rwandan law does 
provide for the participation of counsel at any stage of the proceedings in ordinary courts.
566
 
 
However, although there were enough laws on the right to legal representation, it was never easy 
to put it into practice for genocide suspects. The law acknowledges the right to counsel of one’s 
choice but specifies that he/she cannot be paid by the government.
567
 The right affected here is 
not so much the right to counsel, but a defendant's right to have access to a lawyer of his choice 
even when he is indigent, without any cost. This is contrary to the ICTR system which provides 
lawyers even to its so-called indigent defendants. Even though both systems are not without 
problems and neither are they expected to handle suspects in the same manner; there is however, 
a disparity between the courts’ treatment of defendants, which necessitates addressing the 
hinderance in an all-inclusive way.
568
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Owing to the weak judicial infrastructure and little means of the government, suspects have been 
subjected to feeble legal representation in the aftermath of the genocide.
569
 This is visible from 
the decided cases, where certain courts would deny defendants their right to legal representation. 
In the early years of genocide trials, judges would not allow adjourning cases to another day, as 
requested by defendants still seeking lawyers, asserting that it was reason for delaying cases.
570
 It 
was after several criticisms and continuous training of the judiciary that the situation was 
improved. Various appellate courts reversed decisions that violated the defendant’s right to have 
legal counsel.  
 
A case in point is the judgment of Ndikubwimana Leonidas who had been sentenced to capital 
punishment, and on appeal, the Kigali appeals court ruled that, the sentence given to the 
defendant without observance of his right to have a lawyer was contrary to the 1991 Rwandan 
Constitution,
571
 and Article 36 of the 1996 organic law. Later the appeals court found the 
defendant not guilty and he was acquitted.
572
 Literally translated from the court ruling in 
Kinyarwanda, the court put as follows the acquittal:  
‘Rusanze urubanza rwahanishijwe uregwa igihano cyo kwicwa atarigeze yemererwa kunganirwa na Avoka 
we runyuranyije n’Itegeko Nshinga ryo ku wa 10 kamena 1991 n’ingingo ya 36 y’Itegeko Ngenga ryo ku 
wa 30 kanama 1996.’573   
 
Also the Cyangugu appeals court found that the previous court had violated Munyangabe 
Theodore’s right to have counsel of his own choice when the court denied his request to 
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postpone or adjourn the trial so that he finds a lawyer. Upon examination of the case, 
Munyangabe was declared not guilty. Literally translated from the court ruling in Kinyarwanda;  
‘Urukiko rw’Ubujurire rwa Cyangugu mu rubanza rwa Munyangabe Theodore, rusanze yaravukijwe 
uburenganzira bwo kunganirwa na Avoka yihitiyemo nkuko biteganywa n’ingingo ya 36 y’itegeko Ngenga 
rya 1996, kuko yasabye urukiko kwimurira iburanisha ku wundi munsi kugira ngo ashobore gushaka 
Avoka umwunganira ariko rukabimwangira nkuko biboneka mu nyandiko mvugo rwemeje ko Munyangabe 
Theodore ari umwere.’574 
In fact, it appears that the quality of the trials kept improving over the years as aptly observed by 
Michel Moussalli, the special representative for the U.N Commission on Human Rights, that 
most defendants had advocates in 1999.
575
 And in 2000, he found that the trials conformed to 
international standards.
576
 This is the reason why the Rwandan legislator in 2001 decided to 
entrust high category suspects to ordinary courts which, are supposed to respect due process 
rights of fair trial with regard to individuals who coordinated the genocide while transferring 
lower level offenders to a local mechanism.
577
  
 
Although certain fair trial standards have been recognized as forming part of international 
customary law;
578
  it has been a challenge for societies emerging from conflict to observe the 
duty to prosecute former human rights violators in conformity with international fair trial 
standards, and due process guarantees.
579
 Owing to such criticisms over fair trial standards in 
Rwanda, several countries have refused to extradite genocide suspects, and in certain instances, 
opted for prosecution of the suspects.
580
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G. Excursus: Prosecution of Genocide Suspects by Third States 
I. Extradition Matters 
As it is apparent from practice, several countries have refused the extradition of Rwandan 
genocide suspects due to concerns over fair trial and the independence of the judiciary in 
Rwanda. A case in point is the United Kingdom (UK) high court which so far is not alone in 
turning down extradition requests to Rwanda. As the UK high court judgment itself asserted, 
French and German courts have declined extradition requests.
581
    
 
On 23 October 2008 the Toulouse court of appeal refused to order extradition to Rwanda in 
Bivugarabago, due to concerns over the administration of fair proceedings and safeguards for 
defence witnesses. A similar decision of refusing extradition was rendered in Mbarushimana on 
3 November 2008 by Frankfurt-am-Main court of appeal. Then, was the case of Senyamuhara in 
the appellate court of Mamoudzou on 14 November 2008 and Kamali in the Paris court of appeal 
on 10 December 2008 where extradition was denied. Additionally, on 9 January 2009 in the 
Kamana case, the Lyon appeals court turned down the extradition request of the defendant on 
same grounds.  
 
A contrary decision was arrived at in the Swedish Supreme Court in the 2009 case of Sylvere 
Ahorugeze,
582
  where the court cited weaknesses in the Rwandan justice system but decided to 
extradite the suspect to Rwanda.
583
 Sweden did not find that extradition was in violation with 
Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR) or domestic 
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Swedish law. However, following Ahorugeze’s application, the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) interceded in the case to solve the issue of extradition. The ECtHR demanded 
that the extradition be stayed until the application can be resolved. And in 2011, the Supreme 
Court in Sweden ruled that Ahorugeze should be released due to the time spent in detention, a 
decision that was not well received by the government of Rwanda.
584
  However, an added layer 
of complexity is that Ahorugeze is at the time of writing, living in Denmark. This means that the 
Rwandan authorities will have to turn to the Danish and not the Swedish judicial system if they 
want Ahorugeze extradited.
585
 
 
A challenging case on extradition concerns the UK high court of justice which on the 8 April 
2009 settled an appeal of four Rwandan genocide suspects.
586
 They appealed against the decision 
of an extradition judge to send their cases to the UK secretary of state and, in turn, to Rwanda for 
prosecution in the high court of Rwanda, asserting that they would not receive a fair trial in 
Rwanda.
587
 As a result, the high court expressed concerns regarding difficulties the suspects 
might experience in securing witness testimony in proceedings held in Rwanda and concluded 
that the four suspects would suffer a real risk of violating their fair trial rights if they were to face 
prosecution in their home country.
588
 The high court did not contest the evidence that 
incriminated the suspects for genocide acts in 1994 but instead put emphasis only on the issue of 
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fair trial.
589
 Schabas argues that the refusal to extradite should be raised in the clearest of cases 
and not, for example to deny underdeveloped countries the right to try genocide suspects simply 
because of problems of resources meaning that their courts lack the accessories of those in 
developed countries.
590
 
 
What is problematic however is that at the time of writing the suspects are free in the UK, which 
cannot prosecute them domestically because of concerns over the principle of non-retroactivity 
where its legislation does not provide jurisdiction that goes back to the time of the Rwandan 
genocide. This is because the UK International Criminal Court Act allows domestic prosecutions 
for acts of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity committed in a foreign country only 
after the time of its enactment in 2001; in other words, the legislation does not cover crimes 
committed in 1994.
591
 Consequently, this may yield impunity for genocide criminals where 
certain states refuse to extradite and neither carry out prosecutions themselves, which would be a 
violation of the aut dedere aut judicare principle.
592
 
 
Indeed, in assessing the above issues, the effects of impunity that arise when courts refuse to 
extradite suspects could be avoided where domestic laws in the refusing jurisdictions do permit 
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prosecution.
593
 Then, the pursuit of international human rights regarding fair trials would not 
mean impunity for genocide suspects.
594
  Alternatively, states such as the UK could extradite to 
other countries with competence to prosecute such international crimes. A case in point is 
Germany, one of the forerunners in the world concerning national prosecution of international 
crimes by its adoption of universal jurisdiction laws.
595
 
 
II. Third State Prosecutions: Case of Rwabukombe in Germany 
Germany denied the extradition request of Rwabukombe to Rwanda because there were doubts 
as to whether he would receive a fair trial and decided to carry out the trial in its domestic 
courts.
596
 The refusal to extradite Rwabukombe, a former mayor of the Muvumba commune 
followed the ICTR precedent where the Tribunal had refused to transfer cases to Rwanda,
597
  
raising doubts on the independence of the Rwandan judiciary from political influence, the 
possibility of life imprisonment with solitary confinement, and concerns over the protection of 
defence witnesses in Rwanda.  
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Following his arrest on 26 July 2010, Rwabukombe was placed in pre-trial custody. On 29 July 
2010 he was charged under the German penal code with genocide,
598
  murder
599
  and abetting 
murder
600
 before the higher regional court of Frankfurt am Main. On 8 December 2010, the court 
confirmed the charges against Rwabukombe. His trial was opened on 18 January 2011, and at the 
time of writing, is still underway.
601
 It is submitted that this anticipated lengthy trial further 
indicates the complexities involved in dealing with international crimes cases. However, this is 
understandable given the difficulties involved, such as the travelling of investigators to Rwanda, 
interviews in different languages, translation of available documents into German, the need for 
witnesses from Rwanda to travel to Germany, interpretation in court from Kinyarwanda to 
German or the reverse, and so many other obstacles, such as accommodation, which actually 
render the trial very expensive in nature. Other inconveniences and shortcomings faced include 
the fact that a number of witnesses from Rwanda sometimes face a cultural shock of the court 
proceedings and structure with which they are not familiar, which, in the end, may hamper their 
confidence and consequently the credibility of their testimony due to intimidation or fear and 
uncomfort in testifying. Also, the standards of proof in developed countries’ judicial systems are 
sometimes different from the available evidence. For instance in regard to standards in the 
Rwabukombe case in Germany,  eye witnesses are regularly unable to provide required 
documents as evidence of the suspect’s crimes, or to give exact dates and time when the crimes 
were committed by the suspect. It is very hard to get minutes of meetings or video clips of all 
facts regarding the accusations, as often demanded by the court, which is perhaps right in the 
context of Europe standards but not practical in Africa, where it is rare to find recorded and well-
preserved evidence other than the oral testimony of witnesses and hearsay evidence.  
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Another challenge faced is the uncertain protection from danger or ill treatment of defence 
witnesses in Rwanda. And finally, the translation of documents is a difficult process because 
sometimes coded language is used or words in Kinyarwanda that cannot be translated within the 
context of their actual meaning.
602
   
 
On a positive note, there are several advantages of third state prosecutions. In particular, the case 
at hand affirms the international criminal law principle that there shall be no tolerance of 
impunity of persons who committed grave human rights abuses, no matter where they may be or 
where the crimes were committed.
603
 Also, due to credible justice systems, third state 
prosecutions, especially in developed countries, have a reputation of respecting fair trial rights of 
defendants as provided for under international law and national law. Specifically, in addition to 
full observance of the due process rights of defendants, the German system is characterised by an 
independent judiciary where the trial itself would be an exemplary lesson to several other 
countries in conducting prosecutions under the principle of universality.
604
  
 
Unlike several countries, Germany has a pure universal jurisdiction statute, which is called the 
code of crimes under international law, (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch-VStGB).
605
  Germany has 
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prosecuted suspects of international crimes based on this code which covers crimes committed 
after its entry into force on 30 June 2002.
606
 For crimes committed before the entry into force of 
the Völkerstrafgesetzbuch, Section 220a of the Strafgesetzbuch, (StGB) was used in the case of 
genocide. According to the more recent Völkerstrafgesetzbuch, German national courts are 
competent to prosecute and try alleged perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes regardless of where the crimes were committed. Therefore, it is important for other 
states to learn from German practice in order to comply with the aut dedere aut judicare 
principle.
607
 
 
Apart from Germany, there are several countries that have carried out prosecutions for genocide 
of Rwandans who had sought refuge in countries such as the Netherlands, France, Belgium, 
Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Canada and the US.
608
 According to information provided 
by the genocide fugitive tracking unit, such tremendous strides against impunity would not give 
breathing space to genocide fugitives.
609
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Importantly, by virtue of third state prosecutions, the international community shows that there is 
no safe haven for those who commit international crimes.
610
 This is necessary for deterrence and 
for ending impunity at the national and international level because heinous crimes which go 
unpunished tend to encourage continued violations of human rights.
611
 Therefore, the issue that 
remains is the need for increased cooperation among states in prosecution of perpetrators of 
international crimes. The surrender and arrest of fugitives represents a vital form of state 
cooperation but a state’s unwillingness to surrender or prosecute suspects of grave crimes can 
become a big barrier to accountability.
612
  As put by the UN Secretary General, ‘The fact that the 
ICTR continues to deliver justice, with the cooperation of some states shows the reality of the 
new age of accountability and that international criminal justice is a testament to the collective 
determination to confront the most heinous crimes.’613  
Notwithstanding the above, states, investigators, prosecutors, judges, and courts of countries 
whose legislation incorporates this broad concept of universality, should apply it with great 
prudence, and only if they are certain that convincing evidence is available against the accused, 
moreover that states with a close link to the case are not about to prosecute.
614
 In case states with 
a closer nexus to the crime are able and willing to prosecute as provided by the ICC 
complementarity principle, third states should refrain from any prosecution to avoid conflicting 
jurisdictions by virtue of the subsidiarity principle.
615
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE TRADITIONAL GACACA COURT SYSTEM  
 
A. Introduction 
The word Gacaca originates from the Kinyarwanda word meaning ‘grass’ as a reference to the 
early conduct of hearings in open places aimed at resolving minor conflicts in society and 
reconciling the parties.
616
 It is this old Gacaca culture that was transformed to deal with the crime 
of genocide in the aftermath of war.
617
 The official opening of the Gacaca jurisdiction process 
took place on the 18 June 2002 and the activities of the courts were officially closed on 18 June 
2012.
618
 During their time of service, the courts were coordinated by the national service of 
Gacaca jurisdictions (NSGJ), an agency which was under the ministry of justice.
619
  
 
Gacaca courts worked in different phases which operated one after the other. The initial phase, 
which took place from mid 2002 to July 2006, investigated the facts surrounding the genocide in 
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regard to crimes, victims and perpetrators in every cell through confessions and accusations. At 
the end of the information gathering or investigative phase, the lay judges presiding over the 
Gacaca court of the cell at the lowest administrative level, carried out the categorization of 
suspects, followed by trials in the pilot jurisdictions. Then in July 2006, the trial phase was 
spread to the whole country. The information collected in the previous phase was used to 
conduct the trials of the accused and those who had confessed. Trials for those placed in the 
second category took place at the sector level and those placed under Category Three were tried 
at the cell level, whereas Category One suspects were forwarded to the ordinary courts. 
 
B. Generalities on Grassroot Courts 
As will be explained below, the court system was conceived during the Urugwiro meetings
620
 
and went through several modifications in the course of time, based to a certain extent on the 
findings from the pilot studies in 751 localities which started in 2002.
621
 
 
I. The Evolution of Gacaca Courts 
Gacaca jurisdictions were established in addition to the standard tribunals to try cases arising 
from the genocide.
622
 At the international level, the U.N had set up the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda in November 1994 with jurisdiction to prosecute genocide and other serious 
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violations of international law in Rwanda.
623
 On the national level, the Rwandan government had 
also created special chambers in 1996 within the existing thirteen tribunals of first instance to try 
genocide related cases.
624
 As years elapsed, the ICTR
625
 and specialized chambers were unable to 
address the overwhelming number of genocide cases.
626
  
 
With the existing judicial system incapable of dealing with the massive numbers of suspects, a 
more dramatic solution to the problem of accountability for the 1994 genocide was needed.
627
 
Subsequent to the 1995 international genocide conference and following the 1998 ‘Saturday 
debates’ held at Urugwiro presidential offices, a series of  meetings of leading figures proposed 
the modification of traditional Gacaca system to deal with genocide criminal proceedings.
628
  
 
The participants in the Urugwiro meetings involved members of the government, members of 
important state institutions, representatives of the army and the police, representatives of the 
political parties, members of the judiciary and lawyers. It is important to note that initially, there 
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was no consensus, with academics, prosecutors, lawyers, and judges rejecting the Gacaca system 
entirely. Gacaca was also rejected by human rights bodies and the intelligencia.
629
  
 
However, in response to the social, political and legal problems in the post-genocide period, the 
Rwandan government launched Gacaca to try lower-level genocide suspects, deriving the idea 
from a traditional dispute resolution mechanism.
630
  
 
II. Traditional Roots of Gacaca 
In Kinyarwanda, the word Gacaca is a culture where Rwandans would traditionally sit on grass, 
in open places under trees when talking or solving disagreements between neighbours. A related 
mechanism is found in the Old Testament, where Deborah used to judge cases under a palm 
tree.
631
 To fully understand the origins and purposes of the ancient practice of Gacaca, it needs to 
be traced around the 17
th
 century, when Rwanda consisted of several smaller territories governed 
by kings (Abami).  The king embodied justice, wisdom and political power. He was the ultimate 
arbitrator, assisted by the abiru, the guardians of tradition. However, before a conflict was heard 
by the king, it needed to be brought before the wise men at the lowest units of society, known as 
inyangamugayo. These community elders would hear grievances of conflicting parties, and 
finally find solutions. Women and teenagers were only entitled to participate in the audience as 
defendants or witnesses.
632
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The matters handled by the elders  included family disputes, fighting, theft, land use, live stock, 
property damage, inheritance, marriage or adultery.
633
 The objective of Gacaca was to sanction 
the violation of rules that were shared by the community in order to reconcile the different 
parties in conflict.
634
 In ancient Gacaca, the inyangamugayo judges never imposed prison terms 
on those found guilty although in some instances they did banish individuals from the 
community for a short period but always with the option for them to return eventually and be 
integrated in the society.
635
 
 
In an ideal Gacaca hearing, after hearing from the inyangamugayo elders, defendants would first 
confess their crimes, express remorse and ask for forgiveness from those whom they had injured. 
Gacaca judges would then demand that confessors provide restitution to their victims and the 
process would culminate in the sharing of beer or food, usually provided by the guilty party to 
symbolize the reconciliation of the parties involved.
636
 Where the offending party was unable to 
pay the total reparation ordered, the other villagers helped him/her to execute the Gacaca 
decision. 
 
During the colonial period, a western-style legal system was introduced in Rwanda but the 
Gacaca tradition kept its function as a customary conflict resolution mechanism at the local level.  
During this time, Gacaca meetings were allowed in rural areas and modern classical courts were 
mainly utilised by the civilized Rwandans, or foreigners living in Rwanda. So the Gacaca 
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mechanism continued to function but was inferior to the new system. Serious cases such as work 
contracts and manslaughter were then to be handled in the formal courts.
637
 
 
History records that at the end of the twentieth century, Gacaca did not exist as a permanent 
judicial institution but was based instead on unwritten law and assembled only when conflicts 
arose within or between families, particularly in rural Rwanda.
638
 After independence, Gacaca 
survived informally and Rwandans continued to use it to settle conflicts among neighbours. 
Rather than going to the formal courts, they would sort out the problem among themselves. Even 
with the introduction of formal courts, Gacaca conciliatory and informal character remained as 
the cornerstone of the institution.
639
  
 
The main focus of the ‘ancient Gacaca’ was offences related to property and civil disputes, until 
after the 1994 genocide when the focus changed to include serious crimes like genocide due to 
the huge number of suspects. The relation between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Gacaca portrays a 
difference in nature as illustrated below in the establishing laws. 
 
III. Legal Basis of Gacaca Courts 
Legally, Gacaca courts were created by the 2001 organic law,
640
  which was replaced by the 2004 
organic law
641
 with the latter modified periodically in June 2006,
642
 March 2007,
643
 and in June 
2008.
644
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‘Rwanda’s Gacaca: Objectives, Merits and their Relation to Supranational Criminal Law,’ in R. Haveman and O. 
Olusanya (eds.), Sentencing and Sanctioning in Supranational Criminal Law, (2006), at 169 et seq. 
640
 Organic Law N°  40/2000 of 26/01/2001 governing the Creation of Gacaca Courts and Organizing the 
Prosecution of Genocide Crimes and Other Crimes against Humanity Committed in Rwanda between 1st October 
1990 and 31st December 1994.   
  
 
 
130 
 
In accordance with the 2001 organic law, four categories of genocide suspects were established 
and Gacaca courts were introduced at all administrative levels of the country i.e cell, sector, 
district, province and Kigali city.
645
 The 2001 organic law was repealed by the 2004 organic law 
which merged the old categories, reducing the overall number to three categories to be heard on 
two administrative levels only, the cell and sector. This law also known as the Gacaca law was 
amended in 2006 after the reform of administrative levels in the country and was aimed at 
maintaining the territorial jurisdiction of Gacaca courts. Subsequently in 2007, it was again 
amended in order to reduce the number of cases in the first category by reclassifying some of 
them into the second category. This would permit some of these cases to be tried by Gacaca 
courts while maintaining their gravity. The second category covered not only the perpetrators it 
already contained but also came to include high profile murderers, torturers, and those who had 
degraded the dead bodies of victims.  
 
Finally, in 2008 the Gacaca law was modified in response to the problem expressed by the public 
regarding suspects of the first category who had incited the killings but were not being tried by 
the courts, like orchestrators at the sub prefecture and commune level. The amendment was also 
created as a response to the problem expressed by victims of rape and sexual violence who 
complained that they were being neglected by not receiving justice, yet they are the ones who 
had suffered lasting consequences such as infection with HIV/AIDS, which was still claiming 
their lives. This law further gave Gacaca courts the authority to take over the trial of cases in its 
jurisdiction that were being tried in ordinary courts and had not yet been definitively 
concluded.
646
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While the 2001 organic law that established Gacaca was not applied in practice, the 2004 Gacaca 
law was put into operation by organising the prosecution of genocide and crimes against 
humanity committed between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994. This Gacaca law also re-
classified suspects into three categories based on the gravity of the charges as indicated below.
647
 
 
 First category  
a) Any person who committed or was an accomplice in the commission of an offence that puts him or 
her in the category of planners or organizers of the genocide or crimes against humanity; 
b) Any person who was at the national leadership level and that of the prefecture level; public 
administration, political parties, army, gendarmerie, religious denominations or in the militia group, 
and committed  genocide or crimes against humanity or encouraged others to participate in such 
crimes, together with his or her accomplice;  
c) Any person who committed or was an accomplice in the commission of the offence  that puts him or 
her  among the  category of people who incited, supervised and became  ring leaders of the genocide or 
crimes against humanity; 
d) Any person who was at the leadership level at the sub-prefecture and commune;   public 
administration, political parties, army, gendarmerie, communal police, religious denominations or in 
the militia, who committed any crimes of genocide or crimes against humanity; or encouraged others 
to commit similar offences, together with his or her accomplice; 
e) Any person who committed the offence of rape or sexual torture together with his or her accomplices. 
 
         Second category 
a) A notorious murderer who distinguished himself in his or her location or wherever he or she passed 
due to the zeal and cruelty employed, together with his or her accomplice; 
b) Any person who tortured  another even though such torture did not result into death, together with his 
or her accomplice; 
c) Any person who committed a dehumanizing act on a dead  body, together  with his or her accomplice; 
d) Any person who committed or is an accomplice  in the commission of an offence that puts him  or her 
on the list of people who killed  or attacked others resulting into death, together with his or her 
accomplice; 
e) Any person who injured  or attacked another with the intention to kill but such intention was not 
fulfilled, together with his or her accomplice; 
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f) Any person who committed or aided another to commit an offence  against another without intention 
to kill, together with his or her accomplice 
 
               Third category 
The person who only committed offences related to property. However, when the offender and the victim 
come to a settlement by themselves, settle the matter before the authorities or before the witnesses, the 
offender shall not be prosecuted.
648
  
 
The different categories of suspects were heard nationwide at two administrative levels, the cell 
and sector level.
649 
The Gacaca courts of the cell only heard cases of suspects in Category Three 
whereas cases of suspects in Category Two were heard at the sector level.
650
 The sector also had 
an independent jurisdiction for appeal cases from Category Two.
651
 And as for Category One, 
they were forwarded to the national courts with exception of some category one suspects that 
were transferred to Gacaca jurisdiction by the 2008 amendment.
652 
Most grassroots cell level 
Gacaca courts, however, alone exercised the key function of initial investigation and 
categorization of cases and forwarded them to their respective jurisdictions hence carrying out 
the function of the prosecution.
653
 The consequences of assignment to a category were serious, 
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since sentences depended on the category of the defendant. Classification of genocide suspects 
into categories based on the gravity of the charges helped in determining the respective court 
with jurisdiction over the matter. 
 
Both levels of Gacaca cell and sector, consisted of a general assembly which comprised of 
residents over eighteen years, with elected inyangamugayo judges facilitating the process.
654
 The 
inyangamugayo had to be a Rwandan national over the age of twenty-one, and an honest, 
trustworthy person, free from the spirit of sectarianism and without any previous criminal 
conviction or having even been considered a genocide suspect.
655
 Despite this criterion, at the 
beginning of the data collection at the national level, the Gacaca process was disrupted by 
genocide accusations against 46,000 elected inyangamugayo representing 27.1% of the total 
number of the initially elected lay judges which led to their dismissal from the 
inyangamugayo.
656
  
 
The numbers of judges nationwide were around 17,000 with women constituting around 34.3%, 
and men 65.7%.
657
  The judges usually sat once a week before a required quorum of 100 
members of the general assembly.
658
 Sessions often had to be postponed when the quorum was 
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not reached. The modus operandi of Gacaca courts was popular participation, involving the 
community in all activities of the institution.
659
  
 
By turning from classical courts to the traditional system of Gacaca with its elements of 
reconciliation, punishment and the involvement of the population, suspects were encouraged to 
confess both before they had been accused and again following their hearing in return for a 
reduced sentence.
660
 Victims were equally encouraged to forgive perpetrators.
661
 
 
Gacaca judges could sentence those found guilty to imprisonment, community service,
662
 or 
order them to make reparations to victims.
663
 Whereas Category Three suspects were sentenced 
to restitution for damages caused, Category One and Two sentences varied depending on whether 
suspects were guilty with or without confession, or with confession during trial and whether they 
were minors between 14-18 years when the offence was committed.
664
  
 
Sentences for those guilty without confession included life imprisonment with special provisions 
for Category One while Category Two (a-e), could incur a 10-15 years’ imprisonment, then 
category two (f) faced 7-5 years’ imprisonment with the possibility of commuting half of the 
sentence to community service. Sentences for those guilty with confession during trial included, 
25-30 years’ imprisonment for Category One, and with possibility of commuting half of the 
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sentence to community service, while Category Two (a-e), would incur 6.5-7.5 years’ 
imprisonment, with the possibility of commuting half of the sentence to community service and 
having one third suspended. Category Two (f) incurred 3-5 years’ imprisonment and with the 
possibility of commuting half of the sentence to community service and having one third 
suspended. Minors who were below 14 when they committed genocide crimes were not 
punished, they were ordered to follow a rehabilitation program in a correctional centre (Gitagata 
in Bugesera district), those who were 14 and over but still under 18 when they committed the 
crimes received smaller sentences in comparison with adults who had committed the same 
crimes.
665
 
 
Similar to the 1996 organic law, it is pertinent to note that the Gacaca law did not to include 
substantive criminal provisions, but relied on domestic criminal law that was applicable at the 
time of the genocide.
666
 Gacaca dealt with crimes in the penal code but which were committed 
with a genocidal intent. 
 
IV. A Standard Gacaca Trial 
Gacaca proceedings started by issuing summons to all parties concerned, indicating the date of 
trial.
667
 Before the date of trial the accused was permitted to call his witnesses as he wished. On 
the day of the trial, the court would first read the provision of the Gacaca law that:   
‘Any person who committed the offence of genocide and other crimes against humanity committed 
between 1 October 1990 and December 31, 1994, may confess, plead guilty, repent and ask for forgiveness 
before a duly constituted competent bench.’668  
In order to be accepted as confessions and benefit from reduced jail sentence, guilty plea, 
repentance and apologies required the defendant to give a detailed description of the confessed 
offence, ‘how he or she carried it out and where, when he or she committed it, witnesses to the 
facts,  persons victimized and where he or she threw their dead bodies and damage caused,  
                                                          
665
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reveal the co-authors, accomplices and any other information useful to the exercise of the public 
action, and apologize for the offences that he or she had committed.’669 
 
If the accused did not plead guilty, the Gacaca court judges mentioned the accusations and then 
welcomed witnesses supporting the charges.
670
 After that, the suspect was given the opportunity 
to defend himself since there were no lawyers and provide evidence or witnesses to his account.  
Then the floor was opened to the general assembly to provide testimonies and express their 
views on the trial. At this stage new witnesses from the audience would engage in the 
discussions to give their opinions about the case.
671
 On average, trials would last around eight 
hours in open spaces in full view of the community and in certain instances, a case would take 
the whole day, from morning to evening and, if it was not complete, then, it would proceed on 
another day determined by the court, until the case was concluded.
672
 
 
Once the court found that enough information had been obtained, the president of the court asked 
the secretaries, who were also among the lay judges, to read to the audience what had been 
written during the day. If there was a complaint about precision or missing information, the 
secretaries made relevant correction, and asked parties and witnesses to sign what they had said. 
Everything said and done during the Gacaca session was recorded in the notebook of 
activities.
673
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Before the president closed the court, he announced the next session and what cases would be 
heard at that hearing. Sometimes the court adjourned or pronounced its sentence the same day, 
but usually the sentence was pronounced over the next few days.
674
 The final decision, rested 
with the inyangamugayo who had to weigh all the evidence available and pass judgment on the 
defendants after private deliberations. If the judges failed to reach a consensus, before deciding 
on the person’s guilt, a majority decision of the judges would suffice.675 This unique kind of 
court process led to swift trials in a relatively short time. 
 
C. Status of Gacaca Case Law 
Right from the first trials held in the pilot phase, Gacaca was very efficient in bringing genocide 
suspects to justice.
676
 In a period of ten years, Gacaca courts tried 1,958,634 cases,
677
 with 
approximately 37,000 convicts serving their sentences in various prisons. About 1.2 million 
cases fell in the third category, which involved suspects accused of crimes of a relatively lesser 
magnitude like looting and destruction of property. This helped in clearing the backlog of 
genocide cases, reduced prison overcrowding and delivered expeditious trials.
678 
These trials 
have resulted in acquittals, reparations, imprisonment and community service as an alternative to 
imprisonment. 
 
In the ten years of Gacaca courts’ functioning, out of the 60,552 Category One case files, 53,426 
suspects were convicted of genocide charges whereas the remaining 7,126 were acquitted. Also 
out of the 577,528 Category Two cases, 361,590 suspects were convicted and 215,938 suspects 
were acquitted.  And out of the 1,320,554 Category Three cases, 1,266,632 defendants were 
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ordered to pay reparations and 54,002 of the suspects were regarded to be innocent of offenses 
against property.
679
 The decided cases therefore constitute important jurisprudence for this study 
as discussed below. 
 
D. Analysis of the Gacaca Case Law 
Whereas it was impossible to examine all the above Gacaca cases, the author focuses on 
representative cases from all the three categories describing how Gacaca functions. There was a 
selection of informative cases from Category One, Two and Three in order to demonstrate the 
achievements and weaknesses of the Gacaca process.  The section below shows some of the 
decided cases from all categories and their corresponding verdicts. 
 
I. Gacaca court of Gahunga Sector versus Turikumana  
II. Gacaca Court of Rusebeya cell versus Gakumburwa  
III. Gacaca Court of Rukoma sector versus Gatera  
IV. Gacaca Court of Nyarubuye sector versus Habimana  
V. Gacaca court of Rukoma sector versus Mbaraga  
VI. Gacaca court of Nyakiliba/Kayove sector versus Munyagishari  
VII. Gacaca court of Cyanyanza sector versus Nyirabarinda  
VIII. Gacaca court of Nyakabanda sector versus Musangwa  
IX. Gacaca court of Kirwa sector versus Twagirumukiza  
X. Gacaca court of Kirwa sector versus Mbakenge  
XI. Gacaca court of Nyarubuye sector versus Kageruka  
XII. Gacaca court of Nyakabanda sector versus Mwamini  
XIII. Gacaca Court of Ndaro sector versus Ntawuruhunga  
XIV.Gacaca court of Rusayo cell versus Sinaruhamagaye 
XV.Gacaca court of Rusayo cell versus Simpunga  
XVI.Gacaca court of Gitega sector versus Kaneza  
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Table Showing Summary of the Facts in Gacaca Trials  
Accused 
 
Summary of accusation and Category(Cat) Date of Judgment/Sentence 
 
Gakumburwa Martin (Western 
Province) 
Accused of burning houses and looting 
property in 1990, like Murigo Berchimas’s 
house because he was Tutsi. 
Category (Cat): 3 (No confession) 
10/05/2008: Guilty of burning a house and 
looting its property and charged to pay 25,000 
RWF francs. The defendant was dead and the 
representative was his wife. 
 
Gatera Simon (Southern Province) 
 
Aided to commit murder, complicity in the 
killing of Muderevu’s Children, Kamanayo, 
Niyonsaba, and Mukantaho, Participation in 
criminal attacks, (Cat 2). Category: 2  (No 
confession) 
5/06/2007: Guilty and sentenced to 19 years and 
no community service because he did not 
confess to the crimes. 
 
Habimana Berenari (Eastern 
Province) 
 
Participated in serious attacks, complicity, 
killing and rape accusations, (Cat 1) and (Cat 
3) for looting. He killed, instigated and 
encouraged others to kill Tutsis in various 
cells like Rugarama and Kirehe (Cat 2). 
Category: 1, 2 and 3 (No confession) 
02/02/2009: Guilty and sentenced to life 
imprisonment. 
Kageruka Tesfori  
(Eastern Province) 
 
Committed rape (Cat 1), together with other 
suspects, he killed various victims and 
participated in criminal attacks, (Cat 2). He 
also looted and destroyed houses (Cat 3). 
Category: 1  (No confession)  
27/06/2006: Sentenced to life imprisonment and 
on appeal on the 16/10/2008, he was given life 
imprisonment under solitary confinement 
(special provisions) and loss of civic rights. 
Though he did not confess at sector court, he 
confessed at appeal level. 
Kaneza Hamudari  
(Kigali City) 
 
Genocide acts in 1994 in various cells (Cat 2), 
participated in attacks, accomplice to murder, 
going to roadblocks, unlawful gun possession, 
and rape (Cat 1)  
Category: 1 and later category 2 
(Confessed)  
12/10/2009: Life imprisonment and loss of civic 
rights. On appeal  on the 20/03/2010, the court 
sentenced him to 19 years and was also to pay 
the looted property.  
 
Mbakenge Laurent (former 
Kigali-Rural now Northern 
Province) 
 On the 18/04/1994, he committed property 
crimes and category 2 crimes by killing 
several Tutsis in 1994. Category: 2  but later 
put in Cat 1 because of rape (No confession) 
06/11/2008: On appeal,  life imprisonment under 
solitary confinement because of rape. 
 
Mbaraga Nahason (Southern 
Province) 
Participation in gangs of killers, accomplice to 
Gatera Simon in   the murder of Muderevu’s 
05/06/2007: Not guilty because there were no 
incriminating witnesses for the killing of the 
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children (Cat 2).  
Category: 2  (No confession by defendant) 
children. 
 
Munyagishari Bernari (Western 
Province)  
Supervised and led genocide acts in 1994 (Cat 
1).  
Category: 1 and later 2  (Confessed) 
20/09/2007: Though he confessed, he was found 
innocent on all the charges. 
Musangwa Hamissi (Kigali City) 
 
 Accused of sexual violence and rape which 
infected the victim with HIV (Cat 1), also 
together with other suspects, they killed by 
torturing three children at the roadblock (Cat 
2). After cutting off the children’s sexual 
organs and later thrown to the dogs, their 
bodies were left lying at the roadblock for a 
week. He also destroyed Kigenza’s house (Cat 
3). Category: 1,  2 and 3 (No confession)  
17/10/2009: Guilty of rape and sexual violence 
(Cat 1) hence subjected to life imprisonment 
under solitary confinement as well as loss of 
civic rights. He was further guilty of committing 
acts of murder falling under (Cat 2) together 
with his accomplices where they killed children. 
And he was to repay the destroyed property (Cat 
3). 
Mwamini  Nyirandegeya 
Esperance (Kigali City) 
 
 
Planned, organised and encouraged others to 
commit genocide, supervised, led and acted as 
an accomplice to the acts, committed 
dehumanising acts on dead bodies (Cat 1  and 
2).  She also looted property, (Cat 3) 
Category: 1 (Confessed)  
02/09/2009: Life sentence under solitary 
confinement. On appeal on the 17/10/2009, the 
court sentenced her to life imprisonment only. 
Ntawuruhunga Celestin (Western 
Province)  
 
 
 
Accused of  category 1 crimes,  joining 
paramilitary group and a gang of killers 
(igitero), being an accomplice to murder 
where he participated in the attack which 
killed Sebatimbo Feredariko, thus an 
accomplice to his death and aided in the death 
of other nine victims (Cat 2), looting (Cat 3). 
Category:  1  but later 2 (Confessed)  
10/08/2006: Guilty and thus sentenced to 25 
years of imprisonment and no subjection to 
community service. On appeal on the 
05/09/2006, he was sentenced to 15 years and 
was to serve community service for 4 years since 
he had been detained for 11 years. He had to pay 
the looted property too. 
Nyirabarinda Evelyne (Western 
Province)  
 
 
Accused of aiding killers by revealing 
Nikobamera Adereyeni, to the criminal group 
which dumped him in river Nyabarongo 
where he died (Cat 2)  
Category: 2 (No confession)  
09/10/2007: Not guilty of the accusations and 
was declared innocent.  
Simpunga Theoneste 
(Western Province) 
Looting, and committed property crimes with 
other suspects (accomplice), Category: 3 
11/04/2007: Restitution to the various civil 
claimants. 
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Sinaruhamagaye Lambert 
(Western Province)  
 
Looted property, (Cat 3). He was in the attack 
that went to Nyabanyiginya Fideli’s   home 
and looted his live-stock, domestic animals, 
household furniture and destruction of some 
other property. They also burnt Doleteya’s 
house. Category: 3 
25/01/2007: Guilty of looting and therefore had 
to pay back the civil parties. 
 
Turikumana Emmanuel  
(Southern Province) 
 
Committed crimes in many cells, and 
participated in attacks and gangs of killers 
which resulted in death of many Tutsis.  
Category: 2  (Confessed)  
07/08/2007: Guilty, and was then sentenced to 8 
years imprisonment. It was a reduced sentence 
because of confession but no community 
service. 
  
Twagirumukiza Alfred (Northern 
Province) 
 
Rape accusation 
Category:1 (No confession)  
18/12/2008: Guilty of rape hence life 
imprisonment under solitary confinement and 
deprival of civic rights. 
 
As seen in the table, life imprisonment with special provisions or solitary confinement refers to 
the sentence of imprisonment in an individual cell and the sentenced person is not entitled to any 
kind of mercy, conditional release or rehabilitation, unless he/she has served at least 20 years of 
imprisonment.
680
 
 
1. Detailed Assessment of the above Case Law 
The Gacaca law divided perpetrators into categories based on the gravity of the offence, and 
offered the incentive of dramatically reduced sentences in return for a confession or guilty 
plea.
681
 Confession was central to the process, both for the purpose of truth-findings as well as 
for reconciliation. It was in line with the need for Rwandan society to find by itself solutions to 
the genocide problems and its consequences through the innovation of a plea bargaining system 
that encouraged the notion of justice with restorative ends. Of the above-listed cases, that of 
Turikumana Emmanuel provides is particularly examplary.
682
 
                                                          
680
Art. 3, Law N° 32/2010of 22/09/2010 relating to serving Life Imprisonment with Special Provisons. To date it has 
not been applied despite the fact that it has been included in the new penal code of 2012. Life imprisonment under 
Solitary confinement was changed in 2010 to only life imprisonment with special provisions. 
 
681
 Art. 54 of the Gacaca Law of 19/6/2004. 
682
 Gacaca court of Gahunga Sector versus Turikumana Emmanuel, judgment of 07/08/2007, case file, N° 001; on 
restorative aims See F. Reyntjens and S. Vandeginste,  ‘Rwanda: An Atypical Transition,’ in E. Skaar et al, Roads to 
Reconciliation, (2005), at 15 et seq. 
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The establishing law gave Gacaca courts competence to try the offences of genocide and crimes 
against humanity committed since October 1990 to December 1994.
683
 The temporal jurisdiction 
of Gacaca was clearly different from that of the ICTR, whose jurisdiction is limited to try similar 
crimes committed in 1994.
684
 Though the mandate of the Gacaca courts goes as far back as the 
1990, most of the charges were based on the 1994 crimes, and exceptionally for the 1990 
offences.
685
 In the case of Gakumburwa Martin, for instance, the court was called upon to decide 
on events committed before 1994. 
 
Also, in line with the Gacaca law, the judgments had to be motivated to avoid any abuses or 
partiality concerns.
686
 And in order to promote independence and impartiality as shown in all the 
cases identified above, the Gacaca session could only meet legitimately if at least the required 
number of the inyangamugayo judges were empanneled, and in the presence of the general 
assembly which constituted the community members.
687
 The community was entitled to give 
either incriminating or exonerating evidence concerning the suspects since the courts outlawed 
the involvement of prosecutors and defence lawyers, leaving the community where the crime 
was committed to play all the roles.
688
  The trial of suspects within the jurisdiction of the Gacaca 
court in the cell or sector where the crime was committed was to give the offender the chance to 
return to his community, face victims, be sanctioned, and be reintegrated into the community.
689
  
                                                          
683
 Art. 1 of the Organic Law N° 40/2000 of 26 January 2001 defines the jurisdiction ratione temporis of Gacaca, 
which does not apply to crimes committed after 1994. See P. C. Bornkamm, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between 
Retribution and Reparation, (2012), at 49. 
684
 Art. 1 of the ICTR Statute. 
685
 A. Mugesera, Imibereho Y'Abatutsi Kuri Repubulika Ya Mbere N'iya Kabiri 1959-1990, (2004), at 50 et seq; See 
also G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, (1995), at 33 et seq. 
686
 Art. 25, the Gacaca Law of 19/6/2004. 
687
 Art. 18 and 20 of the Gacaca Law of 19/6/2004; see also Arts. 19, 60(2) and 140(2), Constitution of the Republic 
of Rwanda of 4 June 2003, O.G.R.R. N° special of 4 June 2003 which guarantee Independence and impartiality; 
Urukiko rw’Ikirenga, Umutwe ushinzwe Inkiko-Gacaca, Imfashanyigisho ku Nkiko-Gacaca (2001), at 5; see also S. 
Brown, ‘The Rule of Law and the Hidden Politics of Transitional Justice in Rwanda,’ in C. Lekha Sriram, O. 
Martin-Ortega and J. Herman (eds), Peacebuilding and Rule of Law in Africa: Just Peace?, (2011).  
688
 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Rwanda, (2006), at 
<http:www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/81364.htm>, accessed January 2012; R.M. Borland, ‘The Gacaca 
Tribunals and Rwanda after Genocide: Effective Restorative Community Justice or Further Abuse of Human 
Rights?’ 13 Swords and Ploughshares Journal of International Affairs, (2003), at 12 et seq. 
689
 National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), Opinion Survey on Participation in Gacaca and 
National Reconciliation, Kigali, NURC, (2003); C. Cacioppo, Report on Education and Reintegration of Former 
Prisoners in Rwanda: The Attempt of Ingando and Viewing Reconciliation as a Duty Instead of a Choice, Ligue des 
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Given the fact that crimes were committed in public, the same eye witnesses had to disclose the 
truth, recount the facts, and participate in prosecuting and trying of the alleged perpetrators.
690
  
For example, in the cases of Gakumburwa Martin,
691
 Gatera Simon,
692
 and Habimana 
Berenari,
693
 the population gave incriminating testimony against the defendants who then were 
declared guilty. Apart from incriminating testimony, the population would as well give 
exonerating evidence in favour of suspects as evidenced in the cases of Mbaraga Nahason,
694
 
Munyagishari Bernari,
695
 and Nyirabarinda Evelyne.
696
 These defendants were acquitted due to 
the fact that there was lack of credible witnesses and evidence from the general assembly. 
697
 
 
As in the ordinary courts, the defendant was entitled to the presumption of innocence before a 
Gacaca court. This applied even when suspects had confessed as indicated in Munyagishari 
Bernari’s trial, who was acquitted even though he had initially confessed or pleaded guilty.  
Consequentliy, the presumption of innocence applied irrespective of a confession, guilty plea and 
expression of remorse. Confessions did not take away the duty of the inyangamugayo to examine 
whether the defendant committed the alleged crimes or not.  
 
Although Gacaca courts are community courts, the panel of inyangamugayo acted as arbitrators 
or judges and were not obliged to follow the people’s views, they had to make independent 
decisions as is apparent in the cases of Habimana Berinari and Musangwa Hamissi.  For instance 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Droits de La Personne Dans La Region des Grands Lacs, (2005), available at  
<http://www.christinacacioppo.com/content/publications/EducationAndReintegrationOfFormerPrisoners.pdf>, 
accessed February 2013; P. Clark, and Z. Kaufman (eds), After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond, (2008), at 299 et seq; P. Clark, ‘Establishing a 
Conceptual Framework: Six Key Transitional Justice Themes,’ in P. Clark, and Z. Kaufman (eds), After Genocide: 
Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond, (2008), at 191-206. 
690
 S. Straus, ‘How Many Perpetrators were there in the Rwandan Genocide? An estimate,’ 6 Journal of Genocide 
Research, (2004), at 85-98; F. Reyntjens, ‘Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World: 
Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda,’ 110 African Affairs, (2011), at 1–34. 
691
 Gacaca Court of Rusebeya cell v. Gakumburwa Martin, judgment of 10/5/ 2008, case file, N°048. 
692
 Gacaca Court of Rukoma sector v. Gatera Simon, judgment of 5/06/2007, case file, N° 30. 
693
 Gacaca Court of Nyarubuye sector v. Habimana Berenari, judgment of 02/02/2009. 
694
 Gacaca Court of Rukoma sector v.Mbaraga Nahason, judgment of 5/06/2007, case file, N° 35. 
695
 Gacaca Court of Nyakiliba/Kayove sector v. Munyagishari Bernari, judgment of 20/09/2007, case file, A 10. 
 
696
 Gacaca Court of Cyanyanza sector v. Nyirabarinda Evelyne, judgment of 9/10/2007. 
697
 T. Longman, ‘Justice at the Grassroots? Gacaca Trials in Rwanda,’ in N. Roht-Arriaza and J. Mariezcurrena 
(eds.), Beyond Truth versus Justice: Transitional Justice in the New Millenium, (2006), at 205 et seq. 
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in Musangwa Hamissi’s case of rape, the community said that it was not him but another 
Hamissi, arguing that the accused was mistaken for another person. Nevertheless, the court 
scrutinised the credibility of the testimony and found the defendant guilty of rape and sexual 
violence.
698
 It is important to note that unlike in other cases, rape cases had to be conducted in 
camera and it was the victim who would decide whether to introduce the matter to Gacaca court 
for trial or not.
699
 This was to protect rape victims from trauma and public humiliation which was 
often caused by suspects intimidating them.
700
  Nevertheless, the specific suffering of victims of 
sexual violence was not addressed in Gacaca courts and victims would often perceive talking 
about their rape experiences as unbearable.
701
 
 
Offences relating to rape which Twagirumukiza Alfred,
702
 Mbakenge Laurent
703
 and Musangwa 
Hammis were guilty of, belonged to Category One and were normally supposed to be tried by 
ordinary courts. However, the 2008 modifications to the Gacaca law shifted some Category One 
cases to Gacaca, particularly suspects of sexual violence. That is why the defendants were 
convicted of rape at the Gacaca sector level. The judges subjected the above-mentioned 
defendants to the highest punishment under Rwandan law, which is life imprisonment with 
special provisions, meaning that the convict is held in solitary confinement with pardon being 
possible only after having served 20 years in prison.
704
 In addition, the defendants were deprived 
of certain civic rights.
705
  
                                                          
 
698
 Gacaca court of Nyakabanda sector v. Musangwa Hamissi, judgment of 17/10/2009, case file, N° 302-00/2008. 
699
 Art. 38(3) of the Organic Law N° 16/2004 of 19/06/2004, as modified by Art. 6 of Organic Law N° 13/2008. The 
Inyangamugayo who violated the professional secrecy in rape cases would be sentenced to imprisonment between 6 
months and 6 years. 
700
 See D. Mendeloff, ‘Trauma and Vengeance: Assessing the Psychological and Emotional Effects of Post-Conflict 
Justice,’ 31 Human Rights Quarterly, (2009), at 592; M. Sosnov, ‘The Adjudication of Genocide: Gacaca and the 
Road to Reconciliation in Rwanda,’ 36 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, (2008), at 135 et seq. 
701
 It is important to note that not all rape cases were sued in Gacaca despite the available estimations. It is estimated 
that over 250,000 rapes occurred during the genocide, D. Magsam, ‘Coming to Terms with Genocide in Rwanda: 
The Role of International and National Justice,’ in W. Kaleck et al. (eds.), International Prosecution of Human 
Rights Crimes, (2007), at 161-162. 
702
 Gacaca court of Kirwa sector v. Twagirumukiza Alfred, judgment of 18/12/2008. 
703
 Gacaca court of Kirwa sector v. Mbakenge Laurent, judgment of 16/10/2008, case file, N° 94193. 
704
 Art. 72(1) of the 2004 Gacaca Law as modified by Art. 17 Organic Law N° 13/2008. 
705
 Art.76 of the Gacaca Law of 19/6/2004 provides that loss of civic rights may include, loss of the right to vote, 
being voted, being a soldier, teacher, police, civil servant, doctor, expert etc. However, this sanction was mitigated 
by Article 15 Organic Law N° 10/2007 amended by Art. 76 of the Gacaca Law of 19/6/2004. Instead, the amended 
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In Kageruka Tesfori’s case, the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment with special 
provisions.
706
 Kageruka received this severe sentence due to his being classified in category one 
and due to his failure to confess to the charges despite clear evidence of his participation in the 
crimes.
707
 Life imprisonment with special provisions has been harshly criticized by human rights 
organizations for not meeting international standards.
708
 
 
As shown in the above jurisprudence and the Gacaca law, defendants who refused, to have 
recourse to confession, guilty plea, repentance and apology, or whose confessions, guilty plea, 
repentance and apologies were rejected, incurred heavier sentences, for instance Category One 
convicts would incur life imprisonment with special provisions (solitary confinement).
709
   It 
appears that being guilty without confession would lead to strict application of the retributive 
sentencing regime.
710
 This is why Musangwa Hamissi’s multiple commissions of crimes and his 
failure to confess subjected him to the most severe sentence under Gacaca law.
711
 
 
Besides, the cases of Kageruka Tesfori, Mbakenge Laurent, Mwamini Esperance,
712
 and 
Ntawuruhunga Celestin’s713 demonstrate that when there was a material combination of offences, 
each of which graded the defendant in a different category, the higher category would be 
considered to be the placement of the defendant. For instance, Kageruka was classified in 
Category One for rape accusations but he had also committed, various crimes falling under 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Art. 76(5) stipulates a more extensive and detailed publication of the identity of those convicted and their crimes in 
the genocide memorials, sectors, ‘criminal record’ and Internet. 
706
 Gacaca court of Nyarubuye sector v. Kageruka Tesfori, judgment of 16/10/2008. 
707
 Art. 51 Organic Law N° 10/2007 of 1st March 2007; Art. 73 (1) of the Gacaca law of 19/6/2004. 
708
 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, (HRW), ‘There will be No Trial: Police Killings of Detainees and the Imposition 
of Collective Punishments,’ (2007). 
709
 Art. 72 of the Gacaca law of 19/6/2004 as amended in Art. 17 Organic Law N° 13/2008. 
710
 A. Corey and S. F. Joireman, ‘Retributive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda,’ 103 African Affairs, (2004), at 
73-80. 
711
 Even before, abolition of death penalty, Gacaca courts’ law could not impose death penalty. Their sentences were 
limited to imprisonment with a secondary severity of solitary confinement which so far has not been executed in 
practice though it has been conferred on several convicts. Also a perpetrator who was sentenced for multiple crimes 
served the most severe sentence; see Art. 18 of the 08/96 Organic Law. 
712
 Gacaca court of Nyakabanda sector v. Mwamini Nyirandegeya Esperance, judgment of 02/09/2009, case file N° 
302/0054. 
713
 Gacaca Court of Ndaro sector v. Ntawuruhunga Celestin, judgment of 10/08/2006, case file N° 5. 
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category Two and Three. So the category covering the more serious crimes took precedence in 
case of multiple commissions of criminal acts by the same defendant or accomplices.
714
  
 
As for accomplices, they could sometimes fall under different categories and receive different 
verdicts regardless of their linked accusations.
715
 This was also the case in Mbaraga’s Gacaca 
trial where the defendant was acquitted, while his accomplice Gatera Simon was sentenced to 19 
years’ imprisonment and could not be subjected to community service because he did not confess 
to the crimes. 
 
However, confession was not always followed by community service, as seen in Turikumana 
Emmanuel’s case. He confessed and in turn received a reduced sentence for his confession, but 
could not be subjected to community service because he had already finished his detention. Also, 
Mwamini Esperance could not be subjected to community service because of having received a 
heavy sentence of life imprisonment with special provisions.
716
 Nevertheless, when she appealed 
to the Nyakabanda sector appeals court, she was then sentenced to life imprisonment without 
special provisions. 
 
Confessions need to be sincere and true in order to be accepted by the court.
717
  For instance, in 
the first hearing at sector level, Ntawuruhunga Celestin was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment 
without community service because he had given false testimony concerning his accomplices.
718
 
Despite his prior sincere confession of killing Sebatimbo Feredariko and six other victims, he did 
                                                          
714
 Art. 51 of the Gacaca Law of 19/6/2004 modified by Art. 11 Organic Law N° 10/2007, equates the ‘person who 
committed’ a crime with ‘his or her accomplices.’ Art. 89 of the the 1977 Rwandan Penal Code. 
 
715
 For a discussion on complicity, See M.A. Drumbl, ‘Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The 
Criminality of Mass Atrocity,’ 99 North Western University Law Review, (2005), at 539-610; L. May, ‘Complicity 
and the Rwandan Genocide,’ 16 Journal Res Publica, (2010), at 135.  
 
716
 It is important to note that as a legacy of Gacaca, the recent 2012 Penal Code included life imprisonment with 
special provisons as the highest penalty replacing the death penalty that was in the 1977 Penal Code. Also the 
sentence of community service has been included in the 2012 Penal Code for ordinary crimes other than genocide.  
717
 See discussion in P.C. Bornkamm, Rwanda's Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation, (2012), at 69. 
718
Art. 73, the Gacaca law of 19/6/2004 provides that it is contrary to the ruling of Gacaca proceedings, and shall be 
qualified as perjury to give a testimony ascertaining to be telling only the truth and hold evidences for that, take oath 
and sign it, but later on appears to be false and done on purpose. 
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not reveal his exact role or individual criminal responsibility in killing some other three 
individuals which then aggravated his sentence.
719
 
Nevertheless, at the appeal level, Ntawuruhunga Celestin’s sentence was reduced to fifteen years’ 
imprisonjment including community service. Given that he had already served eleven years in 
pre-trial detention, he was released to take up his community service. The rule holds that those 
who have been in prison benefit from subtraction of the years already spent in prison from their 
final sentence and serve only the remaining years of imprisonment, if any.
720
 Since the 
implementation of community service in 2005, there was a significant reduction in prison 
overcrowding, as well reintegration of convicts in the community after confession.
721
  
 
It is crucial to highlight that confessions would at times remain without consequence, as seen in 
Mbakenge Laurent’s confession which was rejected on appeal for the reason that it was 
incomplete since he denied the rape accusation. Also, the sentence imposed on Kageruka Tesfori 
remained the same because he confessed at a later stage on appeal level yet in the prior sector 
court he had refused to confess and had denied all the accusations.  
 
 It is pertinent to note that appeals would be lodged by interested parties in the interests of 
justice, as stipulated in the Gacaca law.
722
 Judgments passed by the Gacaca sector court at first 
instance were appealed against to the Gacaca court of appeal at the sector, which would then give 
a ruling in the last resort. Judgment pertaining to category three crimes cannot be appealed.
723
 
 
                                                          
719
 S. Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda, (2007), at 97 et seq. 
720
 See Art. 21 of Organic Law N° 13/2008 of 19/05/2008 modifying and complementing Organic Law N° 16/2004 
of 19/06/2004 establishing the organization competence and functioning of Gacaca Courts. Also, see Art. 80 of 
Gacaca Law of 19/6/2004 as amended in 2008. A person sentenced to both a custodial sentence and to serve 
community service shall first serve community service and if it is proved that the work was exemplary executed, 
then, the custodial sentence shall be commuted into community service. Therefore, a convict who pleaded guilty and 
received a sentence of community service could actually avoid serving any time in prison. 
721
 See, M. A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, (2007), at 88 et seq. 
722
 Art. 90, Gacaca Law of 19/6/2004 as modified by Art. 19 of Organic Law N° 10/2007. 
723
 Art. 89 the Gacaca Law of 19/6/2004; Art. 40, the Gacaca Law of 19/6/2004. 
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The Category Three cases of Sinaruhamagaye Lambert,
724
 Simpunga Theoneste
725
 and 
Gakumburwa Martin reveal that in the absence of the defendant or in the event of his or her 
death, the offender still had to be held responsible and his successors would be required to pay 
for the damaged or looted property.  This is why Gakumburwa Martin’s wife was ordered to pay 
25,000 francs (equivalent to 37 USD) as a result of the fact that the deceased had participated in 
offences against property. If the offender was dead, reparations would be paid by the heirs of the 
deceased according to their hierarchy of succession.
726
 
 
The negligible sum or little amount charged shows that most Rwandans are too indigent to pay 
full damages.
727
 In fact, several decisions of Gacaca in regard to payment of damages were not 
executed. Nonetheless, Sinaruhamagaye Lambert’s case shows that when a convict refused to 
reimburse or failed to pay, there could be seizure and auctioning of his property, if at all he 
possessed any.
728
  However, the most essential property was not subject to seizure.
729
 
 
Moreover, those who merely committed offences against property were not subject to penal 
sanctions.
730
  They were only liable to pay damages as confirmed by the Gacaca law, which 
                                                          
724
 Gacaca court of Rusayo cell v. Sinaruhamagaye Lambert, judgment of 25/1/2007, case file, N° 37. 
725
 Gacaca court of Rusayo cell v. Simpunga Theoneste, judgment of 11/4/2007, case file, N° 41. 
726
  Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF), Vade-Mecum: Le Crime de Génocide et Les Crimes Contre L’humanité devant 
Les Juridictions Ordinaires du Rwanda Kigali/Bruxelles, (2004), at 229 et seq; P.C. Bornkamm, Rwanda’s Gacaca 
Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation, (2012), at 87; Art. 8(2) of Instructions N° 14/2007 of 30 March 2007 
of the Executive Secretary of the National Service of Gacaca Courts concerning compensation of property destroyed 
during the genocide and the commission of other crimes against humanity. 
 
727
 L. Zegveld, Victims’ Reparations Claims and International Criminal Courts: Incompatible Values?’ 8 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, (2010), at 79 et seq. 
 
728
 Art. 94 of the Gacaca Law of 19/6/2004; Urwego rw’Igihugu rushinzwe Inkiko-Gacaca (RCN-Justice and 
Démocratie), Isomo ku Itegeko Ngenga N° 16/2004 ryo kuwa 19/06/2004 rigena imiterere, ububasha n’imikorere 
by’Inkiko Gacaca, (2004), at 11. 
729
 The most essential property that cannot be subject to seizure includes, inter alia, two thirds of the debtor’s crops, 
two thirds of his salary, one third of his pension, half of his land, his house, and tools he needs to earn his living. 
Art. 7 of Instructions N° 14/2007 of 30 March 2007 of the Executive Secretary of the National Service of Gacaca 
Courts; Similarly, see Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 260(2) of Law N° 18/2004. 
730
 Penal Reform International (PRI), ‘Monitoring and Research Report on the Gacaca: Information-Gathering 
during the National Phase, (2006); C. Kirkby, ‘Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: A Preliminary Critique,’ 50 Journal of 
African Law, (2006), at 104 et seq. 
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states that defendants, who committed offences related to property, are only sentenced to civil 
reparation for what they have damaged.
731
 It is imperative to establish that paying back what was 
destroyed was not solely for Category Three defendants; it was imposed on anyone on whom 
property charges were confirmed regardless of his/her respective category.
732
 For instance, 
though Kageruka was convicted of crimes in Category One, he still had to pay back the victim 
families whose property he had looted. 
  
Categorisation did not imply punishment; instead it was what the suspect was guilty of that 
confirmed punishment. Categorisation was different from sentences and was based on 
accusations yet sentences depended on convictions.  For example, Mbakenge Laurent who was 
initially in Category Two was later put in Category One because of the rape blame. On the 
contrary, Munyagishari Bernari was first put in Category One but later placed in Category Two. 
Also, Kaneza Hamudani started as a Category One defendant but ended up in Category Two. 
Moving from one category to another meant prescribing different punishments. Specifically, 
Kaneza Hamudani was accused of rape, a Category One crime, but on appeal it was found out 
that he was not guilty of rape and then put in Category Two for aiding in the murder of Tutsis, 
joining gangs of killers or attacks that killed many people.
733
  
 
In principal, participation in attacks, unlawful gun possession and going to roadblocks did not 
necessarily lead to criminal responsibility. As a challenge, it was left for the uneducated Gacaca 
                                                          
731
Art. 95 Gacaca law of 19/6/2004. The law provides that reparation proceeds as follows; restitution of the property 
whenever possible or repayment of the ransacked property or carrying out the work worth the property to be 
repaired. However, if the authors of the offence and the victim have agreed on their own, or before a public authority 
or witnesses for an amicable settlement, the accused cannot be prosecuted in regard to offences against property as 
provided in Art. 51 the Gacaca law of 19/6/2004. 
732
 Art. 75, the Gacaca Law of 19/6/2004; M. B. Braley, ‘Rooting, Reforming, Restoring: A Framework for Justice 
in Rwanda,’ 4 Journal of Lutheran Ethics, (2004) N° 3, MN. 39 et seq; D. Shelton, Remedies in International 
Human Rights Law, 2nd edn, (2005), at 160 et seq. 
733
 Avocats Sans Frontières, (ASF) Monitoring des Jurisdictions Gacaca, Phase de Jugement, Rapport Analytique, 
(Octobre 2005-Septembre 2006), at 19 et seq ; A. Kubai, ‘Between Justice and Reconciliation: The Survivors of 
Rwanda,’ 16 African Security Review, (2007), at 53-66. 
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judges to define the individual criminal responsibility of the defendant in such accusations,
734
  
even when the defendant had confessed.  
 
An example of such cases includes Kaneza Hamudari who apologised for going to roadblocks, 
asserting that though he did not kill at the barriers, he neither assisted nor defended the Tutsis 
who were in danger at the roadblocks. He also confessed and apologised for unlawful gun 
possession as a civilian because it may have caused trauma to those victims who would see it, 
given the dangerous times in 1994 where Tutsis were often attacked in their homes to be killed or 
looted.
735
 On the 12/10/2009, after determining the defendant’s individual criminal 
responsibility, he was sentenced to life imprisonment and loss of civic rights but on appeal on the 
20 March 2010, he was subjected to 19 years’ imprisonment and payment of the looted property 
as seen in the decision by Gitega sector court in Kigali city.
736
 
 
As noted in the above Gitega sector court, case files were made according to the place where the 
crimes were committed.
737
 Since several defendants had committed crimes in various places, 
each community at cell or sector level was left to make case files for its own suspects.
738
  In case 
a defendant was convicted in more than one place, he or she would then be charged to serve the 
heaviest sentence of those which had been pronounced by the various different jurisdictions. And 
if the various courts pronounced different verdicts of guilt and innocence against the same 
person, the defendant in question would be subjected to serve the sentence of the court that 
declared him guilty.  The different files created in various jurisdictions explain why the Gacaca 
                                                          
 
734
 For details on such accusations see, P.C. Bornkamm, Rwanda's Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and 
Reparation, (2012), at 39 and 115. 
735
 See K. Brounéus, ‘Truth-Telling as a Talking Cure? Insecurity and Retraumatization in the Rwandan Gacaca 
Courts,’ 38 Security Dialogue, (2008), at 55-76. 
736
 Gacaca court of Gitega sector v. Kaneza Hamudari,  judgment of 20/03/2010, case file, N° 31. 
737
 Art. 44(1) of the Gacaca Law of 19/6/2004 determines the territorial competence of Gacaca courts within the cell 
or sector where the crimes were committed; Ministeri y’Ubutabera (June 1999), Inkiko-Gacaca mu Manza 
z’Itsembatsemba ryabaye mu Rwanda kuva tariki ya 1 Ukwakira 1990 kugeza tariki ya 31 Ukuboza 1994, at 6. 
738
 F. Reyntjens and S. Vandeginste,  ‘Rwanda: An Atypical Transition’in E. Skaar et al, Roads to Reconciliation, 
(2005), at 15;Urwego rw’Igihugu rushinzwe Inkiko-Gacaca (RCN-Justice and Démocratie), Isomo ku Itegeko 
Ngenga N° 16/2004 ryo kuwa 19/06/2004 rigena Imiterere, Ububasha n’Imikorere by’Inkiko Gacaca, (2004), at 6. 
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archives department has huge records, approximately 60,000,000 case files stored in 17,000 
boxes.
739
 
  
In winding up, justice by Gacaca courts varied from case to case, session to session, and the 
inyangamugayo that chaired the meetings or sessions. This is because all Gacaca members and 
inyangamugayo did not have the same capacity in terms of knowledge in the law. In fact, 
although they were truly men of integrity, not all of them had the capacity to analyse complex 
legal issues in genocide cases, given the fact that most of them were uneducated. As a 
consequence, local trials sometimes moulded Gacaca to their own ends, contrary to the initial 
aims of setting up the courts.
740
 Additionally, the definitions of categories were broad, including 
such terms as ‘notorious murderers and those who killed with ‘zeal.’ Such imprecision, left 
substantial loopholes for the inyangamugayo and contributed to significant variation from one 
jurisdiction to another on how the terms were applied or interpreted. 
 
Therefore, by analysing the above trials and their sentences, a question arises in regard to the real 
nature of the courts.  Based on the relevant laws and available jurisprudence, the following 
discussion will analyse the exact nature of Gacaca courts in the context of transitional justice and 
international criminal law.
741
 
 
E. The Nature of Gacaca Courts: Are they Retributive or Restorative? 
This part examines whether Gacaca was a purely retributive or restorative mechanism or whether 
it played both roles. Retributive justice emphasizes holding individuals accountable for their 
actions through appropriate punishment and individualizes responsibility to avoid the collective 
blaming of abstract groupings.
742
 On the other hand, restorative justice shifts the focus from 
                                                          
739
 For instance, genocide in Bisesero, in the Western Province was committed by people from Kigali, Gisenyi, 
Cyangugu etc which implied different files from various places where same suspects had spread their genocide acts. 
740
 T. Longman, ‘Justice at the Grassroots? Gacaca Trials in Rwanda,’ in N. Roht-Arriaza and J. Mariezcurrena 
(eds.), Beyond Truth v. Justice: Transitional Justice in the New Millenium, (2006), at 206; L.Waldorf, ‘Rwanda’s 
Failing Experiment in Restorative Justice,’ in D. Sullivan and L. Tifft  (eds.), Handbook of Restorative Justice: A 
Global Perspective, (2006), at 422-423. 
741
 UN Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, UN 
Doc. S/2004/616, of 3 August 2004. Transitional Justice and International Criminal Law are seen as linked and 
mutually reinforcing. 
742
 For an elaborate meaning of Reconciliation, see Chapter Six of this Study. 
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individual punishment to the broader needs of the community in an attempt to foster 
reconciliation after large scale atrocities.
743
 As for Gacaca, it applied sentences on the one hand 
and also encouraged dialogue between victims and perpetrators on the presumption that the 
experience of accusation, confession, and forgiveness would have cathartic effects for the 
population.
744
 The table below summarises the nature of the Gacaca courts in the context of 
international criminal law and transitional justice.    
 
Table: Showing main characteristics of Retributive and Restorative justice vis-a-vis Gacaca 
N° TYPE  OF 
JUSTICE            
               ITEM     
RETRIBUTIVE RESTORATIVE GACACA JUSTICE GACACA 
NATURE 
EVALUATION 
 
1   Aims Retribution  
Incapacitation  
Deterrence 
 
Truth 
Healing 
Reconciliation 
Restoration 
Truth 
Speed trials 
Eradicate Impunity  
Unity and 
reconciliation 
 
Semi- 
restorative 
2 Sentences Death penalty 
Life sentence and 
Imprisonment terms  
Reparations 
Reintegration 
Shaming  
Life imprisonment and 
Imprisonment terms 
Community service 
Semi- 
restorative  
 
                                                          
743
 B. Oomen, ‘Rwanda’s Gacaca: Objectives, Merits and their Relation to Supranational Criminal Law,’ in R. 
Haveman and O. Olusanya (eds.), Sentencing and Sanctioning in Supranational Criminal Law, (2006), at 169 et seq; 
A. Kubai, ‘Between Justice and Reconciliation: The Survivors of Rwanda,’ 16 African Security Review, (2007), at 
53-66. 
744
 M.R. Amstutz, ‘Is Reconciliation Possible After Genocide?: The Case of Rwanda,’  48 The Journal of Church 
and State, (2006), at 559; Reports during the International Conference on Gacaca Courts,  ‘Foundation for 
Sustainable Justice and Reconciliation-Achievements and Challenges of Gacaca Courts,’ Parliamentary Building, 
Kigali, 17 June 2012. 
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No amnesty   Amnesty/Forgiveness No amnesty 
Incarceration Prisons 
Pre-trial detention 
No prisons and 
detention 
 Rehabilitation places  
Prisons are the 
detention places 
There is pre-trial 
detention  
Retributive 
 
 
 
3 
Main 
Stakeholders 
Judge, prosecutor, 
lawyer and defendant 
Permanence of the 
court 
Community, 
arbitrator offender  
and  victim 
Temporary meetings  
Community 
Inyangamugayo 
judges, victims and 
defendant 
Temporary in nature  
Restorative  
Role of Parties Active participation 
of legally trained 
judges, prosecution, 
lawyers and minimal 
role of defendant.  
Victim may act as 
witness.  
Active role of non- 
trained arbitrators, 
community, victim 
and offenders. No 
lawyer and 
prosecutor 
Active role of 
community, suspects, 
victims, and non 
trained 
Inyangamugayo. No 
lawyers and 
prosecution  
Restorative 
Sub-poena 
power 
Judges have sub-
poena powers  
No sub-poena powers 
 
Inyangamugayo had 
sub-poena powers 
Retributive 
 
The characteristics of Gacaca courts as described above mainly emanate from the 2001 and 2004 
organic laws.
745
  Having highlighted roughly the common features of restorative and retributive 
justice in the above table, the discussion below attempts to analyse the character or real nature of 
the courts based on their aims, sentencing regime, and stakeholders in more detail.   
                                                          
745
 The Organic Law N°  40/2000 of 26/01/2001 which was repealed by Organic Law N° 16/2004 of 19/06/2004 
governing the Structure, Powers and Functions of Gacaca Courts Relating to the Prosecution of Genocide Crimes 
and Other Crimes against Humanity; Urwego rw’Igihugu Rushinzwe Inkiko-Gacaca (RCN-Justice and Démocratie), 
Isomo ku Itegeko Ngenga N° 16/2004 ryo kuwa 19/06/2004 rigena Imiterere, Ububasha n’Imikorere by’Inkiko 
Gacaca, (2004), at 3-10. 
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I. Aims of Gacaca Courts 
Unlike retributive justice which focuses mainly on deterrence and retribution of perpetrators,
746
 
Gacaca justice combined both retributive and restorative aims.
747
  It addressed a number of aims, 
such as identifying the truth, speeding up trials, the eradication of impunity, facilitating unity and 
reconciliation as well as demonstrating the capacity of the Rwandan people to resolve their own 
problems.
748
  
 
Some of these aims depart from the common trend in ordinary courts to a semi-restorative nature 
of justice.
749
 Taken-alone, Gacaca was partly restorative because it appeared to complement 
retributive justice with its emphasis on truth and reconciliation, and partly retributive due to the 
fact that it stressed the need for punishment, deterrence and the eradication of impunity.
750
  By 
implementing the Gacaca jurisdictions under Rwandan law, the legislator intended to punish 
those responsible for the genocide, whilst encouraging reconciliation among Rwandans.
751
 
 
                                                          
746
 R. Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, (2007), at 18-20.  
747
 See Objectives on the website of the National Service of Gacaca Courts, available at 
<http://www.inkiko-Gacaca.gov.rw/En/EnObjectives.htm >, accessed June 2012. 
748
According to the 2012 Evaluation by the Centre for Conflict Management (CCM), Gacaca attained its set 
objectives at an average of 87.84%, i.e identifying the truth of what happened during the genocide, 83.5%; speeding 
up trials of genocide suspects, 87%; Fight against the culture of impunity, 86.4%; Contributing to the national unity 
and reconciliation process, 87.3%; Demonstrating the capacity of the Rwandan people to resolve their own problems 
95%. See also Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, (2010), at 
http://www.nurc.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/Documents//rwanda_reconciliation_barometer.pdf, accessed February 
2013; National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, (2012), Reconciliation tool, available at 
<http://www.nurc.gov.rw/reconciliation-tools/itorero.html>, accessed February 2013. 
749
 P. Clark, ‘Hybridity, Holism, and Traditional Justice,’ 39 The George Washington International Law Review, 
(2007), at 765-838; see also P. Clark, The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda, 
(2011), at 48; A. Karekezi et al., ‘Localizing Justice: Gacaca Courts in Post-Genocide Rwanda,’ in E. Stover and M. 
Weinstein (eds.), My Neighbour, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, (2005), at 
81. 
750
 G. Mukherjee, ‘Achieving Reconciliation through Prosecution in the Courts: Lessons from Rwanda,’ 28 Conflict 
Resolution Quarterly, (2011), at 331-348. 
751
 See B. A. Leebaw, ‘The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice,’ 30 Human Rights Quarterly, (2008), at 95; 
E. Zorbas, ‘Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda,’ 1 African Journal of Legal Studies, (2004), at 38 et seq; 
Penal Reform International, (2009-2010), The Contribution of the Gacaca Jurisdictions to Resolving Cases arising 
from the Genocide, Contributions, Limitations and Expectations of the Post-Gacaca Phase, at 13 (Hereinafter PRI: 
Final Monitoring and Research Report on the Gacaca Process, (2009-2010) available at <www.penalreform.org>,  
accessed in May 2011; Urwego rw’Igihugu Rushinzwe Inkiko Gacaca, Imbonerahamwe igaragaza imanza zaciwe, 
Ugushyingo 2011. 
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II. Sentences 
Although capital punishment by ordinary courts was abolished in July 2007,
752
 even before this 
date, it could not be imposed by Gacaca courts.
753
 Common punishments under the formal 
criminal justice system include life imprisonment and imprisonment terms which were also 
regular in Gacaca.  As a matter of fact, Gacaca courts cannot be considered as purely restorative 
based on the kind of punishments handed down to convicts. Various defendants were sentenced 
to life imprisonment and several others were to serve varying imprisonment terms up to 30 
years.
754
 Therefore, sentences imposed by Gacaca courts were similar to those in conventional 
courts hence making the courts more retributive and less restorative in this regard.
755
  
 
However, the Gacaca judicial structure of sentences incorporated a system of confession and 
community service that is unfamiliar to retributive justice.
756
  Accordingly, suspects would 
receive reduced sentences if they confessed their crimes and prison terms would be combined 
with community service.
757
 Even though punishment of criminals was a necessary initial 
response, it was shaped towards reconciliatory goals for restorative functions, hence making the 
process semi-restorative.  Also, contrary to other restorative processes like the South African 
TRC, no amnesty was given to perpetrators in Gacaca.
758
 Against this backdrop, it can be argued 
                                                          
 
752
 Art. 2 of Organic Law N° 31/2007 of 25 July 2007 relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty, O.G.R.R. N° 
Special of 25 July 2007. 
753J. Busingye, Presentation on the ‘Reality and Challenges of Legal and Judicial Reconstruction in Rwanda, Center 
for International Legal Cooperation, The Hague, 7 December 2006, available at 
<www.cilc.nl/Post_Conflict_Situations.pdf>,  accessed November 2010, at 21 et seq. 
754
 Art. 72 of the Gacaca Law of 19/6/2004 modified by Art. 17 Organic Law N° 13/2008; Art. 73 the Gacaca Law 
of 19/6/2004 as amended by Art. 14 Organic Law N° 10/2007; see also table above on Gacaca trials and sentences. 
755
 See P.C. Bornkamm, Rwanda's Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation, (2012), at 47-48. 
756
 Presidential Order N° 26/01 of 10 December 2001 relating to the Substitution of the Penalty of Imprisonment for 
Community Service as amended to date. 
757
 The community service program includes public works like building and maintaining roads, schools, hospitals, 
and infrastructure; Art. 73 of the Gacaca Law of 19/6/2004 as modified by Art. 14 of Organic Law N° 10/2007; see 
also Art. 51 of the Gacaca Law of 19/6/2004 as modified by Art. 11 of Organic Law N° 10/2007. 
758
 For details of South African Truth Commission, see A. Boraine, Truth and Reconciliation: The Third Way, in R. 
Rotberg and A. Thompson  (eds.), Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, (2000), at 141–157; see 
also L. Fernandez, ‘Reparation for Human Rights Violations Committed by the Apartheid Regime in South Africa,’ 
in A. Randelzhofer and C. Tomuschat, State Responsibility and the Individual: Reparation in Instances of Grave 
Violations of Human Rights, (1999), at 185 et seq; For more details on Gacaca, see L. Mallinder, ‘Can Amnesties 
and International Justice be Reconciled?’ 2 International Journal of Transitional Justice, (2007), at 208. 
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that sentences in Gacaca contained both retributive and restorative elements but with a slant 
towards retributive justice.  
 
III. Stakeholders 
To be credibly described as restorative justice, the mechanism in question has to involve the 
community in the whole process.
759
 Similarly, Gacaca showed greater resemblance to restorative 
justice because the resolution of cases mainly relied on large-scale participation of the 
community members, who were called to testify on what they had endured, done, seen or 
heard.
760
 The main stakeholders included offenders, genocide survivors (rescapés), 
inyangamugayo judges and community members.  The public played a pivotal role, being the 
prosecution and the witnesses in accusing or discharging the suspects.
761
 The inyangamugayo 
would then pronounce a judgment on the basis of the evidence, witnesses and testimonies 
presented by the community.  
 
However, the sub poena powers vested in the inyangamugayo assimilated them more to judges in 
the retributive system. For example, the inyangamugayo judges were empowered to carry out 
various tasks, including summoning witnesses to testify at hearings, issuing search warrants and 
imposing punishments on those found guilty.
762
 Even witnesses who did not live in the cell or 
sector would be summoned to appear before the court if needed to provide information.
763
  
 
                                                          
759
 See T. Longman, ‘Trying Times for Rwanda,’ 32 Harvard International Review, (2010), at 48; M. Rettig, 
‘Gacaca: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Post Conflict Rwanda?’ 51 African Studies Review, (2008), at 25 et 
seq. 
760
 PRI: Final Monitoring and Research Report on the Gacaca Process, (2009-2010), at 81. 
761
 See J. Fierens, ‘Gacaca Courts: Between Fantasy and Reality,’ 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
(2005), at 908 et seq. 
762
 See Art. 39 of the Gacaca Law of 19/6/2004; Urwego rw’Igihugu rushinzwe Inkiko-Gacaca (RCN-Justice and 
Démocratie), Isomo ku Itegeko Ngenga N° 16/2004 ryo kuwa 19/06/2004 rigena Imiterere, Ububasha n’Imikorere 
by’Inkiko Gacaca (2004), at 5. 
763
 Art. 29(4)(2) of the Gacaca Law of 19/6/2004   imposed penalties for non-appearance without good reason. 
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IV. Evaluation  
By analysing the selected characteristics of Gacaca system, it becomes clear that the courts were 
a mixture of restorative and retributive elements and consequently hybrid in nature.
764
 However, 
while the old Gacaca was a community meeting with powers to arbitrate and organise their own 
functioning at a local level, the new institution emerges more like a proper criminal court with a 
punitive function.
765
 In contrast with the sole conciliatory nature of indigenous Gacaca,
766
  the 
new mechanism appears different in structure save for its local and participatory character,
767
 
thereby making Gacaca courts semi-restorative in nature.  
 
In order to appreciate the particularities of this form of justice, there is need to first understand 
the rationale for adopting the mechanism and then examining the system’s contributions in a 
transitioning state like Rwanda, as discussed below. 
 
F. Achievements of Gacaca Courts 
I. Speedy Justice 
From 2002, Gacaca system enabled speedy justice and accountability for genocide crimes by 
addressing a big number of perpetrators to give an account of their crimes. This reduced the 
overcrowding in prisons considerably and the caseload for the ordinary courts.  In 1998, over 
120,000 suspects were being held in congested prisons on genocide charges without any 
prospects for a trial.
768
 Gacaca dealt with the suspects in prison, and also handled the thousands 
                                                          
764
 P. Clark, The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda, (2011), at 48. 
765
 M. Rettig, ‘Gacaca: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Post Conflict Rwanda?’ 51 African Studies Review, 
(2008), at 25 et seq; National Service of Gacaca Courts, Summary Report on Gacaca Courts Activities, June 2012, at 
26. It was established from the start that the Rwandan Gacaca process should be applied and complemented by the 
necessary laws in order for its proceedings to be conducted as court trials. 
766
 C. Ntampaka, ‘Le Retour à la Tradition dans Le Jugement du Génocide Rwandais: Le Gacaca, Justice 
Participative,’ 48 Bulletin des Séances Académie Royale Des Sciences d’Outre-Mer, (2002), at 434 et seq. 
767
 PRI: Final Monitoring and Research Report on the Gacaca Process, (2009-2010), at 17 et seq; P. C. Bornkamm, 
Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation, (2012), at 32 et seq. 
 
768
 A. Kubai, ‘Between justice and reconciliation: The Survivors of Rwanda,’ 16 African Security Review, (2007), at 
53-66; P. Harrell, Rwanda’s Gamble: Gacaca and a New Model of Transitional Justice, (2003), at 36-37; Avocats 
Sans Frontières, (ASF) Monitoring des Jurisdictions Gacaca, Phase de Jugement, Rapport Analytique, Octobre 
2005–Septembre 2006, at 26, available at <http://www.asf.be/index.php?module=publicaties&lang=fr&id=53>, 
accessed November 2011; Hirondelle News Agency, General Opening of the Semi-Traditional Tribunals, 3 January 
2007, <http://www.hirondelle.org> accessed September 2012; Amnesty International, 17 December 2002,  ‘Gacaca: 
A Question of Justice,’ at 14, available at <www.amnesty.org/en/library>, accessed July 2012. 
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more who were accused when the Gacaca courts started operating.
769
 Right from the pilot phase, 
Gacaca has registered tremendous success in dealing with 1,958,634 genocide cases in a period 
of ten years.
770
  
 
However, despite the huge number of cases tried by Gacaca, not all genocide perpetrators were 
identified and punished for their crimes. This is why the prosecution of genocide crimes 
continues in ordinary courts as provided by the organic law, which dissolved the Gacaca 
courts.
771
 After the closure of the Gacaca courts in June 2012, a total of 71,558 case files were 
transferred from Gacaca to ordinary courts.  
 
The local Gacaca courts ran expeditious trials at the cost of fair trial rights such as lack of legal 
counsel. However, though several practices were often criticized as violating fair trial rights and 
creating doubts over the quality of justice dispensed, several other factors helped to protect the 
credibility and independence of Gacaca courts, such as the sheer number of judges on each panel 
which made it difficult to exercise any influence on them, especially when inyangamugayo 
judges had to be ninenteen on the bench.
772
  
  
Related to this was that the sheer number of courts and community members sometimes made it 
hard for any individual or group to manipulate the entire process.
773
 The reality is that some 
people in the community knew the truth about who killed and who did not, and if there was a 
killing, how, why, and by what degree of ruthlessness it took place. This helped in establishing 
                                                          
769
 B. Ingelaere, ‘The Gacaca courts in Rwanda,’ in L. Huyse and M. Salter (eds.), Traditional Justice and 
Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences, (2008), at 52 et seq. 
770
 National Service of Gacaca Courts, Summary Report on Gacaca Courts Activities, June 2012. 
771
 Organic Law N° 04/2012 of 15/06/2012 terminating Gacaca courts and determining mechanisms for solving 
issues which were under their jurisdiction. 
772
 At the beginning, the 2001  Gacaca law set the number of judges at ninenteen with five deputies, but the 2004 
Gacaca law reduced that number to nine judges and five deputies, and eventually, after the reform of this law,  to 
seven judges and two deputies and subsequently to five judges and two deputies. Nonetheless ninenteen 
inyangamugayo might have been much safer to avoid external influence than only five judges that remained which 
could at times be manipulated. 
773
 Gacaca had over 12,000 jurisdictions which were set up on two administrative levels, cell and sector, with panels 
of locally elected Inyangamugayo judges hearing genocide cases before the community members.  
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the facts of the genocide and determining each individual’s criminal responsibility.774 And in 
cases where the laws were not observed during the first hearing, the defendants in Gacaca had 
the right to appeal against the judgment and to receive retrials.
775
  
 
The innovative aspect of Gacaca can surely be recommended in the great lakes region of Africa 
that has been plagued by wars characterised by gross violations of human rights on the basis of 
ethnicity, nationality, racial or religious grounds. It is suggested that these states, need to have an 
increased reliance on such truth and reconciliation mechanisms when it comes to rebuilding 
communities that have suffered mass atrocities.
776
 It is thus important to preserve the Gacaca 
records, to archive judgments, minutes as well as other documents and make them accessible to 
the public for education. 
 
II. Reconciliatory Mechanism 
The critical question about Gacaca is whether and how it played a role in the reconciliation 
process.
777
  Taking into account the home-grown character of the system to resolve issues arising 
from the genocide, the system was less formal and closely tied to the communities in which the 
crimes were committed.
778
  Any adult could participate, intervene and testify on either side, since 
everyone was there; survivors, perpetrators, judges and the general population over 18 years. 
                                                          
774
 PRI, Final Monitoring and Research Report on the Gacaca Process, (2009-2010), at 17; For discussions on 
general  individual criminal responsibility see G. Werle, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility in Art. 25 ICC Statute,’ 
5 Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2007), at 953 et seq; see also F. Reyntjens, ‘Constructing the Truth, 
Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World: Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda,’ 110 African Affairs,   
(2011), at 1–34. 
 
775
 Arts. 86 et seq. of the Gacaca Law of 19/6/2004. At the level of appeal, Gacaca courts tried a total of 178, 741 
cases representing 9% of all the cases tried by Gacaca courts. 
776
 See P. de Grieff, ‘A Normative Conception of Transitional Justice,’ 50 Politorbis, (2010), at 20 et seq; N. 
Petrovic, ‘Human Potential for Restorative Justice in the Balkans,’ 3 Family Travel Journal, (2009), at 95-98;  M. 
Volf, ‘Forgiveness, Reconciliation, and Justice: A Theological Contribution to a more Peaceful Social 
Environment,’ 29 Millennium: Journal of International Justice, (2000), at 861 et seq. 
777
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This facilitated the process of reconciliation because the proceedings involved the people who 
experienced the genocide firsthand at every stage, thus encouraging direct engagement and 
exchange of facts between the accused and victims.
779
   
 
Positive elements of reconciliation started to manifest through confessions when a Hutu decided 
to plead guilty, then confess the truth about the Tutsis he had killed,
780
 and also identify where 
the corpses had been placed. As a result, many survivors managed to obtain information about 
the fate and graves of their loved ones, for a descent burial and the end, this contributed to the 
historiography of the system as well. Also, through these interactions, information exchange and 
individual convictions, it was believed that not all Hutu were génocidaires.
781
 
 
However, reality indicates mixed results on the restorative effects of the Gacaca experience. To 
some participants, it was a feeling of relief and closure, but for others, participation implied 
uncertainty, re-traumatisation, and fear.
782
 Perhaps, this explains why participation in Gacaca had 
declined steadily over the years or probably it could be attributed to frustration with the process 
for the time it consumed at the expense of their daily activities. Also, among those who attended 
the Gacaca proceedings, only a few were active participants. Those who actively engaged in 
discussions were predominantly the judges, the survivors and a small group of liberated 
prisoners. 
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Another way in which Gacaca attempted to foster reconciliation has been in the partial or 
complete commutation of prison sentences into community service for those who confessed.
783
 
Arguably, this type of punishment is not only productive because it helps to practically rebuild 
the community, but because it also enables those found guilty to reintegrate into the community. 
However the confession procedure attracted much criticism on the grounds that it could be used 
as a trade off for reduced sentences other than remorseful feelings.
784
 Although a significant 
number of detainees made confessions, there is a contention as to whether all these testimonies 
were total or partial, admitting minor crimes, and blaming some people for complicity, mostly 
those who were already deceased and some testimonies were silent on the involvement of those 
still alive.
785
  
 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the repeated act of coming together in the Gacaca sessions, 
irrespective of what was done there in the sense of content, practically had a transformative 
influence on social relations.
786
 The emotional experience survivors had to go through, narrating 
what happened or recalling events, could have contributed to inner healing.
787
 On the other hand, 
though it was a humiliating experience for the perpetrators to explain their role in the genocide, it 
facilitated their integration into the community. Taken as a whole, Gacaca hearings were safe 
and there was no reported violence in the meetings.
788
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III. Affordable Justice 
It is argued that the rewards of these courts clearly outweighed their disadvantages because they 
were informal, cheap, accessible, simple, and people were familiar with the laws and affairs of 
their community.
789
 Indeed, turning to the traditional model of Gacaca circumvented the resource 
constraints because the system was relatively inexpensive, easy to operate and run on a large 
scale by inyangamugayo volunteers. Furthermore, Gacaca was held in villages where the offence 
was committed, hence there were hardly any travel expenses and other logistics were minimized 
or none.
790
 
 
The mechanism provided affordable justice in terms of funds used when compared with formal 
courts. For instance, Gacaca cost only 29,665,828,092 Rwandan francs (about USD 52 million) 
during its operation.
791
 Yet the international Tribunal for Rwanda has so far cost more than 1.5 
billion USD since its inception, with an annual budget of 270 million USD and the ordinary 
courts have cost 17 million USD in the same period as the ICTR. 
 
IV. Enhancement of Local Transitional Justice Approaches 
Gacaca was a form of justice originating from and serving Rwandan culture and a demonstration 
of the local population’s ability to manage their own conflicts.792 As a result, the reality of 
reinventing home-grown strategies and adapting them to the Rwandan circumstances at the time 
facilitated Gacaca to leave behind important lessons in transitional justice.
793
 Based on aspects of 
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Gacaca experience, many studies and research have been conducted and will continue to be 
carried out in order to refine lessons from the process.  
 
The experience of Gacaca provides other states with important lessons for the study of 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in transitional justice.
794
  For example, Gacaca has 
attracted discussions of localized transitional justice in Kenya, South Sudan, Burundi
795
 and 
Uganda,
796
 where the relevant officials regularly visited Rwanda to learn from the virtues of 
Gacaca and often refer to it in their advocacy of community-based trials.
797
 Rwanda’s practice 
may therefore be educative for other societies confronting the aftermath of mass conflict. There 
is thus much to learn from its achievements, as well as its shortcomings. 
 
G. Shortcomings of Gacaca Courts 
Apart from the above major achievements of Gacaca, the system has revealed its own 
weaknesses that could have undermined the institution’s legitimacy and optimal resolution of the 
genocide issues.
798
 Due to its unprecedented nature in pursuit of justice for genocide crimes, the 
system was unavoidably imperfect to dispense justice in a satisfactory manner.  
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I. Lack of Legal Representation  
Gacaca’s major criticism has been the violation of fair trial rights under international law.799 
Indeed, it is true that the Gacaca practice and laws did not observe several due process rights, the 
most noticeable being the right to legal representation and right to reparation.
800
 In the restorative 
spirit of the original Gacaca, the courts sacrificed many of the procedural safeguards of 
defendants in criminal trials in support of a more participatory process.
801
 Such issues reflect 
tensions among the goals of international criminal law and transitional justice.
802
  
In regard to the right to legal representation, lawyers were forbidden from assisting either 
suspects or victims at any stage of a hearing as their involvement would be considered as a 
potential threat to the open, non-adversarial approach of Gacaca.
803
 The accused, judge and 
victims were on equal footing and recourse to a lawyer would merely upset this balance, given 
the fact that there were no prosecutors and even the inyangamugayo judges were not lawyers 
themselves.
804
 This element deviates from the practice in formal retributive courts which involve 
prosecutors and legal counsel.
805
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On the other hand, according to Human Rights Watch, the absence of a public prosecutor placed 
the burden of proof on the accused.
806
 While the law provides for presumption of innocence, in 
practice the burden the burden of proof sometimes fell on the accused to prove that he or she did 
not commit the alleged crime.
 807
  In general, ‘The gacaca laws tried to strike a balance by 
protecting some rights, including the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty; 
modifiying others, such as the right to have adequate time to prepare a defense; and sacrificing 
other rights altogether, including the right to legal representation.’808 
 
II. Absence of Reparations  
Concerning the right to reparation, the Gacaca law did not prescribe reparation to be given by the 
offender.
809
 Yet reparations are crucial for amending the harm caused by perpetrators to 
victims.
810
 Except for restitution of property by some Category Three perpetrators, no reparation 
was made to survivors. Gacaca courts thus failed in enhancing this right and cannot be 
considered restorative in this manner since a key characteristic of restorative justice is that it 
prioritises reparation.
811
 Although, through the survivors fund, the government contributes 6% of 
its annual budget to help survivors in education, health and improving the welfare of the needy 
genocide victims,
812
 still, this assistance does not tantamount to reparations.    
 
                                                          
806
 Human Rights Watch, Justice Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda’s Community-Based Gacaca Courts, 
(2011), at 69 et seq. 
807
 Human Rights Watch, Justice Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda’s Community-Based Gacaca Courts, 
(2011), at 4 et seq. 
808
 Human Rights Watch, Justice Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda’s Community-Based Gacaca Courts, 
(2011), at 69 et seq. 
809
 Art. 96 of the Gacaca Law of 19/6/2004; Urukiko rw’Ikirenga, Umutwe ushinzwe Inkiko-Gacaca, 
Imfashanyigisho Ku Nkiko-Gacaca, (2001), at 10. 
 
810
 L. Fernandez, ‘Reparation for Human Rights Violations Committed by the Apartheid Regime in South Africa,’ 
in A. Randelzhofer and C.Tomuschat, State Responsibility and the Individual: Reparation in Instances of Grave 
Violations of Human Rights, (1999), at 185; L. Zegveld, ‘Remedies for Victims of Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law,’ 85 International Review of the Red Cross, (2003), at 497. 
811
 J. Mucyo ‘Gacaca Courts and Genocide,’ in C. Villa-Vicencio and T. Savage (eds.), Rwanda and South Africa in 
Dialogue: Addressing the Legacies of Genocide and a Crime against Humanity, (2001), at 53; C. Ntampaka, Le 
Gacaca Rwandais, Une Justice Répressive Participative, 6 Actualité du Droit International Humanitaire, (2001), at 
210 et seq; C. Tomuschat (ed.), State Responsibility and the Individual: Reparation in Instances of Grave Violations 
of Human Rights, (1999), at 7. 
812
 Improving the welfare of the needy genocide victims is done through le Fonds d’Assistance aux Rescapés du 
Génocide (FARG); see D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, 2nd edn, (2005), at 160 et seq. 
  
 
 
166 
 
As discussed earlier, Gacaca courts were able to award material damages for destroyed or stolen 
property,
813
 but when it came to determining damages for death or injury, this was overlooked.
814
 
This situation where victims of looting would be compensated through Gacaca courts was unfair 
in relation to victims of violent crimes who did not receive any compensation.
815
 
 
Obviously, there can be no adequate compensation for the loss of a loved one or for severe 
injury. However, given the difficult socio-economic conditions of most survivors, the failure of 
Gacaca legislation to provide victims with appropriate mechanisms of compensation largely 
undermined the legacy of the institution.
816
 It is not always enough to punish only perpetrators of 
the genocide without compensating victims for the harm suffered in order to establish more 
harmonious relationships.
817
 Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the fact that this was largely due to 
economic constraints of the country and poverty of a large majority of those convicted who 
could not afford reparations to the victims. 
 
III. Inadequate Protection of Witnesses  
In Gacaca, witnesses were heard directly in public when testifying. This created uncertainty 
about their security after the testimonies.
818
  It was evident that the weak protection measures led 
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to violence of many kinds against genocide survivors, witnesses, and inyangamugayo, which 
sometimes resulted in murders.  
 
As a result, by failing to provide adequate safety measures, there were biased witness statements 
on what really happened and some of the truth was left unrevealed, particularly concerning mass 
graves of genocide victims.
819
 This was further facilitated by conspiracy for not providing 
information on genocide commonly known as ‘ceceka,’ literally interpreted to mean ‘keep quiet’, 
and whoever went against it risked his security or carried the risk of being accused as well.
820
 
Ceceka was a common practice in the region where none survived or with a small number of 
genocide survivors and it severely compromised the operation of Gacaca itself.
821
 However, 
these negative aspects were not widespread, as could reasonably be expected given the 
challenging situation in the aftermath of genocide.  
 
IV. Corruption within the System 
Gacaca’s main shortcomings included frequent cases of corruption, bribery of judges, and 
favouritism in decision making.
822
 Corruption was seen as a common occurrence which in turn, 
affected the rights of either suspects, or victims depending on who exercised the vice.
823
 Various 
factors have been identified as the cause, such as the poverty of the survivors, the desire of 
defendants to reintegrate in society, and the financial situation of many inyangamugayo judges, 
who sacrificed themselves, neglecting their subsistence farming for the expediency of Gacaca 
trials.
824
  The fact that Gacaca judges did not receive payment and hardly enjoyed any education, 
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made them highly susceptible to corruption, thereby jeopardizing the independence of the 
courts.
825
   
 
Actually, about 400 inyangamugayo were dismissed from the Gacaca system on the basis of 
disgrace and corruption although they had been elected out of the population as men of 
intergrity.
826
 As established by the Rwandan minister of justice, it is not certain how much wrong 
they had done before they were ejected out of the system because not all of the judges were 
disqualified on the same day; it was after a long period of service, thus it is difficult to assess the 
extent of wrong things done.
827
 
 
V.  Instability of Gacaca Laws 
Gacaca’s other setback is attributable to legislative weaknesses. For instance, owing to the 
unprecedented approach and absence of historical templates to refer to,
828
 there were numerous 
amendments of Gacaca law based on deficiencies identified by the public.
829
 As already 
highlighted, Gacaca courts were created by the 2001 organic law, which was repealed by the 
2004 organic law, which was later amended several times, in 2006, 2007, and 2008.
830
 While 
some changes helped to improve the process and responded to particular problems that would 
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arise, the constant alteration of fundamental aspects of Gacaca law often affected the 
population’s comprehension of the justice process.  
 
For instance, suspects would time and again remain uncertain about the court in which to face 
trial when there was an ongoing amendment, such as alteration of categories, which would in 
turn affect their confidence in the procedure and process.
831
 It was also another workload for 
inyangamugayo to regularly adapt to requirements of new modifications in the laws due to their 
limited skills.    
 
VI. Non-Prosecution of RPA Crimes 
Similar to the ICTR,
832
 various criticisms have been advanced on Gacaca for not having 
addressed Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) crimes committed against Hutu during the civil war 
and its aftermath.
833
  Surely, some RPA soldiers shot and killed Hutu soldiers, interahamwe or 
civilians.
834
 These were mainly isolated killings of Hutu by RPA soldiers, who largely took 
revenge for their relatives, who had been killed during the genocide.
835
 Yet, these acts have not 
been qualified as genocide because RPA did not set out to kill Hutu as an ethnic group.
836
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Also, the said killings were not sufficiently systematic and widespread to be qualified as crimes 
against humanity.
837
 Apparently, these crimes were qualified as war crimes,
838
 consequently 
falling outside the material jurisdiction of Gacaca courts but under the jurisdiction ordinary 
courts. Actually, the current Rwandan government did acknowledge on several instances that 
occasional revenge killings occurred but reiterated that they were to be prosecuted by military 
courts having competence to try war crimes.
839
 Below are figures of RPA trials before the 
military courts in the context of the civil war. 
 
Table showing prosecutions of RPA soldiers  
Year 1994  1996  1997  1998  2000  2001  2003  2004  2005  2006  2008  
Accused 2  3  15  11  5 2  2  4 2  3  5 
 
Despite these prosecutions,
840
 various criticisms, particularly from victims of RPA crimes have 
often condemned and regarded the absence of RPA prosecutions by Gacaca courts as victor’s 
justice,
841
 which to some extent has limited Gacaca’s contribution to reconciliation.842 According 
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to various authors, this might diminish the credibility of the justice process among Rwandans 
who lost their families or friends during those events.
843
   
 
However, the genocide against the Tutsi minority cannot be equated with the civil war crimes 
against the Hutu. The first violent behaviour was intended to exterminate, while the second was 
brutality to avenge.
844
 But the fact that the first was dealt with in Gacaca and the second was 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the local courts undermines reconciliatory efforts.
845
 Therefore 
after citing many flaws of the system, this study, finds that Gacaca did not meet all the enormous 
expectations in resolving genocide consequences.
846
   
 
VII. Interim Remarks  
In the face of many Gacaca weaknesses, the process involved its own strengths that ordinary 
justice would not be able to attain.  Gacaca was the necessary evil of resolving the problem of 
the case backlog that was in the country after the genocide, where ordinary justice could not be 
applied. There was no means at the time, no resources and no capacity, both material and human, 
to try all the cases.
847
 This justifies why it was better to do justice, albeit unsatisfactorily, than 
not to do justice at all.
848
 The establishment of Gacaca was inevitable since there was no other 
option, but still it is not recommended for conventional and international trials to be replaced by 
local-level responses such as Gacaca; instead all efforts should work as complementary 
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institutions.
849
 Therefore, the three processes of the UN Tribunal in Arusha, the national courts 
and Gacaca, were established with the hope that the strengths of these approaches might 
complement one another. 
 
Therefore, after assessing the contributions, achievements and shortcomings of the courts, the 
next chapter will analyze the relationship of Gacaca courts with other retributive judicial 
mechanisms empowered to try genocide cases, particularly, the Rwandan national courts and the 
ICTR. 
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CHAPTER SIX: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
ICTR, NATIONAL COURTS AND GACACA COURTS 
 
A. Introduction 
Rwanda constitutes an important case study of the multiple legacies of a troubled past, which led 
to diverse levels of enforcement, the ad hoc Tribunal, national courts and Gacaca vested with 
concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes under international law.
850
 Concurrent jurisdiction 
occurs when a particular set of facts gives rise to the jurisdiction of two or more courts.
851
   
 
The problem that this part addresses is how the three different courts trying similar crimes, use 
different procedures, laws and even prescribe different punishments, for perpetrators of the same 
situation.
852
 This scholarship, therefore seeks to analyze the relationship between the ICTR and 
national mechanisms (both ordinary and Gacaca courts) over genocide crimes committed in 
Rwanda. A section is also attributed to discussing the role of such parallel trials towards 
reconciliation. 
 
B. Jurisdictional Relationship  
Article 8(1) of the ICTR Statute provides that the ICTR and national courts shall have concurrent 
jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious crimes under international law, and Article 8(2) 
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emphasizes that the ICTR shall have the primacy over the national courts of all states.
853
 This 
Article harbors huge tensions because it offers no guidance as to how concurrent jurisdiction is 
supposed to function in the face of potentially significant differences among the various 
competent judicial forums which may simultaneously claim jurisdiction on a specific suspect.
854
   
 
Although the ICTR may formally request national courts to defer to the competence of the 
international Tribunal, it has rarely exercised this right to take over domestic proceedings.
855
 
Moroever no explicit principles exist for the distribution of suspects between the ICTR and 
national courts. An unofficial division between the jurisdictions assumes that the ICTR will hear 
the cases of suspects considered to be among the most important planners and perpetrators of the 
genocide, while leaving the remaining cases to the national courts.
856
   
 
Ramer argues that this emerging system of international criminal law consists of unclear lines 
and procedures which may potentially lead to competing claims to jurisdiction.
857
 Indeed, other 
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authors, such as Werle, assert that the parallel existence of direct and indirect enforcement 
mechanisms can lead to situations in which national and international courts simultaneously 
claim jurisdiction to prosecute.
858 
This is because both jurisdictions have the potential to address 
in parallel, the same disputes involving the same parties and issues.
859
 
 
For example, Froduard Karamira became the object of a brief ‘tug of war’ between the ICTR and 
the government of Rwanda.
860
 Discussions followed between the ICTR prosecutor and the 
government of Rwanda in 1996 regarding the ICTR pursuing prosecution of Karamira, citing the 
leadership positions of the latter as an essential criterion for the ICTR to exercise its primacy of 
jurisdiction in that case.
861
 However, the Rwandan minister of justice pointed out the importance 
of trying Karamira in domestic courts, and also argued that the government had invested 
extensive efforts in gaining that the Rwandan justice system had already invested in gaining 
custody of Karamira who had fled to India. 
 
At last, the ICTR prosecutor withdrew his request for the detention of Karamira until the earlier 
request of the Rwandan government had been acted upon. When he attempted to leave the airport 
during a transit stopover in Addis Ababa, Karamira was subsequently deported from Ethiopia to 
Rwanda.
862
 The trial ended with his being sentenced to death and the sentence was executed in 
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1998, yet had he been transferred to the ICTR, the maximum penalty would have been life 
imprisonment. 
 
This scenario shows one of the primary areas of conflict between the ICTR and national courts, 
namely the distribution of defendants between the two court structures. In cases where the ICTR 
and the government of Rwanda wanted custody of the same individual, the problem has often 
been which court to take custody.
863
 This is because the courts have overlapping jurisdictions 
despite their differences in structure and procedures. If the relationship is not coordinated, the 
gaps in the allocation of judicial competence to prosecute core crimes may lead to a situation 
where criminals may escape prosecution, first at the national level, and, if need be, at the 
international level.
864
 
 
C. Disparities among the Different Approaches 
Numerous aspects and practices emanating from a comparative analysis of the Statute of the 
ICTR and Rwanda’s organic laws for the prosecution of genocide illustrate inequalities in the 
justice dispensed.
 
Yet concurrent jurisdiction is not essentially meant to take away the equality of 
the accused persons appearing before the various courts.  
 
The question raised here is whether concurrent jurisdiction has facilitated a process whereby the 
Rwandan national courts and the ICTR can both administer the minimum guarantees for a fair 
trial in full equality of the spirit of the ICCPR. In other words, are rights enshrined in article 14 
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such as the right to counsel guaranteed to accused persons in all courts? Or what discrepancies 
are in the standards of justice if any?  
Article 14 of ICCPR provides that:  
1) ‘All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge 
against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law;  
 2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law; 
 3) In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following 
minimum guarantees, in full equality: (a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he 
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him; (b) To have adequate time and facilities for 
the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;  (c) To be tried 
without undue delay; (d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal 
assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to 
have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without 
payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it; (e) To examine, or have 
examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his 
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter 
if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court;  (g) Not to be compelled to testify against 
himself or to confess guilt.’865 
In reference to the above provision, the right to a fair trial entails respect of ‘equality of arms,’ 
which aims at equal treatment of parties involved and securing them enjoyment of the same 
rights and guarantees, in terms of the right to defence counsel, expeditious trials, and 
presumption of innocence.
866
 Yet there is an apparent disparity in the implementation of fair trial 
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standards at the international Tribunal in comparison to the national approaches dealing with 
perpetrators of the same situation,
867
 as shown below. 
 
I. Right to Legal Counsel 
The ICTR defendants have the right to be assisted by counsel of their choice or to have legal 
assistance assigned to them without payment if the defendant in question does not have sufficient 
means to pay for it.
868
 Similarly, the Rwanda legislation recognizes the right to counsel for 
defendants tried by national courts, but does not provide defense counsel for indigent 
defendants.
869
  On the contrary, the Gacaca law does not acknowledge the right to counsel,
870
 
which has been criticized as a violation of fair trial rights.
871
 There is a defendant, sometimes a 
victim, but no defence lawyer and no prosecution.
872
  Proponents of the Gacaca system tend to 
argue instead that the absence of any form of legal representation, for both victims and 
perpetrators in Gacaca is another form of equality of arms in that the community that witnessed 
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the massacres gives both incriminating and exonerating evidence.
873 
 However the absence of 
legal counsel for particular suspects creates inequality between defendants depending on which 
court they face trial and in the end contradicts the international fair trial standards.  
 
II. Right to Silence 
The right to remain silent is recognized by the ICTR, just as it is by the ordinary courts of 
Rwanda. According to Rule 63 of the rules of procedure and evidence of the ICTR, the accused 
is not obliged to say anything unless he wishes to do so and with proper caution. As for Gacaca, 
‘no one, according to the law, had the right to remain silent on genocide matters; considering that 
the duty to testify was the obligation of every Rwandan citizen and that nobody was allowed to 
refrain from such an obligation whatever the reasons.’874  These considerations are translated into 
the specific provisions that stipulate the duty to testify, and individuals refusing to do so may 
incur a prison sentence.
875
  
 
Another concern is that detainees were sensitized to confess to such an extent that several of 
them were no longer aware of their right to remain silent.
876
 The emphasis placed on confessions 
may have compromised the principle of presumption of innocence.
877
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III. Right to be tried without Undue Delay 
Although the ICTR is the first international tribunal to try several genocide suspects, still the 
number of trials is small compared to the number of perpetrators implicated in the genocide.
878
 
For a period of almost two decades, the Tribunal has condemned only a handful of suspects 
despite the huge budget allocated to it where it has been operating on an annual budget of 270 
million USD (167.4 billion RWF).
879
 Generally, in eighteen years after the establishment of the 
ICTR, it has indicted ninenty-two individuals and arrested eighty three of them accused of 
genocide among other crimes. The Tribunal has finished the proceedings of seventy-five persons 
and seventeen are appealing their sentences. Eleven of the convicts have finished their sentences 
and have been released, three others died while serving prison sentences and ten defendants have 
been acquitted. Proceedings against four individuals were terminated after two died and after 
indictments against two were withdrawn.
880
 Nine individuals remain at large as fugitives. The 
cases against ten individuals have been transferred to national jurisdictions, mainly Rwanda and 
France following Rule 11 bis.
881
 The Tribunal is bound to close its work on 31 December 2014 
according to the ICTR completion strategy, and will transfer its responsibilities to the 
international residual mechanism which already began functioning for the ICTR branch in July 
2012.
882
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Genocide Research, (2004), at 85–98. 
879
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Rwanda,’ 103 African Affairs, (2004), at 81; R. Zacklin,  ‘The Failings of the Ad hoc Tribunals,’ 2 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, (2004), at 541-543; see the ICTR, available at <http://www.unictr.org/>; accessed 
October 2012. 
880
 See T. Gallimore, ‘The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and its Contributions 
to Reconciliation in Rwanda,’ 14 New England Journal of International and Comparative Law, (2008), at 242-243; 
E. Karake, ‘Right to Host ICTR Archives,’ The New Times Rwanda, 18 September 2012; ICTR, ‘Status of Cases, ’ 
available at <http://www.unictr.org/Cases/tabid/204/Default.aspx>, accessed October 2012. 
881
 Rule 11 bis of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence on Transfer of Cases; It should be noted that French 
courts have been inactive in receiving cases since the referral of the two supects who have not yet been tried to date. 
882
 Statute of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Art. 27(3); G. Acquaviva, ‘Was a 
Residual Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals Really Necessary?’ 9 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, (2011), at 789 et seq; T. Pittman, ‘The Road to the Establishment of the International Residual Mechanism 
for Criminal Tribunals: From Completion to Continuation,’ 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2011), at 
797-817. 
  
 
 
181 
 
In comparison, according to available statistics, the ordinary courts accomplished 7,181 cases 
between December 1996 and mid-2002,
883
  and by the end of 2004, a total of 10,026 individuals 
had been tried by the courts. And from January 2005 to March 2008, the courts merely tried 222 
genocide suspects as indicated in previous chapters. Thus, the total number of persons tried for 
genocide related crimes in Rwanda’s ordinary courts from 1997 to March 2008 was 10,248.884  
After March 2008, very few genocide trials were heard in ordinary courts since most of the cases 
had been transferred to Gacaca courts.
885
 So far the courts have tried 15, 286 cases in a period of 
eighteen years after the genocide. At this pace, and without undermining the remarkable role 
played by specialised chambers, national courts were too slow to deal with all the genocide 
suspects in the overcrowded prisons approximately 120,000 at the time without including those 
at large. There was need for an alternative mechanism such as Gacaca to deal with the huge 
backlog, in order to observe the right of suspects to be tried without undue delay.
886
    
 
Since their creation in 2002, Gacaca courts tried 1,958,634 cases
887
 in a period of ten years, with 
approximately 37,000 convicts serving their sentences in various prisons and about 1.2 million 
cases fell in the third category of property offences which consequently cleared the backlog of 
genocide cases and delivered swift justice.
888
 Some of these trials resulted into acquittals, 
property reparations, imprisonment and some sentences being commuted to community service 
as an alternative to imprisonment. During its operation, Gacaca courts only used 29,665,828,092 
                                                          
 
883
 See Amnesty International, 17 December 2002, ‘Gacaca: A Question of Justice,’ at 17 available at 
<www.amnesty.org/en/library>, accessed July 2012; Similar statistics are provided in J. Fierens, ‘Gacaca Courts: 
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886
 See Avocats Sans Frontieres (ASF), Ingendanyi, Imiburanishirize y’Icyaha cya Jenocide n’Ibyaha byibasiye  
Inyokumuntu Mu Inkiko zisanzwe z’u Rwanda 2004, (2005),  at  7; W. A. Schabas, ‘Genocide Trials and Gacaca 
Courts,’ 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice, (2005), at 895. 
887
 National Service of Gacaca Courts, Summary Report on Gacaca Courts’ Activities, June 2012. 
888
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the genocide, others were released; see also LIPRODHOR, Rapport de Monitoring des prisons au Rwanda, (2012), 
at 14 et seq. 
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Rwandan francs (about 52 million USD). Yet the international Tribunal for Rwanda has so far 
cost more than 1.5 billion US dollars since its inception with only 75 completed trials. A separate 
budget for national courts on genocide trials indicates that 17 million USD from the whole 
judiciary’s budget has been used in a period of seventeen years. On average, Gacaca trials cost 
50 USD per suspect and tried almost two million cases,
889
 while the ICTR tried 75  in eighteen 
years at a cost over 20 million USD per suspect. 
 
Consequently, the slow pace of the ICTR and national courts’ trials impacts on the right of 
suspects to be tried without undue delay.
890
 The effect created by this inconsistency in the laws 
directly impacts on the equality of all persons before a court of law as enshrined in article 14 of 
the ICCPR. 
 
IV. Jurisdiction Disparities 
Article 7 of the ICTR Statute provides that the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR extends from a 
period beginning on 1 January 1994 and ending on 31 December 1994.
891
 On the other hand, 
similar to Gacaca courts,
892
 the organic law confers jurisdiction to national courts over offences 
committed from 1 October 1990 to 31 December 1994.
893
 
 
Though there is an overlap of jurisdiction regarding the 1994 crimes, both mechanisms perceive 
the time frame in which atrocities were committed very differently. The ICTR Statute does not 
                                                          
889
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890
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Uvin, ‘The Gacaca Tribunals in Rwanda,’ in D. Bloomfield et al. (eds.), Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A 
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September 1998. 
 
892
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Judgment of 10/05/2008, Case file, N° 048. The jurisdiction ratione temporis of Gacaca courts is defined in Article 1 
of the Gacaca Law as including offenses ‘committed between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994. 
893
 See Charles Zirimwabagabo v. the Prosecution, (RPA/GEN 0002/10/HC/Mus), Urukiko Rukuru, Urugereko rwa 
Musanze tariki ya 29/07/2010; Charles Zirimwabagabo v. the Prosecution, (RPAA 0002 GEN/10/CS), Supreme 
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take into account the organizational and planning stages of the Rwandan genocide as it does not 
consider any criminal activities that took place before January 1994.
894
 On the other hand, the 
different organic laws governing national and Gacaca courts include what were called ‘pilot 
projects for extermination’ which took place as far back as 1st October 1990.895 In fact, it is often 
advanced by the Rwandan government that without the pilot phases of early 1990s, the genocidal 
massacres of 1994 would not have been so successfully implemented.
896
 Therefore, although the 
months of April to July 1994 are believed to mark the commission of genocide in Rwanda, it 
cannot be overlooked that a series of massacres had started in the late 1990 and continued 
thereafter.  
 
Thus, the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR precludes investigations into the responsibility born 
by the orchestrators for acts committed before January 1994. The leaders of the genocide are, in 
effect, more narrowly accountable than the low level offenders detained in Rwanda’s prisons. It 
cannot be said that there is equality before the law when there is such a wide divergence in the 
temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR and national mechanisms.  
 
V. Discrepancy in Sentences 
Despite the success in convicting many of the key individuals behind the genocide, there exists 
an apparent irony in the course of justice. It lies in the sentencing options that are available 
among the three courts. Although death penalty was abolished under Rwandan domestic law,
897
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161 et seq.; V. Morris and M. P. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Vol. 1, (1998),  at 302. 
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X, (1996), at 61 et seq; G. Umugwaneza,  ‘A Comparison of  the Prosecution of Crimes under the Statute of the 
ICTR and Rwandan Organic Law N°08/96 of 30 August 1996,’ National University of Rwanda,’ Dissertation, 
(1999), at 11-15. 
896
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this penalty was substituted with life imprisonment with special measures.
898
 Yet, the most 
responsible defendants before the ICTR face a maximum penalty of life imprisonment with the 
possibility of parole depending on the venue for their incarceration.
899
 
 
More incongruent legislation between the ICTR and Rwandan courts is evidenced in Article 17 
of the organic law which entails a secondary penalty in addition to the main sentence.
900
 
According to this provision, the civil rights of persons found guilty of genocide are withdrawn. 
And for persons whose acts place them under Category One, the deprivation of their civil rights 
would be for life. However the ICTR Statute does not provide for such secondary punishments 
for its convicts. Similar to ordinary courts, the Gacaca law includes the loss of civic rights as an 
accessory penalty to imprisonment.
901
 Those convicted may be deprived of their rights to be 
elected to public office and to serve in certain official functions.
902
  
 
In line with this, there is explicit differential treatment of suspects referred by the ICTR or 
extradited by third states to Rwanda, since they cannot be subjected to such accessory 
punishments. The law stipulates:  
‘[…] however, life imprisonment with special measures shall not be pronounced in respect of cases 
transferred to Rwanda from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and from other states [...].’903 
 
On the contrary, life imprisonment with special measures is imposed on other accused persons 
appearing before national courts, including those tried by Gacaca courts who were believed to 
                                                          
898
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901
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bear the least responsibility.
904
 It is thus a legal paradox to see that the planners or commanders 
of the genocide are being treated with more leniency and full observance of fair trial rights than 
the subordinates who executed the superiors’ orders. 
 
This chain of inconsistency under international and local trials has an impact not only on the 
quality of the sentences of the courts but also on the right of the accused to be treated equally.
905
 
As a result, persons accused of the same genocide offence may be co-offenders, but face 
contrasting kinds of sentences for the mere fact that they appear before different courts. 
Nonetheless, even if all courts are not expected to give absolutely the same kind of decisions 
with regard to a given law, the inequality, however, should not be inflated.
906
 The disparity in the 
sentencing practices under the different approaches can be socially divisive and negative to the 
national reconciliation process. 
 
VI. Unequal Detention Facilities 
Rule 103 of the ICTR RPE provides that imprisonment shall be served in Rwanda or any state 
designated by the Tribunal from the list of states which have indicated their willingness to accept 
convicted persons. Such imprisonment shall be in accordance with the applicable law of the state 
concerned subject to the supervision of the ICTR. Yet convicts of regular courts and Gacaca 
serve their sentences in Rwanda, basically in overcrowded prisons.
907
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According to the Rwandan justice approaches to the 1994 genocide, while architects of the 
genocide would have relative ‘comfort’ and ‘luxurious’ prison conditions in Arusha or foreign 
prisons,
908
  low level perpetrators tried by national and Gacaca courts, are incarcerated in 
congested prisons, sometimes under unhealthy conditions.
909
  This is not to imply that the ‘big 
fish’ should be incarcerated in an inhumane way, however, the disproportion of punishment and 
modalities of detention for those who are convicted and sentenced by the ICTR and persons 
convicted and sentenced by domestic courts differs radically.
910
 Therefore concurrent jurisdiction 
created inequality before the law for the accused detained in the Arusha detention facility, or 
third countries and those in Rwanda’s prisons.911  
 
For instance, in order for the ICTR to accept referral of Uwinkindi Jean to Rwanda, it had to first 
carry out an inspection of the prison conditions in Rwanda, and found that mainly Muhanga and 
Kigali central prison are the only ones that fulfil the international standards.
912
 Yet detention 
facilities of other genocide convicts in Rwanda are not subject to such prior inspections. In this 
case, perhaps if defendants were given a choice of which category to belong to, they would most 
likely choose to be classified under high profile offenders so as to benefit from the fair treatment 
of the international Tribunal. Different cases taken from both the national and international 
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after Military Interventions, (2006), at 360; It is important to note that prison conditions may not be so 
disproportionately harsh when compared with living conditions for the average Rwandan citizen. 
911
 M. A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, (2007), at 21 et seq; S. Negri, ‘Equality of Arms-
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mechanisms illustrate how concurrent jurisdiction can compromise the principle of equality 
before the law as enshrined in article 14 of the ICCPR.   
 
The discussion above shows that although justice has been sought through a plurality of 
mechanisms, the disparity between judicial standards, procedures and even sentences among the 
courts can be detrimental to ensuring equality of parties before the courts.
913
 When it comes to 
penalties and due process rights in this system of concurrent jurisdiction, there is greater 
protection of high category génocidaires tried by the ICTR than in national prosecutions.
914 
 
 
Apart from the inequality issues from the use of international, national and Gacaca mechanisms, 
there are suggestions that simultaneous trials on the other hand can have aspects of reconciliation 
in a post-conflict society. The next section examines these aspects and the impact of criminal 
trials to reconciliation. 
 
D. The Contribution of Different Trials to Reconciliation 
This section, deals with the concept of reconciliation and its objectives. It further analyses how 
each of the objectives is being realised in the different justice systems in Rwanda at both national 
and international level.
915
 The main focus will be put on the contribution of the trials towards 
reconciliation, as regards individualisation of guilt, acknowledgement of responsibility and the  
uncovering of the truth. 
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I. Meaning of Reconciliation  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term reconciliation as “the renewal of amicable relations 
between two persons who had been at enmity or variance; usually implying forgiveness of 
injuries on one or both sides.”916 Reconciliation can also be defined as the repair and restoration 
of relationships and the rebuilding of trust.
917
  According to Staub, reconciliation is more than 
co-existence, of formerly hostile groups living near each other, or simply interacting and 
working together.
918
 Reconciliation requires that members of the two groups come to value the 
humanity of one another by breaking the cycle of violence.
919
  It means coming to accept each 
other and to develop mutual trust.
920
   
 
Reconciliation in simpler terms may refer to coming to an agreement over differences, whatever 
the magnitude, and it takes a long process rather than a quick one-time event.
921
 Reconciliation 
means going over previous disagreements, recognizing that there were rights and wrongs on both 
sides, recognizing that the mutual relationship is worth more than petty differences, and agreeing 
                                                          
916
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920
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to forego the divisions in favour of unity.
922
 It does not guarantee that things will be put back 
where they were, but it does mean that hostilities and violence have ceased.
923
  
 
Reconciliation can be defined either positively or negatively; that is in respect of what should be 
done and what needs to be avoided in order for reconciliation to materialise.
924
 It should seek to 
avoid various aspects like absence of violence. On the positive note of the concept, reconciliation 
needs to contribute to restoration of relationships of both individuals and groups under conflict, 
which is reconciliation at an individual level and reconciliation at a group level of the society 
torn apart by conflict.
925
 
 
There are several other indicators of reconciliation in a post-conflict society, but these vary from 
one society to another depending on both internal and external factors,
926
 like the historical 
background to the conflict, the cultural context, nature of conflict and the political will of the 
government as well as external influences.
927
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Therefore the notion of reconciliation is complex and consists of a wide array of elements. These 
elements include; acknowledgement of past violations, discovery of truth, restoration of 
relationships, healing, forgiveness, reparations, co-existence, accountability, individualization of 
responsibility, re-integration of perpetrators, absence of collective criminality, absence of 
violence, and absence of ethnic polarisation.
928
 Given that the focus of the present study is on 
justice approaches to the Rwandan genocide, the following discussion will focus on three 
particular aspects of reconciliation that are commonly associated with criminal justice, namely 
the official acknowledgement of the crimes committed, the individualisation of guilt, as well as 
truth recovery.
929
  It will be examined how the three justice approaches to the Rwandan genocide 
contribute towards these three distinct elements of reconciliation. 
 
II. The ICTR, National Courts and Gacaca Contribution to Reconciliation 
It is important to point out, that the existing body of research on criminal tribunals, centres a lot 
on punishment, seldom however, is the focus on their impact on reconciliation.
930
  Though there 
is no direct link between criminal trials, be it international, national and local courts with 
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reconciliation;
931
 the author examines the matter in the context of the established indicators of 
reconciliation in post-conflict societies.
932
   
 
1. Official Acknowledgement of the Crimes 
The trials by both national and international trials have facilitated the official, public 
acknowledgement of gross violations of human rights in Rwanda and explored the causes of such 
violations.
933
 In so doing, they have restored the dignity of those who have been victims of the 
grave crimes.
934
 It is in this context that the role of acknowledgement must be emphasized, and 
any facts about violation of human rights abuses need to be fully and publicly exposed.
935
 This is 
because acknowledgement affirms that a victim’s suffering is a result of injustice and is worthy 
of attention through convicting offenders to avoid historical revisionism.
936
 Acknowledgement of 
genocide acts in trials sets a moral standard, which provides a basis for restoration of relations 
between victims and perpetrators.
937
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The government of Rwanda through the minister of justice has always acknowledged that the 
government did accept political responsibility for the genocide, but not criminal liability because 
the current government did not commit genocide but took the political responsibility of the 
government it replaced.
938
 However, the crime of genocide does not necessarily require that the 
intent to destroy a protected group must be held by a state or state-like organization.
939
 
 
In regard to Gacaca trials, suspects were given the opportunity to admit their responsibility so as 
to contribute to the shaping of a new Rwandan society (Umuryango Nyarwanda).  There has 
been acknowledgement of responsibility for genocide through massive confessions by the 
perpetrators. This has happened during public gatherings where the perpetrators personally 
apologised to the victims, in front of the community, acknowledging their role in killing 
Tutsis.
940
  This has helped former antagonistic parties to reconstruct their society through 
reintegration of the criminals amongst themselves, forgiving those that wronged and ensuring 
that they are living together as a community of one Rwandan identity, and not ethnic groupings 
or divergent groups.
941
  
 
At a more practical level, the significant step towards reconciliation is that the former 
antagonistic groups are still living side by side in harmony, sharing the welfare and good things 
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of their community, as well as solving the problems of society together.
942
 The Rwandan victim 
and perpetrator groups are trying not to identify themselves by their presumed ethnic differences 
but as one complementary group that has a lot in common beyond their divergences.
943
 
 
Similarly, the national courts have acknowledged the occurrence of genocide in Rwanda by 
convicting the perpetrators. The national courts have acknowledged genocide through their 
judgments passed under the 08/96 organic law.  However, although the national legislation and 
the courts themselves acknowledge genocide, the suspects have often denied taking part in the 
crime, despite the available mass of evidence and victims of the atrocities.
944
 This is an 
impediment to reconciliation manifested in the fact that the ICTR and national courts have had 
little confessions and guilty pleas by defendants compared to Gacaca defendants.
945
  
 
On a global level, the ICTR, which was set up by the UN Security Council Resolution, shows 
international acknowledgement of the human rights abuses committed in Rwanda amounting to 
genocide.
946
  Not all ethnic massacres amount to the definition of genocide.  The international 
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recognition of the acts committed in Rwanda as genocide helps in reconciliation of the society 
rather than if the international community had ignored or denied the genocide. 
947
 
 
To measure the ICTR’s impact on inter-ethnic reconciliation is a significant undertaking for 
international criminal justice research. The fact that the ICTR is an international Tribunal means 
that its judgments are globally recognised. So there has been acknowledgment of genocide 
against the Tutsi by the international community as a whole. Motivated by ICTR trials, the on-
going prosecutions of suspects by third states is evidence of an increasing recognition among 
states within the international arena of the responsibility to prosecute human rights violators,
948
 
and this is a significant development in international law. To cite Antonio Cassese, ‘The role of 
the Tribunals cannot be overemphasized. Far from being vehicles for revenge, they are tools for 
promoting reconciliation and restoring peace.’949  
 
2. Individualization of Guilt 
In criminal trials, emphasis is put on individualisation of guilt rather than the collective 
assumption that a particular group committed the atrocious crimes.
950
 This is important for 
reconciliation because those who did not engage in the crimes easily interact with the victims 
and help in the reconstruction of the society. In case of non-individualisation of guilt, the 
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perpetrator group is held collectively guilty for everything that occured and there is a multi-
layered sense of victimhood which could foster feelings of bitterness, anger or revenge.
951
  
 
Also, in case of the non-individualised guilt, the victim group is not comfortable to associate 
with the perpetrator group for fear of being subjected to the same kind of violence and the latter 
are prone to fear revenge. There is much suspicion among the groups, that could hinder 
reconciliation.  Determining the individual role of the accused persons is therefore, a necessary 
step for reconciliation through avoiding collective responsibility.
952
 
 
Taking a look at Gacaca, the process of justice engaged the participation of the victims, the 
offenders and their respective community members who determined the guilt or innocence of the 
suspect before them since it was the same community which had witnessed and participated in 
the killing of their own members. In other words, Rwandan themselves were responsible for 
dealing with suspects of crimes committed in Rwanda by Rwandans against fellow Rwandans.
953
 
Rather than simply punishing the perpetrator, justice was aimed more at reconciling the parties 
and reintegration of offenders.
954
 In case a suspect confessed his individual role in the crimes, he 
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would receive a reduced sentence upon conviction.
955
  
 
On the other hand, the national courts and ICTR individualized guilt for the leaders and 
instigators of the genocide, which was not an easy task because some of the suspects had not 
personally or physically perpetrated crimes of genocide.
956
 They had acted as commanders, 
architects and organizers, such that it was not certain to determine their share or individual 
responsibility in the crimes.
957
 The legally trained judges were able to establish the role of the 
leaders in the genocide, inter alia by applying the notion of superior responsibility for both 
military and civilian leaders.
958
  The case law of the ICTR and national courts shows that the 
indifference of a superior does not exonerate him from responsibility for crimes perpetrated by 
his subordinates because he is supposed to either prevent or punish the subodinates for any 
illegal acts.
959
 
 
The ICTR did not collectively try former government leaders for genocide. There had to be a 
link between a given individual’s leadership with the committed crimes, and the consequence is 
that several high profile defendants have been acquitted. Nonetheless, such acquittals have often 
resulted in demonstrations in Rwanda, which blames the Tribunal for not rendering fair justice in 
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some instances. Victim associations have publicly denounced several acquittals of military 
officers and ministers as negation of the genocide and revisionism.
960
 
 
Based on the author’s own experience, while the local population often criticizes the ICTR, it is 
important to highlight that their knowledge of the case law is very little, with limited 
understanding of how the ICTR reached its verdicts. Although the ICTR’s judgments are 
available on its website, not all individuals can access the internet. The long and complex court 
judgments in foreign languages are not accessible to the population at large. There is a 
remarkable absence of information about the trials, with very little media coverage in Rwanda. 
Outreach activities have not been realised to a sufficient extent, despite the fact that outreach 
information is important in explaining the findings of the Tribunal. 
 
This study asserts that in order to help create the good perception of justice, it is necessary for 
the victim and perpetrator community to feel part of the transitional justice process. In Rwanda, 
one of the fundamental problems is precisely that people on the ground are very disconnected 
from the Tribunal, by its location and insufficient outreach activities. This has direct implications 
on the community because, an essential step towards reconciliation through a criminal justice 
process is that of ownership, where people feel included.
961
 To achieve reconciliation fully, 
transitional justice mechanisms need not to be separated from local realities and needs,
962
 
particularly victims’ interests. The distant location of the Tribunal and inadequate outreach 
activities created a significant gap between the ICTR and Rwandans for whom it was set up to 
render justice, and this in turn has ignited some perception, particularly among the victims that 
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198 
 
ICTR justice is flawed, which may be detrimental to reconciliation.
963
  
 
 A response to the above issue is that the ICTR should engage much in mobile outreach 
programs that travel around the country to provide important information and answer people’s 
questions, particularly in the aftermath of very controversial judgments. For example, following 
a particular suspect’s release, members of the ICTR should explain the outcome and discuss the 
verdict to the community where the alleged massacres were committed. For facts on the ICTR’s 
role in building the affected community, the author’s previous chapter three demonstrated the 
ICTR’s limited contribution to outreach programs in Rwanda and its impact on the local 
population.
964
  
 
3. Truth 
Practically, in examining what the three level approach means for truth finding and 
reconciliation, the author finds that under national and international law, victim families have a 
right to the full truth of the past violations.
965
 According to the South African TRC, there are 
various kinds of truth that would arguably help in reconciliation, such as factual or forensic truth, 
personal or narrative truth, social or dialogue truth as well as healing and restorative truth.
966
 For 
instance, formal courts are better geared to establish forensic truth than narrative or healing truth, 
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where the latter is most likely to emerge from restorative mechanisms, therefore making each of 
the courts powerful in this regard.
967
 
a) Personal and Narrative Truth 
The Gacaca courts were open to the public to uncover the past by hearing individual accounts of 
everyone. By telling their stories, both victims and perpetrators exposed their subjective and 
multi-layered experiences.
968
 By providing an environment in which victims could tell their own 
stories, the hearing not only helped to uncover existing facts about past abuses, but also assisted 
in the creation of a narrative truth. Telling stories through narration had a healing potential and it 
is believed that Gacaca captured the widest possible record of people’s perceptions, stories, 
myths and experiences through its numerous trials.
969
 
 
Also, Gacaca’s road to reconciliation entailed confessions and apologies by individual persons, 
families and local leaders, resulting in forgiveness by those who had been victimised.
970
 The 
admission that one bears or shares responsibility for wrongs against others, and accepts liability 
in that context was an essential contribution of any reconciliation process.
971
 At the gatherings, 
the inyangamugayo judges and the community listened to everyone, unlike in the ICTR and 
national courts where witnesses were limited to testify on only relevant information that the 
judges needed to hear. In Gacaca, the conversation was open for all sides to narrate their stories 
and experiences in the presence of the society, and in their own local language, Kinyarwanda. 
This should not be underestimated since it was vital for healing, more specifically the 
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acknowledgement that others suffered,
972
 and for the revelation of the corpses of those killed to 
offer them a decent burial by their families.
973
 
b) Factual and Forensic Truth 
The recognizable legal and scientific notion of bringing to light factual evidence, or obtaining 
accurate information through reliable, impartial and objective procedures featured prominently in 
the ICTR findings and judgments, more so than in the other concurrently running courts. The 
Tribunal’s record is impressive when it comes to establishing factual truth because its findings 
were based on factual and objective information, or evidence collected and received by the 
Tribunal.
974
 In pursuing this factual truth, the Tribunal had to bring together evidence from 
Rwanda, especially through its prosecution office in Kigali.  Therefore, truth as a factual aspect 
with objective information cannot be totally divorced from contributing to reconciliation, which 
is a noteworthy role. The long and detailed judgments of the Tribunal are highly regarded in 
terms of finding facts about the genocide and these facts are no longer widely disputed. 
 
Whereas the detailed judgments of the ICTR reveal the comprehensive truth about the facts 
regarding the genocide, the slow pace of trials undermines reconciliation within the society. The 
fact that guilt has not been individualised to any significant degree is questionable in the affected 
community. While some justice is better than no justice at all, one wonders whether incomplete 
justice could heal or reconcile. It is open to discussion that in some cases, the Tribunal laid a 
foundation for reconciliation through revealing large scale facts about the genocide.
975
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In fact the ICTR has been much more constructive than the local mechanisms in establishing 
forensic truth that is necessary for clarifying the past and healing individuals.
976
 This is because 
the international Tribunal has the capacity of obtaining accurate information through its impartial 
and objective procedures. Therefore, although truth does not necessarily lead to healing, it is 
often a first step towards reconciling the damaged relations. 
 
Concerning trials by the national courts, the pursuit for truth should be viewed as a contribution 
to a much longer-term goal of reconciliation. Its purpose lies in attempting to uncover the past 
for accountability purposes and retribution. By exposing the negative side of the past, those 
responsible for violations of human rights are held responsible for their actions in order to 
combat the culture of impunity and establish deterrence.
977
 Ordinary court trials helped in the 
reconciliation process, especially when the courts held itinerant hearings in Rwandan 
communities, where the crimes were committed, thereby revealing and obtaining important facts 
about the genocide. Such itinerant courts were temporarily designated to try genocide cases, and 
they periodically conducted hearings in areas outside the seat of the courts, and were presided 
over by judges of the ordinary courts. This was done with a view to enhance access to justice and 
to afford hearings to persons held on criminal charges in remote places. 
 
The essence of the aforementioned discussion is that criminal trials provide an official truth that 
facilitates reconciliation by, inter alia, combating denial and documenting the core facts around 
which a broad consensus can be built.
978
 Ultimately, this provides a clear picture of facts which 
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are widely not disputed as regards what happened, to whom, where, when and how, and who was 
involved in the conflict.
979
    
 
Though truth finding was perceived differently in the available mechanisms, the various kinds of 
truth obtained aimed at addressing the past violations in order to ensure restoration of human 
dignity.
980
 Therefore, the relationship between truth and reconciliation is important because truth 
contributes significantly to the process of reconciliation through clarification of what happened 
and prosecution of past human rights abuses.
981
 Trials conducted by international or national 
courts establish an indisputable, historical record of events, with legally binding consequences.
982
 
The explanation for this is that trials contribute to reconciliation by documenting the truth, even 
if incomplete at times.
 
The documentary material, transcripts of the hearings, videos and 
individual statements are all part of the invaluable record and archives which need to be availed 
to the public for education and future generations.
983
  
 
III. Interim Conclusion 
The above discussion looked specifically at the extent to which the ICTR, national courts and 
Gacaca trials have aided reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda.  While one of the 
goals of the trials, in addition to justice and deterrence, is to contribute to reconciliation, there 
has always been a controversy in respect of how the trials might facilitate this complex 
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process.
984
  Obviously, since no justice mechanism is perfect, criminal trials cannot do 
everything in regard to retribution and restoration because there are several limitations, which 
call for a more creative and multi-dimensional approach to transitional justice.
985
 A two-track 
model is recommendable where truth commissions and penal prosecutions may be used in 
parallel as complementary tools to deal with past human rights violations.
986
 
 
Therefore, this research does not allow the conclusion that criminal trials can never facilitate 
reconciliation,
987
 because any decent trial, even if retributive, has aspects of reconciliation. 
Instead, what it suggests is that retributive justice should not solely be relied upon to bring 
reconciliation. In order to deal comprehensively with a legacy of grave crimes, it is necessary to 
look beyond criminal justice in order to consider the concept of restorative justice, too.
 988
 
Ultimately, a coordinated relationship between the various established measures forms an 
important basis for reconciliation. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS  
 
Following the extensive study in each chapter, the following general conclusions were derived 
from the study. 
 
A. General Conclusions 
Chapter One highlighted that the administration of justice in post-genocide Rwanda was 
implemented by different entities; the ICTR, national courts and the Gacaca courts. As a result, 
there have been overlaps in some areas and friction due to the differences in procedural and 
substantive matters among the courts. For example, perpetrators who committed the same crime 
of genocide have been subjected to different procedures and laws, depending on which court 
tried them.  
 
The author argues that relying on different justice approaches entailed the risk of treating equal 
situations unequally. This becomes particularly obvious when looking at the unbalanced 
sentencing practices under the different approaches. Besides, in the context of a state undergoing 
transition and reform after conflict, the disparity in judicial standards, procedures and sanctions 
within the international Tribunal and domestic courts can compromise various international and 
domestic principles. The challenge for these courts was the need to maximize their legitimacy, 
efficiency and effectiveness while balancing the tension between the moral demands of justice 
and the political requirements of reconciliation. 
 
Chapter Two has shown that although distinctions between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups 
existed throughout history, the dividing line between the two groups was not as rigid as 
commonly stressed. In Rwandese tradition, the criterion of defining Hutu or Tutsi was not based 
on ethnic reference, but on a socio-economic status that favoured the political promotion of the 
Tutsi or demotion of the Hutu, depending on one’s fortune at a given moment. The process of 
ethnicisation was institutionalised by the Belgian colonisers who had replaced the Germans and 
they relied on the Tutsi monarchy to administer their colony. Such reliance exacerbated divisions 
and tensions based on ‘a superior ethnicity’ belief which did not even disappear after Rwanda’s 
independence in 1962. 
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However, more destructive divisions had been reinforced in the 1934 census, when the Belgian 
colonialists required the ethnic identity of every citizen to be stated on state-issued identity cards. 
This latter measure tragically facilitated, some sixty years later, the identification of Tutsis by 
Hutu génocidaires during the 1994 genocide, especially at roadblocks, for it had become hard to 
differentiate Tutsis from Hutus since both groups spoke the same language, and shared many 
cultural traditions. Therefore these identity cards were instrumental in identifying who had a 
right to life in the 1994 genocide and who did not. Nevertheless, the culture of impunity that had 
existed in Rwanda was much more instrumental in facilitating the genocide. 
 
Chapter Three, shows that at the international level, the establishment of the ICTR was a 
milestone under international law for dealing with core crimes of genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. The ICTR has also provided an indisputable recognition of the 
Rwandan genocide and recognized that Tutsi were an ethnic group falling under the protected 
groups of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Yet, perhaps even more significantly, by virtue of its 
very existence, the Tribunal shows that there is no safe haven for those who commit serious 
crimes like genocide, even at the highest level. This is necessary for deterrence and ending 
impunity because perpetrators of heinous crimes which end up not being punished tend to 
encourage continued violations of human rights. 
 
The jurisprudence of the ICTR is another point in its favour, because it has greatly contributed to 
the development of international criminal law in various areas like observance of fair trial rights 
and due process requirements than national courts. In its judgments, the Tribunal established 
considerable facts regarding the genocide, thus creating a significant historical record. Various 
lessons can therefore be derived from the convictions and acquittals made by the Tribunal in 
establishing criminal accountability.  
 
However, the location of the ICTR has been a hindrance for the Rwandan population to follow 
the proceedings physically. On the other hand this distance from Rwanda helped to foster 
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impartiality of the Tribunal and independence from influence of the government. Also, with an 
annual budget of around $270 million USD, the ICTR, has to date handed down judgments to 
only seventy-five individuals in eighteen years after its establishment yet the domestic courts, 
have tried more than 15,000 suspects in the same period as the Tribunal using $17 million USD, 
and more than 1.9 million trials have been accomplished by Gacaca in ten years with a total cost 
of $52 million USD. This divergence shows that classical justice is slow and limited capacity 
wise. 
 
Consequently, the Tribunal has faced criticism and complaints from Rwanda for the huge budget 
in relation to Rwandan mechanisms while various genocide suspects, whether officially indicted 
by the ICTR or not, are able to live freely in many countries. Certainly, it is not possible for the 
ICTR to bring to trial all genocide suspects, but the most the Tribunal could do was to try only 
high level perpetrators just like other international mechanisms. The Tribunal’s legacy should 
therefore be evaluated not in terms of ‘numbers tried’ but in terms of the ‘important lessons’ 
from the trials. Actually, the ICTR trials have provided the most comprehensive account of the 
machinery of genocide and shed light on the anatomy of the crime. Moreover, the ICTR is 
credited for having been able to try most of the master-minders of the genocide that had fled 
Rwanda. 
 
Chapter Four has shown that national court prosecutions are necessary for societies that have 
suffered mass atrocities. This is because such conventional courts are located at the scene of the 
crime and easy to manage. This chaptert illustrated various advantages of upholding international 
criminal law at the domestic level and argues that it is the straightforward way to combat 
impunity and deterrence for the society, while at the same time complying with the state duty to 
prosecute. 
 
Nonetheless, the chapter has identified the most common obstacles that hindered the effective 
trial of suspects in Rwandan domestic law, such as, adherence to minimum procedural 
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safeguards, limited resources, few qualified judges and the huge number of suspects. Domestic 
courts in post-conflict situations may be unable to guarantee fair and equal treatment to accused 
persons and to manage the high volume of cases. In fact, after the 1994 genocide, the ordinary 
courts of Rwanda had little capacity to try the 120,000 suspects in prisons at that time due to the 
collapsed judiciary and destroyed infrastructure.
989
 Even though the Rwandan government tried 
to reconstruct the judiciary, only 6,000 suspects were prosecuted between 1996 and 2001. The 
process was very slow and violations of basic fair trial rights and other human rights standards 
were frequently reported, particularly the absence of lawyers for indigent defendants and the 
extremely overcrowded prisons. The Rwandan judicial system suffered from a serious shortage 
of resources, and the reality was that post-conflict justice needed to be reconstructed in order to 
deal with the situation in a fair and effective manner. 
  
A fair and effective judiciary would therefore necessitate various essential conditions such as 
appropriate domestic legislation with well-drafted statutes of criminal law and procedure, 
qualified judges, prosecutors, defenders, and investigators, adequate infrastructure, such as 
investigative offices, courtroom facilities, record-keeping facilities, detention facilities, and most 
importantly, a culture of respect for the fairness and impartiality of the process. All of this was 
not possible for the ordinary courts in the aftermath of the genocide.  
 
 As a consequence of the ineffectiveness of the Rwandan judiciary, the government of Rwanda 
had to suggest other mechanisms, such as Gacaca to help reduce or remove the obstacles. With 
this traditional model, only high profile category one suspects remained to be prosecuted by the 
ordinary criminal courts, while the rest of the backlog was to be tried by the community in 
Gacaca. Thus a shared caseload was a reduced caseload for the national courts in Rwanda. 
 
Chapter Five looked at how the current government in Rwanda chose to implement its own 
solution of semi-restorative Gacaca courts after many years of slow formal justice by the national 
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courts. The study also showed the importance of creating courts with a closer contact to the 
community. The lesson is that when a court is close to the affected community with less 
retributive elements, it has the potential to contribute significantly to reconciliation of former 
conflicting groups. Thus, the chapter views Gacaca’s potential to reconcile a community with its 
past, in addition to facilitating justice through punishment. 
 
In order to promote justice and reconciliation, Gacaca faced the challenge of having too many 
goals such as, restoring relations, deterring atrocities, reducing overcrowded prisons, revealing 
the truth and providing speedy justice to both victims and perpetrators. Nevertheless, Gacaca has 
delivered fast justice in a way that no formal mechanism would have been capable of doing by 
trying 1,958,634 cases in ten years.   
 
However, it must not be ignored that by having speedy trials, the Gacaca process violated a 
number of key fair trial principles, such as the right to legal representation recognised by various 
national and international instruments. Also, the courts were plagued by corruption of the 
inyangamugayo judges, as well as partiality concerns. The likelihood of biased judgments from 
the legally untrained judges that moderated the process was another shortcoming of the system. 
More so, the courts were criticised for not protecting witnesses and for victors’ justice. Victors’ 
justice was manifested by the fact that Gacaca only dealt with genocide crimes committed by 
Hutu perpetrators, leaving aside the war crimes that were committed by RPA Tutsi soldiers in the 
sole competence of military courts. 
 
Ultimately, the winding up of the Gacaca judicial system left many challenges, especially the 
compensation of victims and several other unresolved problems. Although the remaining 
genocide case files were transferred to ordinary courts, it should be acknowledged that Gacaca 
still left many other issues unresolved, which is a challenge that needs to be addressed. A 
residual mechanism to settle legal issues and other disputes left by Gacaca after its closure would 
 
 
 
 
209 
 
be commendable. Such a legal mechanism would deal with certain errors that might have been 
committed or decide on situations where there is evidence that there was a miscarriage of justice. 
Chapter Six examined the concurrent relationship between the international and national criminal 
jurisdictions in Rwanda. While the ICTR had primacy of jurisdiction, it did not have exclusive 
jurisdiction over genocide suspects.
 
This inevitably meant that the bulky number of suspects 
would be prosecuted by domestic justice mechanisms, hence providing alternate courts to fight 
against serious criminality. 
 
Although justice has been sought through a plurality of mechanisms, the study has identified a 
number of weaknesses in as far as the prosecution of the crime is concerned, such as the 
differential treatment of the accused, the violation of fair trial rights, the lack of cooperation and 
incoherent relationship between the courts.
990
 Actually, the Rwandan example showed that while 
national and international courts had much in common in terms of their overall objectives, 
conflict arose at particular times. This is because the courts existed concurrently and 
incoherently, with many disparities in treatment of suspects. Yet from a human rights 
perspective, jurisdictional relationships between domestic and international courts must not 
function as principles that conflict with each other or compromise the equality of the accused 
persons appearing before the different courts. 
 
As a solution, the study suggests a comprehensive legal framework as the starting point towards 
a harmonised and coordinated relationship. Though the ICTR is closing down soon,  its existence 
provides lessons that interactions between international and national courts in post-conflict 
societies should have well established legislation so that parallel jurisdiction does not lead to 
competing claims, but mutual partnership in the repression and prevention of serious crimes. 
This thesis asserts that even though having appropriate legislation may not be the only solution 
for justice and reconciliation in a post conflict society, however, when applied with other efforts, 
it can be transformative.  
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B. Overall Concluding Remarks and Optimal Approach 
In light of the findings reached above, the aforegoing study submits that although justice has 
been sought through a plurality of mechanisms, the disparity between judicial standards, 
procedures and sanctions within the international Tribunal and domestic courts can be socially 
divisive and detrimental to the national reconciliation process.
991
 When it comes to penalties and 
due process rights in this system of concurrent jurisdiction, there is greater protection of high 
category defendants tried by the ICTR than in national prosecutions.
992 
These controversies 
between international, national and Gacaca mechanisms have greatly undermined the principle of 
fair trial and equal treatment of the accused which is the cornerstone of criminal law.
993
 
 
The ICTR and national courts need to be examined against the backdrop of criminal law since 
they are purely retributive in nature.
994
 However, this was not necessarily the case with Gacaca 
courts which had a dual nature of retribution and restoration.
995
  It was practically not easy for 
the semi-restorative courts to balance retribution and reconciliation goals while complying with 
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the international fair trial standards.
996
 Nevertheless, as put by Bornkamm, the fact that 
customary traditional institutions mete out certain formalities does not necessarily render their 
decisions unfair.
997
 Therefore, although Gacaca courts shared competence with ordinary courts in 
trying genocide defendants, it is not necessarily evident that their trials be regarded entirely as a 
form of retributive criminal justice, since there were semi-restorative in nature.
998
 
 
In spite of the differences and inequalities resulting from the use of three accountability 
mechanisms under study, recourse to a single mechanism would still not have been the 
appropriate model to the post-genocide situation because of various reasons; a) the ICTR alone 
would not have been able to try all the genocide perpetrators given its slow speed;
999
 b) It was 
also uncertain that regular trials could be completed faster in a domestic system while 
guaranteeing all the fair trial rights of the accused;
1000
 and c) Gacaca courts would have not been 
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able to deal with the complex genocide matters of high level perpetrators single-handedly, 
mainly due to the lack of legal training.
1001
  
Hence, one can assert that the specific focus on the complementary sample approach in solving 
Rwandan conflicts was the realistic way for Rwanda to establish reconciliation, accountability, 
and justice through the combined efforts of the ICTR, national courts and Gacaca processes.
1002
 
However, their respective usefulness would have increased if they had a well-organised and 
coordinated relationship.
1003
  
 
In such a situation, the availability of a number of courts would assist in preventing violators of 
the 1948 Genocide Convention from escaping criminal liability, thus minimizing jurisdictional 
weaknesses. Therefore, based on the positive trends and transformations of parallel trials over 
Rwandan genocide suspects, a multifaceted approach is suggested for post-conflict societies with 
large scale perpetrators and broken relationships so as to foster accountability at the international 
level, and enhance reconciliation through local mechanisms.
1004
 In particular, such an approach 
can surely be recommended in the great lakes region of Africa that has been plagued by wars 
characterised by gross violations of human rights on the basis of ethnicity, nationality, racial or 
religious grounds.  
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In regard to the optimal relationship between the various courts, international tribunals need to 
complement rather than to supersede the jurisdiction conferred on national courts.
1005
 This 
possibly explains why the complementarity principle of the International Criminal Court may be 
the recommended remedy where there is a prevalence of national courts other than the absolute 
primacy of the international court, which should intervene only in exceptional circumstances.
1006
 
Therefore, the basic operating presumption should be that the local domestic courts will have 
primary jurisdiction to prosecute a crime, where however, a given state is unwilling or unable to 
conduct a free and fair trial, alternate mechanisms of justice at the international level would need 
to be considered.  
 
This research argues that when domestic mechanisms that are specifically established to deal 
with the post-conflict crimes are properly implemented, they might then offer a powerful new 
mechanism for the enforcement of international criminal law while at the same time contributing 
to reconciliation of the affected population. Therefore in establishing the accountability of low 
level offenders who are usually the majority, priority should be accorded to alternatives which 
put restorative justice at the center of the whole process, such as Gacaca, while the high profile 
offenders should be subjected to purely retributive courts and international tribunals which fully 
observe fair trial rights. 
 
Admittedly, this limited research cannot provide a full analysis of the relevant international and 
national law issues and may thus leave some questions unanswered. The author therefore calls 
upon future researchers to direct their research efforts with the aim of filling the gaps which this 
work did not cover.  
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